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Abstract
This dissertation is an analysis of "discovery" in judicial
decision-making. I discuss four types of "discovery": (1)
legal justification as "discovery", (2) insights as
"discovery", (3) general problem-solving strategies as
"discovery", and (4) "discovery" as a method of expression
and persuasion.
Chapter One reviews the conventional jurisprudential
literature on "discovery". It begins with the American
legal realists' explanation of "hunching" in judicial
decision-making and then traces how "discovery" and
justification have come to be considered distinct
processes. The realists' and legal positivists'
conflicting opinions concerning the nature of "discovery"
are presented and I conclude that the only way to settle
the conflict is to study "discovery" in detail.
Chapter Two begins with a critical evaluation of the
analogy between science and law that Neil MacCormick draws
between scientific testing and legal justification. The
chapter ends by identifying elements in legal justification
that play a role in discovery. In particular, the legal
syllogism and the reguirements of coherence and consistency
play roles in the process of discovery in judicial
decision-making.
In an effort to examine "discovery" in more detail than
that found in conventional jurisprudence literature,
Chapter Three introduces the work of Bernard Lonergan on
insight in other fields. I present his approach to
studying human knowing and his account of insight in
theoretical and practical problem-solving.
Then, in Chapters Four and Five, I use Lonergan's method
and his analysis of insight to study "discovery" in
theoretical and practical problem-solving in judicial
decision-making. I conclude that not only does insight
play a key role in interpreting situations and discovering
solutions to legal problems, but insight plays a crucial
role in testing interpretations and evaluating courses of
action.
Chapter Six is a portrait of two general forms of
"discovery" in judicial decision-making. I use Garret
Barden's work to present the application of posited law and
the process of reaching equitable judgments as specialized
methods of "discovery" in decision-making.
Chapter Seven is an analysis of "discovery" in the form of
a method of expression and a technique of persuasion in
Madame Justice Bertha Wilson's opinion in R v Moraentaler.
Finally, I suggest that "discovery" plays a far greater
role in judicial decision-making than is currently
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Preface
This dissertation is an inquiry into what is often called
"discovery" in judicial decision-making. Many legal
theorists may consider this topic to be relatively
unimportant compared to the process of legal justification.
The author of a recent PhD dissertation (soon to be
published) captures this point of view when he states that
"Justification dominates (is at the centre of) the
structure of judicial activity in the application of law."1
Some modern legal theorists go even further and claim that
"discovery" cannot, and should not, be studied by legal
theorists.
Questions about "discovery" in judicial decision-making
have been obscured and suppressed in a number of ways. In
an effort to reconcile a debate between legal formalists
and American Legal Realists concerning the nature of legal
reasoning, modern legal theorists have drawn a clear
separation between the processes of discovery and
justification and have characterized "discovery" as an
essentially arbitrary, irrational, and unconscious
activity. By contrast, they portray justification as a
rational and logical process. The exercise of drawing
analogies between science and law in terms of testing and
justification has also helped bolster the significance of
justification relative to discovery in the legal context.
1 J. Bengoetxea, Edinburgh Univeristy PhD thesis, 1989,
29.
Further, accepting the process of justification as the
solution to the key political concern of many legal
theorists - how to constrain judicial decision-making in a
liberal democracy - has directed the attention of theorists
toward examining justification rather than "discovery".
Finally, questions about "discovery" have been suppressed
inasmuch as the methods of persuasion used by judges have
not been examined in terms of how judges lead and guide
their audience to discoveries.
However, in my opinion, "discovery" in legal decision¬
making is worthy of investigation. The legal decision¬
making process is an interesting topic in its own right.
There is also the possibility that the specific questions
and answers of judges that precede the public exposition or
justification of a decision play a more significant role in
legal decisions than is currently acknowledged by legal
theorists. And perhaps, as the legal realists argue,
understanding the decision-making process will help judges
reach wise decisions and lead to more open and candid legal
reports. But these issues cannot be addressed unless
"discovery" in legal decision-making is examined and
understood.
Hence this thesis is an effort to analyse the nature of
"discovery" in judicial decision-making. I begin by
reviewing the few places in the conventional jurisprudence
literature where "discovery" is discussed. Then I turn to
the work of scholars in other fields, especially that of
Bernard Lonergan, in order to understand the nature
"discovery" in more detail-
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Chapter One
The Problematic Nature of Discovery and Justification in
Legal Theory
1. Introduction
Modern legal theorists distinguish between two quite
separate processes in the judicial decision process - the
process of discovering or reaching decisions and the
process of justifying them. They portray the process of
discovery as essentially irrational and arbitrary. In
contrast, the process of justification is presented as
rational and logical. The aim of this chapter is to trace
how discovery and justification have come to be considered
as separate processes. I also raise questions about
whether the clear distinction between discovery and
justification can be maintained and whether the process of
discovery is irrational ana arbitrary. I conclude the
chapter by suggesting that these questions can be answered
by investigating the nature of discovery and testing in
decision-making.
2. The American Legal Realists
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(1) The Response to Formalism
Among legal theorists, the legal realists came the closest
to identifying the process of discovery in the judging
process when they wrote about "puzzling" and "brooding"
which led to "hunches" or "intuitions". Their use of
judges' reports about how they reached their decisions can
be considered an attempt to create an approach to studying
mental activities involved in decision-making. The
American Legal Realists, especially Jerome Frank and John
Dewey, stated that activities such as puzzling and brooding
preceded the hunches and intuitions which led to judgments
that were subsequently presented in the appropriate form as
ratiocinations to or justifications of the decision.
Moreover, the realists also raised many other interesting
questions about other elements in the judging process such
as the influence of a judge's personality, bias, prejudice,
and logic in decision-making.
The work of the realists can be understood as a critique of
legal formalism where this is taken to imply that judges
use deductive techniques to decide cases, that judges'
legal opinions are accurate descriptions of how judges
reach decisions, and that legal certainty and
predictability are ideals that ^judges should strive to
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reach. Consequently, many legal theorists have understood
the work of Frank and Dewey as a response to legal
formalism and have stressed the role of the legal realists
in this debate.
Legal realists such as Holmes, Llewellyn, Frank, and Dewey
criticized the decisions of judges who were committed to a
deductive or quasi-deductive method of deciding cases. In
their opinion, to decide cases logically would be
equivalent to mechanical decision-making and would lead to
undesirable results. Frank wrote that
...law is dealt with [by the formalists] as if it were
settled once and for all; its rules are supposed to
operate impartially, inflexibly: justice must be
uniform and unswerving. In other words, the stress is
on generalizations, not on concrete happenings; on
averages, not on details. Little allowance can be
made for justice in the particular case: thus the law
is written and thus it must be applied. Novelty and
creativeness must not be permitted. Adaptation of the
rules to peculiar individual circumstances is frowned
upon. Discretion in the judge must be avoided for
fear that it would lead to dangerous arbitrariness.
Individualization of controversies, response to the
unique human facts of the particular case, would make
4
the law uncertain, unpredictable.1
In Dewey's opinion, the belief that "ready-made antecedent
universal principles"2 are a key part of reasoning is the
chief obstacle to the type of thinking required for
intelligent social reforms and social advance by using law.
Realists also rejected the claim that formalism was a
correct description of legal decision-making. Many legal
realists criticized theorists who described the judging
process as deductive or quasi-deductive. Such formal
descriptions3 of legal reasoning were thought not only to
misrepresent the judging process and promote the illusion
and myth of legal certainty, but also to mask judges'
biases and prejudices that can affect their work. Holmes,
for example, describes the major factors in the judging
process which are not examined by legal formalists and
asserts that the logical form has had a limited function in
decision-making. For Holmes,
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind. (London: Stevens
& Sons, 1949), 118-119.
2 J. Dewey, "Logical Method and Law", 10 The Cornell Law
Quarterly, 27.
These descriptions were formal in the sense of (1)
passing tests of validity and (2) having a universal
form.
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prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men,
have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which law shall be governed.4
Holmes also sums up the legal realists' criticisms of the
use of the logical form to present legal decisions insofar
as the logical form masks other elements in the decision¬
making process. In his opinion,
The fallacy of the logical form... flatters that
longing for certainty and repose which is in every
human mind. But certainty generally is an illusion
and repose not the destiny of man. Behind the logical
form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and
importance of competing legislative grounds, often an
inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and
the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You
can give any conclusion a logical form.5
The point is that different logical justifications could be
used to justify conflicting outcomes. Hence the
indeterminacy of formal decision-making leaves open the
question of substantive elements being the real
determinants of the decision.
According to Frank, how a judge reaches a decision was
O.W. Holmes, The Common Law. (Boston: 1881), 1.
O.W. Holmes, "The Path of Law", (1987) 10 Harvard Law
Review. 466.
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described by the formalists as "the judge begins with some
rule or principle of law as his premise, applies this
premise to the facts, and thus arrives at his decision."6
For Frank, this description was "a dogma based on
inadequate observation" and was closely tied to illusions
and myths such as legal certainty, predictability, and the
claim that law is completely settled. He also thought the
formalists ignored the critical role of the judge or jury
as a fact-finder and that a multitude of elusive factors
are involved in fact-finding which gave the judge or jury
a creative role and made it hard to predict what a judge or
jury will decide.
Frank believed that the dogma or illusion of predictability
and legal certainty can lead to numerous harmful
consequences such as disrespect for law, a wasteful
technique of circumlocution that turns "lawyers into a
profession of rationalizers who appear to laymen like a
guild of professional hypocrites".7 In addition, such
beliefs result in concealing rather than disclosing what
the law is and attempting to mechanize law and "reduce it
to formulae in which human beings are treated like
identical mathematical entities".8 The clear thinking of
judges is hampered because they are compelled to "shove




their thoughts into traditional forms, thus impeding
spontaneity and the quick running of ideas, tempting lazy
judges to avoid creative thinking and, instead, to find
"platitudes that will serve in the place of robust
cerebration.1,9
Dewey claimed that mechanical logic and abstract forms in
written legal decisions are used to assume that a decision
is impersonal, objective, and rational, and give an
illusion of certitude which masks the vital process of
reaching a decision. He also thinks that the desire for
maximum possible stability and regularity of expectation in
legal decisions conflicts with practical realities and
results in increased practical uncertainty and social
instability. In addition, understanding and portraying
rules as immutable, antecedent, and necessary sanctifies
old rules and decisions, widens the gap between social
conditions and the principles used by the court, breeds
irritation and disrespect for law, and contributes to
alliances between the judiciary and entrenched interests.
Both Frank and Dewey agree that judgments are neither
dictated by legal rules and principles nor reached
according to syllogistic reasoning. In Frank's opinion,
rules and principles "...do not and cannot completely
control his mental operations and it is therefore
ibid., 130.
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unfortunate that either the judge or the lawyers interested




(2) The Judging Process
The legal realists, especially Frank and Dewey, not only
criticized the formalists' decisions, descriptions of
judging, and their ideals; they also developed a
constructive programme. They believed that, by
understanding the judging process, the multiplicity of
factors that affect decision-making could be identified and
that undesirable elements such as bias and prejudice could
be controlled. The results of this part of their project
were obtained by examining what they considered the "actual
judging process" in law and in this work they were aided by
studies about the judging process completed by
psychologists.
The person who wrote most comprehensively about the judging
process was Jerome Frank. His goals were to reform some
trial methods that in his opinion were "hopelessly
antiquated"11 and to "inject more reason and more justice
into its daily workings" by examining the "non-rational"
and "non-idealistic" elements in court-house government.
He wanted judges to recognize and to acknowledge the
necessary existence of human and personal elements12 in
themselves in order to address the possible effects of




believed that wise decisions would be achieved through
self-knowledge. According to Frank, a judge, like
everyone, will have habits and pre-judgments since
"interests, points of view, and preferences are the essence
of living."13 In addition, a judge will have acquired
social value judgments and many unavoidable idiosyncratic
"leanings of the mind", uniquely personal prejudices which
may be unconscious and may interfere with a judge's
fairness at a trial. Frank believes that "to recognize the
existence of such prejudices is the part of wisdom"14 and
that "The concealment of the human element in the judicial
process allows that element to operate in an exaggerated
manner..."15 For Frank, "...the judge, through self-
scrutiny, can and should prevent the operation of this
class of biases."16 This type of self-knowledge is
especially important and needed in a judge, according to
Frank, because a judge is peculiarly exposed to emotional
influences in a court room.
Frank is also convinced that judges can perform their job
of balancing conflicting human interests and determining






favour in order to promote social well-being17 if they have
accurate knowledge of the methods they employ to reach
decisions. He asserts that, to do their job well, judges
need as clear a consciousness of their purpose as possible
and that "the pretence, self-delusion that when they are
creating they are borrowing,1,18 or merely applying the
commands given by an external authority cannot but diminish
their efficiency. Moreover, they must learn the virtue,
the power and practical worth of self-authority and not
rely on a non-existent guide.19 To reach this end he wants
to disclose, not conceal, the process of exercising
discretion, applying abstract rules in cases, and making
law. Moreover, Frank claims that "If every judicial
opinion contained a clear exposition of all the actual
grounds of the decision, the tyrants, the bigots, the
dishonest men on the bench would lose their disguises and
become known for what they are"20 since "The honest, well-
trained judge with the completest possible knowledge of the
character of his powers and of his own prejudices and
weaknesses is the best guaranty of justice."21










alternative to the formalists' methods of decision-making
and understanding of the judging process. The foundation
of his position is his method of studying the judging
process. His approach was to ask judges how they reached
their decisions. Evidence for his results were the self-
reports of judges such as Judge Hutcheson, who describe how
they reach their decisions. His method was neither
grounded on assumptions about the role of logic nor guided
by values such as legal certainty or predictability.
Dewey, like Frank, claims he studies how people think,
rather than simply considering "the relations of consistent
implication which subsist between the propositions in which
his finally approved conclusions are set forth..."22
The legal realists also used the results of psychologists
who studied decision-making in other fields to guide and to
support their own analyses of the judging process in law.
For example, Llewellyn wrote that psychologists say that a
person reaches a decision either by
...sudden intuition - a leap to some result that eased
the tension; or else it was one of successive mental
experiments as imagination developed and passed in
review various possibilities until one or more turned
up which had appeal. In any ordinary case a reasoned
justification for the result represented a subsequent
job, testing the decision against experience and
ibid., 18.
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against acceptability, buttressing it and making it
persuasive to self and others.23
Frank believed that the process of judging was the same for
lawyers, judges, and "people of ordinary affairs". He says
that according to psychologists the process of judging
...seldom begins with a premise from which a
conclusion is subsequently worked out. Judging begins
rather the other way around with a conclusion more or
less vaguely formed; a man ordinarily starts with
such a conclusion and afterwards tries to find
premises which will substantiate it. If he cannot, to
his satisfaction, find proper arguments to link up his
conclusion with premises which he finds acceptable, he
will, unless he is arbitrary or mad, reject the
conclusion and seek another.24
Frank calls this method of reasoning backward reasoning.
According to Frank, judges also arrive at their judgments
in this way. In marked contrast to formalists'
descriptions of deductive legal reasoning, Frank's position
is that judgments "in most cases are worked out backward
from conclusions tentatively formulated."25
Dewey claims that, although mathematicians, farmers,
K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1961), 11.
Law and The Modern Mind. 100.
ibid., 101.
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lawyers, and merchants deal with different subjects and
materials, the course of the operation and the form of the
procedure to investigate, accept, reject, and justify their
conclusions are similar. Dewey's description of thinking
resembles Frank's analysis of the judging process in that
the starting points of the judging process are guestions
about particular concrete cases. Dewey writes that
"...thinking actually sets out from a more or less confused
situation, which is vague and ambiguous with respect to the
conclusion it indicates, and that the formation of both
major premise and minor proceed tentatively and
correlatively in the course of analysis of this situation
and of prior rules."26
(a) Hunches and Intuitions
For Frank, the most significant element in the judging
process is the hunch or intuition of the judge. Frank
guotes from Judge Hutcheson's self-analysis of the role
hunches play in reaching a decision to a court case. Judge
Hutcheson says he puzzles over all the available material
and broods over the issue and waits for the feeling or
hunch which is "that intuitive flash of understanding that
makes the jump-spark connection between guestion and
decision."27 For Hutcheson, the hunch depends on intuition
26 "Logical Method and Law", 23.
27 Law and The Modern Mind. 103.
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because he thinks that "The vital motivating impulse for
the decision is an intuitive sense of what is right or
wrong in the particular case..."28 In Frank's opinion,
examining the process of hunching in reaching decisions is
important to understanding the legal process because "If
the law consists of decisions of the judges and if those
decisions are based on the judge's hunches, then the way in
which the judge gets his hunches is the key to the judicial
process. Whatever produces the hunches makes the law."29
Frank identifies the hunch producers as the rules and
principles of law, political, economic, and moral
prejudices of the judge, and the judge's personality and
entire life-history which reflect his temperament,
education, environment, and personal traits.
Frank and Dewey examined hunches in relation to other
elements which constitute the judging process. A hunch is
an answer to the question "What is the just solution to
this particular case?" In the context of distinguishing
between the activity of reaching a decision or making a
judgment, its written presentation, and its justification,
Frank quotes Hutcheson to illustrate and affirm the
distinction between the activity of hunching and the
written presentation of a decision. Hutcheson separated




and also distinguished between the judgment itself and its
exposition - the apologia or ratiocination for that
judgment in which the judge explains and encases the
judgment. Judge Hutcheson states that once he has reached
a judgment, he
...enlists his every faculty and belabors his laggard
mind, not only to justify that intuition to himself,
but to make it pass muster with his critics.
Accordingly, he passes in review all of the rules,
principles, legal categories, and concepts which he
may find useful, directly or by analogy, so as to
select from them those which in his opinion will
justify his desired result.30
Like Frank, Dewey distinguishes between reaching a decision
or solution and the presentation of the decision, but uses
the term "search and discovery" when he describes the
process of reaching a decision. Dewey contrasts "search
and discovery" with exposition. He calls arriving at a
conclusion "search and discovery" since "the situation as
it exists is more or less doubtful, indeterminate, and
problematic with respect to what it signifies."31 Search
and discovery "unfolds itself gradually and is susceptible





"Logical Method and Law", 24.
ibid., 24.
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discovery", exposition, for Dewey, implies a definitive
solution has been reached.
In these accounts, the justification of decisions seems to
be related to the judging process and to the written
presentation but the precise role and status of
justification in the judging process is unclear. For
example, Frank writes that one of the chief uses of rules
and principles is to enable judges to give formal
justifications-rationalizations of the conclusions at which
they otherwise arrive.33 His statement implies that formal
justifications occur in oral or written presentations, but
there is no indication that the primary function of oral or
written decisions is justification or that justification is
the most significant feature of legal reasoning.
Hutcheson's self-report suggests he justifies his decision
to himself and then writes it down. In Dewey's opinion,
the purpose of the exposition "is to set forth grounds for
the decision reached so that it will not appear as an
arbitrary dictum, and so that it will indicate a rule for
dealing with similar cases in the future."34
Although both Frank and Dewey distinguish between the
elements involved in the process of reaching a decision and
the presentation of the decision, nothing in their work
Law and The Modern Mind. 130.
"Logical Method and Law", 24.
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indicates that the elements of legal reasoning can be
studied in isolation from each other in terms of their
psychological, discursive, justificatory, or ethical
status. For Frank and Dewey the elements of the judging
process, which include both the method of reaching and
presenting a decision, are closely linked in that the
judging process consists of the operation of the following
five elements: (1) brooding and puzzling, (2) achieving a
hunch or intuition, (3) checking or testing the hunch or
intuition, (4) reaching a judgment, decision or solution,
and (5) presenting or expounding the judgment in the time-
honoured fashion. Hence, the exposition of a decision,
which includes arguments concerning why the decision is
justified, is but one aspect of a decision, not the major
constituent or the primary function of the judging process.
They only mention briefly that the presentation or
exposition sets forth the grounds of the apologia,
ratiocination, or justification. They ascribe a limited
function to justification to the extent that justification
is only one of a number of aspects of decision-making and
as such is a distinct issue from the actual judgment and
the written presentation of that judgment.
(b) The Judging Process and Logic
Frank's and Dewey's study of logic can be understood as an
attempt to understand the relation between non-logical and
19
logical forms and activities in the judging process in
order to determine the proper role of logic in decision¬
making. Their distinction between the judgment as a non-
logical activity and the written presentation of the
judgment helps explain why decisions can be presented in a
logical form. Although Frank asserts that the judging
process is not deductive he thinks that legal opinions
...are written in conformity with the time-honored
theory. They picture the judge applying rules and
principles to the facts, that is, taking some rule or
principle (usually derived from opinions in earlier
cases) as his major premise, employing the facts of
the case as the minor premise, and then coming to his
judgment by processes of pure reasoning.35
Frank's explanation is that the written decision does not
describe how the judging process actually works. Dewey
also distinguishes between thinking and the syllogism. In
his words, "...while the syllogism sets forth the results
of thinking, it has nothing to do with the operation of
thinking."36 Thus, for Dewey, syllogisms can play a role
in presenting decisions.
In Frank's opinion, the proper logical use of rules and
principles is to check tentative conclusions. The judge
tries to link by formal logic his own tentative conclusion
Law and The Modern Mind. 103.
"Logical Method and Law", 22.
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with the acceptable and more general point of view of the
rule or principle. If he does not discover any link he is
forced to re-consider "whether his tentative conclusion is
wise both with respect to the present case and with respect
to possible implications for future cases."37 Dewey's
opinion is almost identical. For Dewey, legal rules and
principles "are working hypotheses needing to be tested by
the way they work out in application to concrete
situations. .. "3S
Dewey, like Frank, denigrates the role of logic in legal
decision-making, but Dewey's explanation of the nature of
thinking and logic is more precise than Frank's rejection
of the logical form as the method of thinking used by judge
to decide cases. Dewey believes that syllogisms can play
a limited role in justifying legal decisions insofar as
they present the results of thinking and are the means by
which judges account to others for their conclusions.
However, for Dewey, understanding the decision process in
terms of logic misrepresents how decisions are actually
reached. He thinks that "logical justification implies the
prior and given existence of particulars and universals"39
and that such a view implies that for every possible case,
there is a fixed antecedent rule already at hand; that the
Law and The Modern Mind. 131.






case in question is either simple or unambiguous, or is
resolvable by direct inspection into a collection of simple
and indisputable facts.
The exposition of realism presented here does not include
the argument that different logical justifications could be
made to support either side of a case. The implication is
that the indeterminacy of formal decision-making leaves
open the question about whether substantive elements are
the actual determinants in a decision.
22
(3) Conclusion
The legal realists raised interesting questions about the
nature of decision-making and how to study it. One
contribution was their approach to studying the judging
process as it "actually occurs in judges". Although Frank
and others did not explain or evaluate their methodology,
their use of self-reports about how judges reach decisions
was a novel way to study the mental activities of judges.
Their method of studying the judging process provided an
approach to identifying and accounting for the multitude of
factors that influence legal decisions.
Their method of studying the decision process was an
approach in which the mind of the judge was the centre of
the analysis, not unsubstantiated assumptions or formal
classifications. Their data was the judge's mind. Their
method was to understand decision-making by analysing how
it concretely occurred. They understood decision-making as
a dynamic process that included various activities, not as
a static and completed end-product such as the formalists'
perspective suggested.
The realists' explanation of the judging process can be
understood within different contexts. Not only was their
explanation of the judging process the basis of their
criticisms of mechanical decision-making and the portrayal
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of legal reasoning as deductive or quasi-deductive, but
they identified the significant elements that constitute
the judging process. They named activities such as
puzzling, hunching, intuiting, checking and testing the
solution, judging or deciding, and presenting the judgment
as playing a role in the judging process. Despite the fact
that some of these activities are little more than names,
the realists created the basis for further investigations
into the nature of these activities and the relations among
them.
One of their most important results was the identification
of the judicial hunch or intuition. Frank identified the
hunch with the discovery or invention of solutions to legal
problems. The hunch was the key element in the realists'
explanation of the functions of, and relationships among,
the other constituents of the judging process which include
puzzling, testing, deciding and expressing the decision.
Although the realists did not explain hunches in detail,
the acknowledgment of hunching and intuitions provided the
realists with an alternative to the primacy ascribed by
jurists to deductive methods of decision-making and
descriptions of decision-making that were deductive.
Although the realists' method of investigation did not
amount to much more than the assertion that they were
studying how judges actually think by examining self-
reports and asserting that hunches were the creative
24
elements in the decision process and claiming that the
decision process involved a non-logical process, they
nevertheless initiated an important line of research into
the role of non-logical and logical process in law in that
hunches occur in response to brooding and puzzling.
The realists' results also raise guestions about the
relationship between how legal decisions are reached and
how they are presented, including both how hunches are
presented in a decision and whether hunching and intuitions
play any role in the presentation of decisions.
Unfortunately the term "hunch" seems to suggest that the
process of hunching is mysterious and cannot be analysed.
Neither the legal realists' method of studying decision¬
making nor their results have been used or developed by
modern jurists. Hunches and intuitions have not been
studied in contemporary analyses of legal reasoning.
Indeed, I shall argue, the nature of the judging process
itself has been distorted and ignored by subsequent jurists
and that the relationship between the judging process and
formal logic remains problematic. This state of affairs
may exist because the realists themselves used their
awareness of the importance of the judging process in a
negative way to undermine the claims of their formalist
opponents. But, there are other explanations. Although
the realists distinguish between puzzling, hunching and
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testing hunches in the decision process, their innovations
have been responded to in the form of a debate about the
process of discovery and the process of justification which
obscures many of the realists' arguments, novel
contributions, and even their overall project to understand
and to promote wise decision-making and candid legal
reporting.
It is necessary to examine these later developments - in
the form of contributions by Wasserstrom, Bankowski, and
MacCormick - as they define the current context in which
questions about "hunches" and "discovery" are posed.
Wasserstrom reformulates the legal realists' description of
formalism by retreating from the claim that logic or
deduction describes the actual way judges reach decisions.
In so doing, he creates a clear distinction between the
process of reaching a legal decision and the process of
justifying it. MacCormick supports the clear distinction
between discovery and justification. His work represents
a modified formalism that recognizes that substantive
elements play a role in the process of justifying legal
decisions. Bankowski clarifies what is meant by
"discovery" by redefining it as including both the
procedures used to reach and to test legal decisions.
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3. Searching For The Clear Distinction Between Discovery
and Justification
(1) Richard Wasserstrom
Wasserstrom's search for a clear distinction between the
process of discovery and the process of justification can
be understood as a response to the legal realists'
criticisms of legal formalists who described or proposed an
essentially deductive or logical decision-making procedure.
Wasserstrom calls such a view the deductive theory. His
account of the deductive theory, in fact, represents an
important modification or qualification of the formalism,
attacked by realists, that claimed the judging process is
logical and that written decisions accurately describe how
a decision is reached. The distinction between discovery
and justification, in Wasserstrom's opinion, helps explain
the disagreements between jurists who emphasize deduction
in judicial decisions and jurists, like Frank, who
criticized their theories for being inaccurate and for
impeding clear and consistent thinking about the judicial
process. Wasserstrom says that the critics of the
deductive theory say that "the deductive theory is an
inadequate, quite inaccurate account of the way in which
courts really have decided cases."40 However, in his
R. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision. (London:
Oxford University Press, 1961), 16.
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opinion,, neither the characteristics of the deductive
procedure nor the reasons for its rejection have been
clarified in respect to the use of logic in the decision
process.41 He admits that "alternative expositions [of the
decision process] have been hinted at"42, but thinks that
they have not been developed.
Wasserstrom considers the work of Hutcheson and Frank as
two undeveloped alternatives to the deductive theory.
According to Wasserstrom, Frank's position is that a hunch
or intuition of what is the just solution in a case is not
the determinative factor by which a judge decides a case.
Instead, he argues, Frank believes that it is a judge's
personality which is the key to understanding the way in
which cases are decided. The decision process employed in
a case can be explained only by referring to the individual
traits of the judge.43 Hunches, then, depend on the
judge's personality. Wasserstrom argues it is wrong to
base a criticism of the deductive theory on the idea that
the key aspects of the decision process are "feeling,







Wasserstrom's account of Frank's position amounts to an
over-simplification of Frank's point of view in that
Wasserstrom states that personality traits stimulate
hunches and are the sole elements that influence the
decision that is made. By contrast, Frank's opinion is
that legal rules and principles also influence the
emergence of hunches. Indeed, Frank's point is that, if
judges could identify or account for their personality
traits, legal decisions would be wiser and more candid.
Hunching is only one of the five elements (which include
checking and testing hunches) involved in the decision¬
making process. Hunching is therefore not the only element
in the decision-making process.
Wasserstrom also singles out Holmes' statement (quoted on
pages four and five) that a judgment regarding the relative
worth and importance of competing legislative grounds lies
behind the logical exposition of a judgment as an example
of the perspective which portrays legal decisions as
determined by judges' personalities. Wasserstrom
criticizes this point of view by contrasting it with the
notion that good or persuasive reasons are the best that
can be required to support propositions. He argues that
many philosophers, including the realists, confuse the
question of whether an argument is formally valid with the
question of whether there can be good reasons or persuasive
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reasons for believing a proposition to be true or false.15
Wasserstrom wants to explicitly distinguish between the
process of selecting and evaluating the contents of the
propositions, which involves presenting persuasive reasons
that support propositions, and the use of formal logic to
test the relations between premises that have been
selected. Hence he thinks that statements such as Holmes'
above and Frank's criticisms of the deductive theory are
mistaken if they infer the inherent arbitrariness of the
judicial decision process from the limited utility of
formal, deductive logic.46
Although Wasserstrom states that it makes little sense to
describe the judicial decision process as completely
deductive and that a judge's opinion is not an accurate
report of the decision process, he claims that it makes
even less sense to insist "that for this reason courts
could not (and should not) employ a procedure or set of
procedures that permits of some kind of reasoned
justification for the judicial decisions reached by those
courts."47 He proposes that deduction can be used to test
the validity of legal arguments.








simplification. The realists did, in fact, advocate the
use of logic to check the relation between legal rules or
principles and potential judgments. Hence both Wasserstrom
and Frank seem to identify the use of logic in testing
decisions. There is no evidence in Frank's writings that
justifying a decision does not require reasons to be given.
Wasserstrom solves the problem concerning the legal
realists' response to the formalists, as he understands it,
by concluding that the formalists and Frank are describing
two distinct processes or "procedures that must be followed
before a decision is made or accepted."48 The realists are
describing the process of discovery and the formalists are
describing the process of justification. The process of
discovery is concerned with "the manner or procedure in
which a decision or conclusion was reached"49 - the
factors that led to or suggested the decision such as
judicial hunches, emotions, and personality. On the other
hand, questions concerned with the process of justification
inquire about whether a given decision or conclusion is
justifiable or justified and "...the manner in which the
conclusion was to be justified."50 The process of
justification involves searching for and testing premises







explanation of the way in which a conclusion or decision
was reached is distinct from an account of the procedure a
judge employed in "testing" it and does not always "respond
to the question of whether the conclusion is in fact
justifiable."51 In other words, he rejects the
interpretation of formalism in which the syllogism
describes the actual process of decision-making. From
Wasserstrom's point of view, the realists were attacking
too crude a version of formalism. All that really matters,
to Wasserstrom, is how the decision is justified.
Wasserstrom insists that, before judges render a decision,
they must be able to justify it. Hunches and intuitions do
not count as justifications for a binding judicial
decision. They are aspects of the process of discovery.
Hence, the decision must be tested to determine if it is
justified. For Wasserstrom, there are two procedures that
might be followed before a decision is made or accepted.52
He leaves open the question regarding at what point one can
speak of a "decision", that is whether one speaks of a
decision only after a conclusion has been justified.
Wasserstrom understands the judicial opinion to be a report
of the justificatory procedure employed by a judge. He




upon rules of law and rules of logic and "the kind of
reasoning process that is evidenced by the usual judicial
opinion is more suggestive of a typical justificatory
procedure"53 than a discovery process. His evidence that
such a justificatory procedure exists is the assertion that
"some judges have thought they must be able to establish a
formally valid relationship between the decision and
certain more general premises, and to be able also to give
good reasons for the premises so selected."54
Wasserstrom states that his description of the process of
justification does not conflict with Frank's description of
how decisions are reached and that it corresponds, in fact,
to Frank's description of how a decision is checked.
According to Wasserstrom, the legal realists' arguments are
probably correct if the decision process is understood or
equated with the process of discovery which he describes as
a report of why or how a judge "hit upon" the decision.
Remembering that, according to Frank, judging of all kinds
begins
...with a conclusion more or less vaguely formed; a
man ordinarily starts with such a conclusion and
afterwards tries to find premises which will
substantiate it. If he cannot, to his satisfaction,




arbitrary or mad, reject the conclusion and seek
another.55
To help explain both the dichotomy between reaching a
conclusion by whatever means and the process of testing the
decision or conclusion, Wasserstrom presents several
examples. He illustrates and supports the distinction
between discovery and justification in law by introducing
a "scientist who has discovered a vaccine which purportedly
provides complete immunization against cancer..."56 This
scientist "... informs the scientific community that he hit
upon this particular chemical combination... by writing
down 1,000 possible chemical combinations on separate
pieces of paper, putting them all into a big hat, and
pulling out one of the pieces at random."57 This method of
finding the vaccine is the process of discovery the
scientist followed. But whether the vaccine works is not
known. It is a subsequent question whether the scientist's
claim is in fact justifiable. This vaccine must be
empirically tested to determine if it immunizes people
against cancer. "How the scientist happened to select the
formula is one question"58 and "Whether this formula is an
effective vaccine, whether the conclusion can be





empirically validated, is quite a different [question]."59
Moreover, it does not matter how the vaccine was discovered
or selected for testing. The relevant question is whether
the vaccine, in fact, works.
Although he seeks to establish a "rigid dichotomy" between
the factors that lead to the "discovery" of the conclusion
and the process by which it is justified, Wasserstrom
states that, in practice, discovery and justification may
be related in three ways: (1) "...there is nothing
immutable about any particular process of discovery or
justification."60 Various procedures of discovery and
justification are possible. The process of discovery and
the process of justification may be (a) ordered and formal
or (b) haphazard and unsystematic. Wasserstrom reserves
the terms "logic of discovery" and "logic of justification"
for those procedures of discovery or justification that
form a regular pattern and are systematically used in each
instance of discovery or justification. (2) The logic of
justification guides discovery and provides the criteria
for evaluating particular conclusions and the procedures of
discovery.61 (3) The two separate procedures - discovery
and justification - are usually performed by the same








should not put forward a conclusion or act upon a decision
until one has subjected it to, and substantiated it by,
one's logic of justification."" Wasserstrom uses the
term "decision" to refer to an outcome that has not been
tested and suggests that discovery and justification are
not independent processes insofar as justification guides
the process of discovery and tests the tentative conclusion
or decision.
Wasserstrom's method of analysis is different from the
legal realists' approach. It consists of attempting to
reconcile the debate between formalists and legal realists
by constructing two analytical categories - discovery and
justification - based on relegating the non-deductive
aspects of decision-making to a process of discovery. He
is not engaged in an empirical study of how a decision is
reached. His method is to identify the opposing positions
in a debate, to comment on them, and then to settle the
debate by creating two classifications or categories,
arguing that the debate has arisen, at least partly, from
realists mistaking formalist claims about the role of logic
in justification for claims that logic describes the whole
decision-making process. By using this technique he
explains and justifies his interest in justification and
portrays justification as the primary or more significant
process in the decision process.
ibid., 27.
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Wasserstrom concentrates on the critical project of the
legal realists and downplays their constructive aims and
results. Frank names five activities to be part of the
judging process, whereas Wasserstrom claims that only two
processes constitute the decision process. Frank's
analysis includes (1) puzzling (2) having a hunch (3)
checking and testing, (4) judging or reaching a decision or
solution, and (5) expounding the decision, but Wasserstrom
identifies only (1) the process of discovery and (2) the
process of justification. In his explanation of the
decision process, Wasserstrom relegates hunches to a minor
role relative to the process of justification. But,
according to Frank, hunches are the source of legal
decisions and play a vital role in the decision process.
For Frank, the justification of a decision is simply one
aspect, feature, role, or purpose of the written decision,
not the primary part of the decision process. The outcome
of Wasserstrom's analysis is to reduce the five elements of
the decision process named by the realists to two
categories and to make one category, justification, the key
element in legal reasoning.
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(2) Neil MacCormick
Neil MacCormick's explanation of the process of
justification can be understood as an affirmation and
development of Wasserstrom's response to the legal
realists7 methodology and results on behalf of an extended
formalist positivist perspective. It is an "extended"
perspective insofar as he recognises some of the
limitations of formalism as pointed out by realists, and
hence he accounts for the presence of substantive elements
in legal decision-making. His analysis is also shaped by
analogies he draws between testing in science and in law
and by his own legal-political theory.
MacCormick affirms Wasserstrom's distinction between
discovery and justification. He shares Wasserstrom's view
that justification has the more significant role in legal
reasoning relative to the process of discovery. MacCormick
writes that analysing justification in the legal context
will make it possible to determine whether discovery or
justification is the more dominant process and whether
justification guides discovery.63
A number of factors that support the distinction between
discovery and justification can be identified in
N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 16.
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MacCormick's work. His interpretation of legal realism is
one reason for his distinction between discovery and
justification. He writes that "what prompts a judge to
think of one side rather than the other as a winner is
quite a different matter from the question whether there
are on consideration good justifying reasons in favour of
that side rather than the other side."64 He identifies the
study of the process of discovery with the legal realists
who, in his opinion, have studied "what prompts judges to
think of one side as a winner..."65 and associates the
process of justification, in contrast, with the study of
"good justifying reasons" in favour of one side rather than
another. The separation of discovery and justification
answers the claim of the simplified version of legal
realism that justifying reasons are so vague and indecisive
that they are always compatible with a decision no matter
what it is. The line of solution to this problem taken by
MacCormick is to analyse the process of justification in
law in order to determine whether the process of
argumentation as a process of justification simply consists
of justifying reasons that do no more than cloak decisions
made on other grounds.66








namely (1) first-order justification and (2) second-order
justification. In first-order justification, decisions are
justified if they can be deduced from a major premise
formulating a valid rule of law and a minor premise
formulating the facts proven by the relevant legal
procedures and rules of evidence. Thus first order
justification could lead to the situation so often stressed
by realists that rival rulings in a case could both be
formally justified and as such be legally valid. To
address that situation MacCormick analyses second-order
justification. Second-order justification involves testing
rival universal rulings or norms in order to decide which
one to accept as legally valid. This topic will be
discussed in more detail in the following pages.
MacCormick's book, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory r is
important in that he openly acknowledges the political
aspects of his approach. (Such political concerns have, of
course, been at work from the outset in the debates between
formalism and realism but often they are left unstated.)
His theory can be understood as a way of coping with
challenges or problems posed by a liberal democracy
concerning the function and role of law, namely how to
limit judicial discretion and to maintain the separation of
powers between the legislature and the judiciary. Not only
are deduction and legal justification methods to constrain
judicial discretion, they are also methods to control the
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arbitrary and irrational factors that influence the
formulation of rulings. The realists7 talk of hunching
represents a threat to the rule of law model in that
hunches are seen as arbitrary, irrational, unpredictable,
subjective, and the root of unauthorized innovation.
Hence, MacCormick presents his account as a description and
a prescription concerning how arbitrary and irrational
factors in the discovery process are contained and should
be contained and how unsystematic and unauthorized judicial
decisions are constrained and should be constrained.
Because the problem is the arbitrary power of judges there
seems to be a fear of anything that looks arbitrary,
irrational, or uncontrollable.
To the extent that his theory responds to these challenges
or solves these problems, his account of legal
justification is not only presented as a description of
legal justification, but also as a prescription for a
"sound justification procedure".67 He "...argues for what
[he sees] as good procedures of decision-making and
justification."68 Indeed, his theory amounts to a defence
of current judicial practice which he apparently believes
lives up to the prescription.
N. MacCormick, "Universalization and Induction in
Law", Reason in Law; Proceedings of the Conference
Held in Bologna. 12-15 December 1984, Volume One, ed.
C. Faralli & E. Pattaro, Milan, 1987, 100.
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 77.
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Nevertheless, questions about the extent to which these
political concerns affect and distract from an uncommitted
and comprehensive investigation of legal decision-making
can be raised. In particular, one can ask about the extent
to which the clear distinction between discovery and
justification is a solution to problems about how to
constrain the discretion of judges and how to control the
arbitrary and irrational factors that may affect legal
decision-making rather than an investigation devoted solely
to understanding the nature of discovery and justification.
The process of discovery is portrayed as the psychological
part of decision-making that must be "constrained" or kept
under control by an independent process of justification.
MacCormick uses his understanding of discovery and
justification in science to illustrate and support the
distinction between the process of discovering legal
decisions and the process of justifying legal decisions.
Discovery and justification, he asserts, are separate
processes in science. "Insights" or sudden flashes of
illumination are part of the discovery process. The process
of discovery is exemplified by Archimedes' "blinding flash
of insight" which occurred when the water overflowed as he
got into the baths. In law, the various arguments
presented by lawyers to a judge are analogous to
scientists' "flashes of insight". Flashes of insight,
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however, must be justified.69 They could be true or false.
Deciding whether an insight is true or false involves
testing and proof which are part of the process of
justification. Similarly, a judge must test legal
arguments and rulings in order to decide whether or not
they are legally justified.
MacCormick draws an analogy between Popper's version of
"scientific justification" and "second-order legal
justification" in order to explain and support his analysis
of "testing" in second-order justification. MacCormick
explains the analogy between testing in science and second-
order justification in the following way. He argues that
"...just as scientific justification involves testing one
hypothesis against another and rejecting that which fails
relevant tests second-order justification in law involves
testing rival possible rulings against each other and
rejecting those which do not satisfy relevant tests..."70
The relevant tests are whether or not the
hypotheses/rulings (1) make sense in the world and (2) make
sense in the context of the system. Whether a scientific
hypothesis makes sense in the real world depends on whether
the experimental evidence supports it; by analogy, whether
a ruling makes sense in the world depends on whether an




Whether a scientific hypothesis makes sense in the system
depends on whether it is compatible with other relevant
theories; by analogy, whether a legal ruling makes sense
in the system depends on whether it is consistent and
coherent with the existing legal system.
I will examine MacCormick's analysis in greater detail in
the next chapter. I have chosen his position on the
distinction between discovery and justification because, of
modern legal theorists, his writings on the subject are the
most comprehensive and persuasive.
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(3) Zenon Bankowski
As part of an essay defending the use of the jury,
Bankowski analyses notions of truth and fact-gathering. He
challenges the position that there is a clear distinction
between discovery and justification. Two lines of argument
can be identified which support his claim. His first
argument is terminological. It is concerned with when
something can be properly called a discovery. Stated
simply, a discovery is something that has passed the
relevant tests. His second argument is concerned with the
relationship between discovery and justification. In his
view, discovery and justification are not independent
processes.
Bankowski's point about the use of the term "discovery" is
that something cannot be called a "discovery" until it has
been justified. Something counts as a "discovery" only if
it has passed the appropriate tests. Thus mistakes are not
discoveries. In other words, a discovery is a "justified
truth". It is wrong either to call a new drug that has not
yet been tested a "discovery" or to call the outcome of a
legal case that has not yet been justified a "discovery".
The new drug or the outcome of the case do not count as
discoveries unless they satisfy the relevant tests. For
Bankowski, just as part of the process of discovering a
cure for cancer is to show that the particular drug
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actually works, part of the process of a jury discovering
whether an accused person is guilty involves testing and
showing that the events form a coherent picture, ie.
showing that the events "fit together".
Bankowski directs his criticism of the use of the term
"discovery" at Wasserstrom who uses the term to cover only
those factors involved in reaching hypotheses or tentative
legal decisions. Thus, on Wasserstrom's view, discovery is
independent from the process of justifying scientific
hypotheses or legal decisions. Nonetheless, in
Wasserstrom's analysis, discovery and justification are
related insofar as the process of justification guides the
procedures and evaluates the conclusions of the discovery
process. By contrast, Bankowski argues that Wasserstrom's
version of discovery "...artificially curtails the notion
of discovery."71 Bankowski is emphatic that "...discovery
includes justificatory activity."72
Bankowski states that his version of what counts as a
discovery fits in more readily with our ordinary way of
speaking about scientific research than Wasserstrom's
explanation of discovery in science. According to
Bankowski, if a scientist presented a conclusion to the
71. Z. Bankowski, "The Jury and Reality", ed. M. Findlay
& P. Duff, The Jury Under Attack. (Edinburgh:
Butterworths, 1988), 13.
72. ibid. , 13 .
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world "...we assume that part of the process of discovery
is showing that it actually works..."73 "...and we would
assume that this was part of the process of discovery."74
Bankowski claims that "Wasserstrom is equating the stage of
the choice of hypothesis with the whole process of
scientific discovery."75 Hence "...it is straining
language to demarcate [the act of choosing an hypothesis]
as discovery and the rest as justification."76
Bankowski's point about when the term "discovery" should be
used is important in distinguishing simplified versions of
legal realism from the accounts of legal realism presented
in this chapter. The simplified versions claim that judges
decide cases the way they personally desire and then
rationalize their decisions or make up justifications to
support them. Such decisions, by implication, are merely
"discoveries" that are not necessarily related to legal
rules or principles and have not been subject to legally
authorized testing or justification. Indeed, the
justifications given are considered to be merely camouflage
for the "real" reasons for the decision. But this version
is not the position of Frank or Dewey who both claimed that











legal rules and principles in the judging process.
The terminological point is also important in requiring
linguistic precision. Unless one espouses a simplified
version of legal realism, one should not speak about
"discovery" as constituting the judging or decision-making
process unless one also includes testing. At the same
time, in the decision-making process, the activities of
puzzling and hunching which lead to tentative conclusions
should be distinguished from the activities involved in
testing the tentative conclusions, just as the realists
have argued.
Bankowski's second argument is that discovery and
justification are not two clearly distinct processes. In
Bankowski's words, "Discovery cannot be independent from
justification: one cannot separate the two. Discovery
includes justificatory activity."77 Discovery and
justification are inter-related in that what counts as a
discovery is partly determined by the procedures of
discovery which, in turn, depend on the procedures of
justification adopted in that particular situation.78 Like
Wasserstrom, Bankowski implies that justification or truth-
certifying procedures guide the process of searching for




He argues against a form of the correspondence theory of
truth whereby the "truth" or "facts of a matter" correspond
to some independent reality which is used to measure the
truth or falsity of a statement. The criterion of "truth"
is not whether particular facts or events correspond to
what "really happened". On the contrary, he argues that
knowledge of the "truth" or "facts of a matter" is
inexorably linked to the methods used to apprehend it.
Thus, the procedures of discovery and justification one
uses affect what one discovers.
The discovery of the "truth" or "facts of a matter" depends
on both the method of searching for what subseguently
counts as a discovery and by the criteria or tests used to
certify that a discovery has been made. For example,
scientific truth depends on the particular method used to
discover a hypothesis and satisfying the particular
criteria used to test it. Similarly, whether a jury finds
an accused person guilty depends on the trial process ana
the laws of evidence and procedures that are used to
construct and to test rival "coherent" stories about what
occurred. In Bankowski's own words, "The way we set about
finding the truth will also determine in part the truth we
get...1,79
The inexorable links between the procedures used to search
ibid., 21.
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for and to certify or justify a discovery, plus the links
between the truth-certifying procedures and what ultimately
counts as a discovery, lead Bankowski to the conclusion
that different methods of discovering the "truth" or "facts
of a matter" can exist that are not necessarily
incompatible. Particular procedures of discovery and
truth-certification are specific to different systems,
institutions, or modes of life. For example, the
conclusion of a police investigation that "X did it" is the
endpoint of a particular method of discovering what
happened. The verdict of a jury that "X is guilty" is the
endpoint of a different procedure for discovering what
happened. The two conclusions are the outcomes of
different methods of discovery.
However, they are not competing "truths" or rival
explanations of what "really happened". The particular
method of discovery adopted is influenced by a mixture of
political, moral, and pragmatic criteria.30 For example,
the discovery and truth-certifying procedures used by the
police are influenced by the desire to apprehend as many
law breakers as possible. In contrast, the discovery and
truth-certifying procedures adopted in the context of a





Two explanations of discovery and justification have been
presented in this chapter: (1) the legal realists' version
in which hunching and testing are part of the judging or
decision-making process and (2) the legal positivists'
analyses of the process of discovery and the process of
justification. In this section, I highlight the
differences in these two positions by summarizing how legal
theorists have answered two key guestions about discovery
and justification. The guestions are: (1) "What does the
process of discovery entail?" and (2) "What does the
process of justification entail?"
So, "What does the process of discovery entail?" Various
answers have been given to the question. Both the legal
realists and legal positivists identify a creative moment
or act, called a hunch or insight, as the key element in a
non-logical decision-making process. The realists define
a hunch as an intuition of what is just in a case. An
insight, the equivalent to a hunch, is the name positivists
give to the creative moment in the discovery process. Both
the legal realists and legal positivists claim that hunches
and insights are tentative and hence they must be tested or
justified before they are accepted.
Despite these similarities, legal realists and legal
51
positivists offer conflicting explanations of the nature of
the inquiry that leads to hunches and insights. The legal
realists' and legal positivists' characterizations of the
discovery process and the factors that influence the
emergence of hunches and insights cannot be reconciled with
each other. The legal realists treat the process of
discovering hunches as a deliberate problem-solving
activity. The judge puzzles and broods about a case in
order to discover a just solution to it. This search for
a solution and the hunch itself are not treated as if they
are essentially arbitrary or irrational activities.
Although a hunch may be influenced by factors such as a
judge's personality traits, the crucial factors that
stimulate hunches, according to legal realists, are legal
rules and principles and a judge's experience deciding
cases. These factors are not portrayed as arbitrary or
irrational influences.
By contrast, legal positivists stress that the emergence of
judicial insights depends primarily on '•subjective" factors
such as personalities and emotions which they consider to
be essentially arbitrary and irrational influences.
Moreover, they characterize the process of discovery that
leads to insights as an essentially arbitrary and
irrational process in the sense that it is a psychological
process that cannot be studied by using the rational and
logical methods used by legal positivists. While
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Wasserstrom recognises that the process of discovery can
form a regular pattern, and in that sense be "logical", he
categorizes the act of hunching as primarily irrational.
Legal positivists create confusion regarding what the
"process of discovery" entails when they identify the
process of discovery with only part of the legal realists'
explanation of the judging process. The legal realists do
not explicitly use the terms "discovery" or "process of
discovery" to describe the judging process. But legal
positivists define the "process of discovery" as the
subject-matter of the legal realists' studies, namely how
a judge reaches a decision. However, legal positivists
define the "process of discovery" in terms of only two
elements named by legal realists as part of the judging
process: (1) puzzling and brooding and (2) the hunch or
insight. Legal positivists ignore the other three elements
- (1) testing a hunch, (2) reaching a solution or decision
in a case, and (3) expounding the decision - that legal
realists present as part of the judging process.
Confusion about what the process of discovery entails is
also due to the different ways the term "discovery" is used
by legal theorists. "Discovery" is used by legal
positivists to denote a hunch or insight that is tentative
or untested, ie. not yet justified. By contrast,
"discovery" would be used by Bankowski to describe a hunch
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or insight that has satisfied relevant tests. For him,
something is properly called a "discovery" only if it has
passed tests. His argument is that the successful outcome
of an investigation, what is discovered, depends on both
the procedures followed to reach tentative conclusions and
the truth-certifying procedures that are used to test
whether or not to accept a conclusion. Thus, the process
of testing or justifying is part of the process of
discovery.
Unfortunately, the confusion about, and conflicts between,
the answers to the question "What does the process of
discovery entail?" cannot be addressed by simply comparing
and contrasting the differences among legal theorists and
then resolving them. In my opinion, the process of
discovery itself must be investigated in greater detail if
the nature of discovery in law is to be correctly
understood.
When answering the second question, "What does the process
of testing/justification entail?". legal realists and legal
positivists agree on a number of issues. They both claim
that both logical deduction and procedures which are not
strictly logical are used to test or justify tentative
conclusions. Legal realists claim that one method of
testing a hunch is by comparing it to legal rules and
principles to determine if the tentative solution can be
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deduced from the rule or principle plus the circumstances
of the case. Similarly, in first-order justification
logical deduction is used to justify outcomes in cases. If
the outcome can be deduced from a valid rule of law or
legal principle plus the requisite set of facts stated by
the rule or principle, then the outcome is said to be
legally justified.
Legal realists and legal positivists identify testing or
justifying procedures that involve evaluations that are not
strictly logical. Legal realists claim that what a judge
thinks to be just and wise in a particular case and in
similar future cases is a crucial factor in checking and
testing judicial hunches. Similarly, the non-logical
justification procedures identified by legal positivists
include an evaluation of whether the consequences of a
legal ruling make sense in the world in light of justice,
common sense, public benefit, and convenience.
Despite these similarities, legal realists and legal
positivists offer competing explanations of the
relationship between the process of discovery and the
process of justification. Legal realists present testing
as an element in the decision-making process or what would
be known by positivists as the process of discovery.
Realists treat checking and testing as an inherent part of
a decision-making or judging process that includes: (1)
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puzzling and brooding over the case, (2) having a hunch,
(3) checking and testing the hunch, (4) reaching a solution
or decision, and (5) expounding the decision. The process
of checking and testing hunches is not considered to be
independent or distinct from the decision-making process.
Bankowski offers an explanation of the relationship between
discovery and justification that corresponds to the legal
realists' position. Both the realists and Bankowski treat
the process that leads to tentative conclusions and the
method of testing them as part of a more comprehensive
problem-solving procedure. Like the legal realists,
Bankowski treats the method of discovering tentative
solutions and the procedures used to test them as part of
a discovery process. He argues that the conclusion of an
inquiry depends on both the procedures of discovery and the
truth-certifying procedures that are used by an
investigator. Bankowski's point is that discovery and
justification cannot be separated. The criteria of testing
the truth of a matter guides the process of searching for
the truth and the truth of a matter depends on the
discovery procedures. Discovery and justification are
related to the extent that a person takes into account the
testing criteria when devising a strategy to make a
discovery. Hence truth-certifying procedures are part of
the discovery process.
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In contrast to the legal realists and Bankowski, legal
positivists do not consider legal justification to be part
of the decision-making process. The legal positivists make
a clear distinction between the process of discovery
whereby a judge discovers a tentative legal ruling and the
process of justification whereby legal rulings and
decisions are legally justified. Indeed, discovery and
justification are distinct and independent processes that
must be studied by different methods. The process of
discovery is the proper subject-matter for psychologists
who employ specialized methodology to study it, whereas the
process of justification is the proper subject-matter of
legal theorists who use logical and rational methods of
investigation. They stress that the process of
justification is not part of the decision-making process in
the sense that justification is a process that is
independent from any mental elements that comprise the
decision-making process and is not necessarily related to
questions about what a judge thinks about when reaching a
decision.
Legal realists and legal positivists differ in their
assessments of the relative significance of discovery and
justification in the legal context. Realists do not treat
puzzling, brooding, and having hunches as less important or
more important than checking and testing tentative
solutions or presenting them in public. However, legal
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positivists claim that the process of justification is the
more crucial process compared to discovery. The effort to
find out how a judge reaches a decision is less important
than determining whether the decision, reached by whatever
means, is legally justified. Hence the legal positivists
study legal justification and ignore the process that leads
to insights. Moreover, they have not explicitly asked
questions about how a judge actually goes about testing
tentative rulings and decisions in the decision-making
process.
These rival explanations of the relation between discovery
and justification are related to a number of problems
concerning what decision-making entails. (1) The first
problem is terminological. The term "decision" is used in
various ways. (2) The second problem is that explanations
of the process of decision-making itself are problematic.
Different versions of "decision-making" offer conflicting
explanations of the relations between discovery and testing
in the decision process. (3) The third problem concerns
the relation between the process of decision-making and
legal justification. The relation between "testing" in
decision-making and legal justification has not been
investigated by legal theorists, yet various relations
between "testing" and legal justification are assumed. I
will identify each of these problems in turn.
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(1) The absence of deliberate efforts to define "decision"
leads to confusion and conflicts about the subject-matter
under investigation. "Decision" is used to denote a
possible or tentative outcome or conclusion that has not
been tested. "Decision" is also used to indicate an
outcome or conclusion that has successfully passed tests.
"Decision" is, additionally, the name given to an outcome
or conclusion reached on grounds that are different from
the reasons publicly given for the outcome. Here a
"decision" would be a rationalization of the "actual"
decision process. "Decision" is also used to refer to an
oral presentation or written text that communicates an
outcome. And "decision" is also used to indicate the
moment when a judge chooses a conclusion. It is difficult
to resolve debates about the relations between the nature
of decision-making and justification when theorists are
defining "decision" in so many different ways and are, in
effect, talking about different things.
(2) Legal theorists offer conflicting versions of the
decision-making process. The legal realists' and
Bankowski's versions of decision-making include both the
process of discovering tentative outcomes and the process
of checking and testing them. Both discovery and testing
are elements comprising the actual process whereby a judge
or an inquirer reaches a legal decision and subsequently
expounds it. By contrast, legal positivists define the
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process of decision-making solely in terms of the process
of discovering tentative outcomes such as insights and
possible legal rulings. In other words, "decision-making"
and the "process of discovery" are different names for the
same process. Unfortunately, they neither ask questions
about the nature of testing in the decision-making process
nor about the relation between testing in decision-making
and the process of legal justification. Their view is that
the process of legal justification begins where the process
of discovery or decision-making ends.
(3) Legal positivists argue that legal justification is
distinct and independent from the decision-making process.
Although they do not treat the process of justification as
part of the process whereby a judge reaches a decision,
they do not deny that there may be some overlap of testing
in the decision-making process and the public legal
justification of a decision. In their opinion, how a judge
actually tests and justifies a legal decision to oneself in
private is independent from the process of public legal
justification that ultimately determines which rival legal
ruling is accepted which, in turn, determines the outcome
of a case. Hence questions about the mental processes that
comprise the decision-making process such as how a judge
actually tests and justifies an outcome to oneself are
irrelevant to their project. Instead legal positivists
direct their efforts to understanding and explaining why
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and how a legal decision is legally justified irrespective
of what a judge actually thought about when testing it.
Perhaps one should simply accept Wasserstrom's conclusion
that discovery and justification are clearly distinct and
that the realists and legal positivists are talking about
different things. The realists are investigating the
process of discovery, (how a judge reaches a tentative
outcome), and the legal positivists are analysing legal
justification, (how a decision is publicly justified).
Even Bankowski's amendment that the process of discovery
includes truth-certifying procedures does not undermine
Wasserstrom's conclusion above. The legal positivists'
version of legal justification can still be regarded as
independent from the process used by a judge to privately
test and justify a decision to oneself.
The problem with accepting this conclusion is that
discovery and testing in the decision-making process have
not been studied by legal theorists. Thus one can neither
conclude that discovery or testing in legal decision-making
are independent from legal justification nor claim that any
similarities between testing and legal justification are
merely incidental. Before drawing such conclusions,
discovery and testing in the decision-making process must
be thoroughly investigated.
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In summary, the explanations of the nature of discovery and
justification discussed in this chapter are problematic in
two important ways: One, the realists7 version of
puzzling, brooding, and having hunches competes with the
legal positivists7 explanation of the emergence of insights
and tentative legal rulings as the correct explanation of
the process of discovery. The nature of discovery is
disputed. Legal realists treat puzzling and hunching as a
deliberate problem-solving activity, whereas legal
positivists portray the process of discovery as an
essentially arbitrary and irrational activity. Moreover,
the contents of the discovery process are not settled.
Discovery, for legal realists and Bankowski, would include
testing, but legal positivists define the process of
discovery in terms of puzzling and insights. The question
is whether the process of discovery includes untested or
tested hunches/insights. In my opinion, these issues can
only be resolved by examining the process of discovery in
detail.
Two, legal positivists draw a number of conclusions about
the relationship between discovery and justification that
compete with the methodology and findings of the legal
realists. Legal positivists assume that justification is
the crucial process compared to how a conclusion is reached
or is privately tested, whereas realists do not treat any
of the elements in the judging process as more important
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than another. Legal positivists define decision-making in
terms of discovering tentative conclusions. By contrast,
for the realists, not only is discovering hunches part of
decision-making, but testing is also a crucial part of
decision-making. Finally, although legal positivists study
justification, the nature of testing in decision-making and
the relations between testing and justification are not
known. Unfortunately, the nature of testing in the
decision-making process has not been studied by modern
legal theorists. In my opinion, these issues can only be
addressed by investigating "testing" in the decision-making
process.
The goal of this thesis, then, is to introduce an approach
to examining the nature of discovery and testing in legal
decision-making. Questions about the nature of discovery,
testing, and justification are answered by examining the
decision-making process in detail. How tentative outcomes
actually emerge and how they are actually tested will be
examined. The writings of two philosophers - Bernard
Lonergan and Garret Barden - on discovery and testing will
be used to help answer two questions: (1) "What does
discovery in legal decision-making entail?" and (2)"What
does testing in legal decision-making entail?"
Chapter Two
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The Analogy Between Science and Law
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I want to explore the analogy between
science and law referred to in Chapter One. A number of
modern legal theorists, including R. Wasserstrom and Z.
Bankowski, have drawn an analogy between science and law in
order to illustrate and support their arguments concerning
the relation between discovery and justification in law.
Yet, I would suggest, these discussions about the
relationship between discovery and justification in science
and law are more general and gestural than explanatory. By
contrast, Neil MacCormick offers what appears to be a more
sustained and explicit use of the science-law analogy in
his analysis of legal justification.
In particular, I will examine how the analogy between
science and law has been used (1) to understand how legal
justification is similar to testing in science and (2) to
understand the distinction between discovery and
justification. My focus is on how MacCormick invokes
Popper's explanation of scientific testing in Legal
Reasoning and Legal Theory.
Insofar as MacCormick's analysis of legal reasoning goes
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beyond a general and gestural invocation of science in law,
it presents an opportunity to investigate the processes
involved in legal decision-making that are understood and
explained by using this analogy. However, if the analogy
between science and law is taken seriously, it turns out
that the analogy is rather weak. Perhaps MacCormick did
not intend the analogy to be taken so seriously, but it is
disappointing to discover that the analogy offers a limited
perspective from which to study "discovery".
Although I do not want to reject the science-law analogy
entirely, this chapter raises doubts about the enterprise
of comparing science and law. Using the scientific analogy
as a means to study law, that is, studying law in terms of
science, may obscure processes that are particular to law.
In fact, even as an account of science, the Popperian model
of science used by MacCormick as the basis of his analogy
between science and law has been challenged by a number of
philosophers of science. Hence an important question
raised later in this chapter is, "To what extent do science
and law operate in analogous ways?"
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2. Legal Justification
As sketched out in the previous chapter, Legal Reasoning
and Legal Theory explores the potential and limitations of
formalism in the deductive application of rules.
MacCormick calls the process of legal justification, to the
extent that it is purely deductive and logical in
character, first-order justification. First-order
justification consists in testing whether the relationship
between a valid rule of law, legal facts, and a legal
decision is a valid deductive inference. A decision is
legally justified if it can be logically deduced from a
valid rule of law plus the existence of the relevant
operative facts which are stated in the rule of law.
Deductive justification, however, has a number of well-
known weaknesses. The same decision can be derived from
different rules of law and, on the other hand, opposite
decisions can also be obtained by deductive reasoning. As
the realists emphasised, the problem of formalism as a test
is that rival decisions can easily survive. Hence,
deductive subsumption in some cases, by itself, does not
seem to be a sufficient test of legal justification. It is
due to these weaknesses of first-order justification that,
while first-order justification is necessary, it is not
always sufficient on its own to justify a decision.
Due to these weaknesses, especially the possibility that
rival rulings or rival versions of a ruling may be
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applicable in a case, other factors including substantive
concerns are evaluated in order to determine which ruling
to apply. In MacCormick's opinion, the judges' evaluation
of such factors is not some whimsical irrational activity
that leads to arbitrary decisions, but rather the process
is controlled through various requirements or processes
known collectively as second-order legal justification.
Hence judicial decision-making is constrained by fulfilling
a set of general requirements or conditions. The
consequences of the legal rulings are evaluated in the
particular case and in other imagined cases in terms of
public good, justice, common sense and convenience. The
legal ruling must also be consistent with other valid and
binding rules of law and be coherent with the legal
principles in the legal system.
The comparison MacCormick makes between Popperian science
and law is concerned with two overarching analogies: (1)
testing in science as a model for legal justification and
(2) the clear distinction between discovery and
justification. In the following sections, I will examine
and evaluate these two analogies in more detail.
3. Popper's Model of Science
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Sir Karl Popper sharply distinguishes between discovery and
justification in the sense that "the process of conceiving
a new idea" is independent from "the methods and results of
examining it logically".1 This distinction is based on his
claim that different methods must be used to study how
hypotheses are reached or discovered and how hypotheses are
tested. How new ideas and scientific theories occur and
the reconstruction of the processes involved in the
stimulation and release of an inspiration are, in his
opinion, the concerns of empirical psychology, not his
discipline - the logic of knowledge. Questions about the
discovery of new ideas and inspirations cannot be answered
by logical analysis. Popper claims "There is no such thing
as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical
construction of this process"2 because "every discovery
contains an irrational element, or a creative intuition, in
Bergson's sense."3
Despite the title of his book, The Logic of Scientific
Discovery. Popper limits his study to the logic of
justification. His discipline - the logic of scientific
knowledge - is a quite different field of inquiry from
Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. (New




psychology. The logic of scientific knowledge is concerned
with answering questions about how new ideas and hypotheses
are tested and justified. It is concerned with the logical
examination of scientific statements that have been
formulated and presented for logical analysis and testing.
Some of the questions the logic of scientific knowledge
seeks to answer are "Can a statement be justified? And if
so, how? Is it testable? Is it logically dependent on
certain other statements? Or does it contradict them?"''
Testing begins only after tentative hypotheses have been
formulated and presented for testing. Popper describes his
account as the "deductive method of testing". His method
of logically analysing the procedure of testing in science
is based on his stated assumption that the logic of
knowledge "consists solely in investigating the methods
employed in those systematic tests to which every new idea
must be subjected if it is to be seriously entertained.1,5
His method is to rationally reconstruct, that is, to give
a logical skeleton of the procedure of testing.
Testing a theory or hypothesis is performed by deducing
predictions from the theory which will, in turn, be subject
to empirical tests. Two stages can be detected in Popper's
explanation of testing in science. The first stage of




predictions and comparing them to each other, (2)
determining whether or not the predictions can be
empirically tested, and (3) judging whether, if the theory
passes the reguisite tests, it would be a scientific
advance compared to a rival theory. These activities are
involved in determining whether the theory can be
empirically tested. In other words, the first stage of
Popper's account of scientific testing could be considered
a test of the empirical testability of the theory. If the
theory is not empirically testable it would be rejected.
The following paragraphs are a brief explanation of the
three activities involved in the first stage of testing.
(1) Predictions are deduced from a theory or hypothesis
which is given or assumed to be known and initial
conditions which are known or assumed to be true by
observation. These predictions are compared to each other
to determine whether the logical relations among
predictions are equivalent, derivable, and compatible with
each other and to determine whether the theory is
internally consistent.
(2) The theory or hypothesis is analyzed to determine if it
is empirically testable in the sense that the predictions
must be empirically falsifiable. It must be possible to
design an experiment to test whether or not the predictions
deduced from the theory conflict with experimental results.
In other words, it must be possible to refute the theory or
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hypothesis by observation. If contracdictory predictions
can be deduced from the same theory and no experiment can
be designed to show that, if the experimental results agree
with one prediction, they cannot agree with the other
prediction, then the theory is empirically untestable.
Some theories are more testable than others insofar as "the
testability of a theory grows with its degree of
universality since the number of predictions that can be
deduced and tested is proportional to the degree of
universality of the theory."6 The greater a theory's
degree of precision7, the greater its testability. A
precise statement can be more easily refuted than a vague
statement because specific predictions can be deduced from
it. Measurements and quantitative statements in testing
help increase the degree of empirical testability of
theories.
Popper envisages testing as a competition between rival
theories - the current or existing theory and the new
theory. One theory is accepted in preference to another if
it can stand up to more severe tests and if it is testable
in a more rigorous way.3 As between two competing
theories, predictions that are testable are further





selected according to two criteria: (a) the non-
derivability of the predictions from the current theory, in
contrast to the new theory and (b) the extent that the
predictions contradict the current theory.
(3) The theory is examined to judge if it would be a
scientific advance, assuming it survives testing, by
comparing it with other theories. Here, Popper envisages
competing theories being tested to determine which one is
better corroborated by experimental results, can predict
new phenomena that the rival theory cannot predict, and is
capable of explaining the success of the rival theory. The
concern is whether the theory or hypothesis makes sense in
the context of current scientific knowledge.
The second stage of scientific testing includes performing
experiments in order to compare the predictions to an
actual observable situation. One decides whether or not
the predictions agree with the experimental results and, in
turn, whether the theory is falsified or not. Thus, the
second stage of testing involves testing a theory or
hypothesis in order to find out how far the predictions
deduced from it stand up to experimentation and/or
practical technological applications.
Popper explicitly analyses the procedure of testing
predictions. Predictions are compared with the results of
experiments which represent an actual observable situation
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and practical applications in order to make a positive or
negative decision about whether the predictions occurred or
not. If a prediction does not agree with the observed
situation, then the hypothesis or theory is shown to be
false and is said to be falsified. Whether a prediction
turns out to be acceptable or not therefore depends on
whether the experimental results contradict the prediction
or not. If the prediction turns out to be acceptable or
corroborated, then the theory has passed the test. For the
time being there is no reason to discard the theory. There
is always the possibility of future negative experimental
results which could overthrow the current theory. As long
as a theory withstands testing and is not superseded by
another theory, Popper says it is corroborated or has
proved its mettle by past experience. But a theory is
falsified if the predictions derived from the theory are
contradicted by the experimental results.9 "If the
[predictions or] consequences do not agree with the actual
observable situation"10 the theory or hypothesis from which
they were logically deduced is false.
After this type of testing we still do not know whether the
theory is false or whether the initial conditions describe
a situation that does not correspond to the real situation
and hence are false. But we do know that if a prediction
is falsified that means that either the theory or the
9. ibid., 96.
10. Objective Knowledge. 353.
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initial conditions are false or that both the theory and
the initial conditions are false. However, if the
prediction is not falsified it does not mean that the
theory is verified because a prediction that corresponds to
observable events can be deduced from false premises.11 A
theory, then, is not and cannot be tested directly. Only
specific predictions are tested by experiments and
practical applications. The question of the falsifiability
of theories is reduced to the question of the
falsifiability of predictions.
Theories are also tested against their rivals. Competing
theories offer different predictions. If the predictions
deduced from the first theory agree with the experimental
results and the predictions deduced from the second theory
do not agree with the experimental results, the second
theory should be rejected and the first theory should be
accepted. The theory with the greater number of predictions
that agree with the experimental results should be accepted
as the better explanation and the other theory should be
rejected.
But decisions settle the fate of a theory. The result of
a test includes a decision about the point at which further
testing of the observable events is unnecessary and a
decision about which empirical results to accept or reject.
These decisions ultimately rest on agreement among
ibid., 353.
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investigators. But one general guideline is that a theory
is not rejected due to the immediate or automatic
acceptance or rejection of a single prediction.12
Although all statements about observations can be subject
to further testing, every test of a theory must stop at
some observable event that "we decide to accept."13
Scientists stop at the point they are satisfied with for
the time being. The stopping point is identified during
testing when investigators agree to accept or reject the
correspondence between predictions and observable events as
a sufficient criterion. Although Popper talks about
"observable events" as stopping points, in his opinion,
predictions are not justified by perceptual experiences.
Popper says that, from a logical point of view, the testing
of a theory depends upon accepting or rejecting predictions
as the result of a decision or agreements which "are
reached in accordance with a procedure governed by
rules."14 A theory is applied and if the observable events
are accepted by a free decision, then the theory is not
falsified.
The role of deduction is a crucial aspect of Popper's
analysis of testing in science. Deduction is used when a
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it empirically. During the first stage of testing, in
which predictions are deduced from a theory, deduction is
the method used to find the logical conseguences or
predictions from a theory and initial conditions. Here,
its role is to deduce predictions and as such is a method
of discovery. But deduction is also an important part of
testing whether the theory can be tested. If predictions
cannot be deduced, then the theory is not testable.
Deduction, then, is both a discovery technigue and a method
of testing. In the second stage of testing, each
prediction is tested by comparing it to an actual observed
situation. If the prediction does not agree with the
observed situation, either the universal theory or the
description of the initial conditions, or both the theory
and initial conditions are false. Here, deduction is used
to test a theory by double checking whether the observed
results of experimentation can be deduced from the theory
and the initial conditions.
4. The Analogy Between Science and Law
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(1) Scientific Testing/Legal Justification
MacCormick compares Popper's model of testing in science
with justification in law. In this section, I will
identify the main points of correspondence between
scientific testing and legal justification. I will examine
the analogies he draws between (a) scientific hypothesis
and legal rulings (which are general legal rules or norms),
(b) predictions deduced from scientific theories and
consequences derived from legal rulings, (c) the
requirement in science and law that hypotheses and rulings
must make sense in the system and (d) in the real world.
It is essential not to confuse Popper's first stage of
testing with first-order legal justification. One might
expect the law-science analogy to be between testing
predictions deduced from a theory and testing outcomes or
conclusions deduced from a rule of law. Hence the
plausibility of the analogy might seem to rest on
understanding the legal syllogism as the method of deriving
predictions, just as predictions in science are logically
deduced from theories and hypotheses. But this is not the
case. The difference is that, in science, empirically
testing the predictions will test the theory. By contrast,
in first-order justification the particular outcome or
conclusion in a case is not deduced in order to test a rule
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of law; the rule of law is taken to be legally valid
before the conclusion is deduced. There is no question at
all that one could end up concluding that a rule of law is
not valid. Rather, deduction is used to test whether the
particular outcome or conclusion in a case is legally
valid. The legal syllogism is used to determine whether a
particular outcome can be deduced from a single valid rule
of law plus the requisite factual situation stipulated by
the rule.
Further, in science, deduction is used to draw predictions
from rival theories in order to empirically test which of
the competing theories should be accepted, whereas in
first-order justification deduction is not used to settle
situations involving rival rulings, for each ruling has a
corresponding outcome that is part of a syllogistic
justification. That is why they are rivals. Hence the
analogy between science and law drawn by MacCormick is
between testing rival scientific hypotheses and justifying
rival rulings in second-order legal justification.
(a) Hypotheses/Rulings
MacCormick compares the legal problem of rival legal
rulings (i.e. "rival legal rules or rival general norms")
to the situation in science described by Popper of rival
scientific theories or hypotheses. A legal ruling is like
a hypothesis. Both rulings and hypotheses are universals
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that must be tested. Two legal rulings (two rules of law
or two versions of the same rule of law) seem to be rivals
in two ways: (1) competing for acceptance and also (2)
yielding opposed outcomes. In science, if the relevant
tests are satisfied, one is justified in accepting one
hypothesis rather than another and in law, if the
appropriate tests are passed, one is justified in claiming
that the ruling is legally justified and therefore it ought
to be given.
(b) Predictions/Consequences
Testing in science is treated as analogous to justification
in law in that rival hypotheses and rulings are tested to
determine which one to accept. For Popper, the key to
testing hypotheses is to deduce predictions from them and
then to test the predictions by comparing them to
experimental results. The analogue to predictions in law
is actually the consequences which are derived from legal
rulings and subseguently tested. For instance, it might be
that accepting a ruling that allowed recovery for pure
economic loss would lead to a huge increase in litigation.
This is a consequence to be "tested". It is in this
context that MacCormick applies Popper's hypothetical-
deductive model of testing to law.
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(c) Hypotheses/Rulings Must Make Sense in the System
MacCormick draws an analogy between the requirement that,
before a legal ruling is considered justified, it must make
sense in the legal system and the requirement found in
Popper's first stage of testing that a hypotheses must make
sense in the system or body of knowledge. A hypothesis
must be compatible with, or fit with, other theories and
hypotheses. The requirements of consistency and coherence
are the tests of whether a legal ruling "makes sense in the
legal system". Legal rulings must be "consistent with the
pre-established body of law in the strict sense of not
directly conflicting with any already authoritative and un-
distinguishable rule."15 A ruling also "has to fit with
the general principles of the system, whether principles
already formulated or newly developed on the basis of
analogical arguments."16
(d) Hypotheses/Rulings Must Make Sense in the World
MacCormick's claim that legal rulings must "make sense in
the world" is equivalent to Popper's second stage of
testing in which theories and hypotheses are empirically
tested. Presumably, evaluating the acceptability of the
N. MacCormick, "Universalization and Induction in Law",
Reason in Law: Proceedings of the Conference Held in
Bologna, 12-15 December 1984. Volume One, ed. C. Faralli
& E. Pattaro, Milan, 1987, 101.
ibid., 101.
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logical and probable consequences of legal rulings in light
of their justice, common sense, public benefit and
convenience is analogous to testing predictions by
performing experiments and comparing then to observable
experimental results.
Despite the plausibility and attractiveness of the
analogies between testing in science and legal
justification, there seems to be a floating quality to the
analogy. If the analogy with science is examined more
closely, we find that some aspects of testing in science
and legal justification are very different. Furthermore,
we find that some analogies between science and law have
not been developed and, hence, what at first glance seems
analogous is not. Although MacCormick's explanation of
legal justification has a persuasive appeal it does not, on
further examination, seem to be a rigorous analysis.
Indeed, it is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis.
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(2) The Clear Distinction between Discovery and
Justification
MacCormick transfers Popper's clear distinction between
discovery and justification in science to law.
MacCormick's explanation of the roles of discovery and
justification in law parallels Popper's account of
discovery and justification in science; in both fields the
process of discovery provides tentative formulations -
hypotheses and legal rulings - that must be subseguently
tested by an independent testing or justifying process.
The distinction between discovery and justification in
science rests on Popper's claim that independent methods
must be used to study each process. Similarly, the proper
discipline for examining the process of discovery in
science and law is psychology, whereas the process of
justification in science and law is studied from the point
of view of the logic of testing. A scientist and judge can
come up with their ideas by any means, but the crucial
issue is whether their ideas are justified. Hence studying
how legal rulings are discovered is not directly relevant
to investigating the process of legal justification.
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5. PT-ohl pthk with the Analogy Between Science and Law
In section four, I explained that the analogue to
scientific predictions was not the syllogistic deduction
involved in first-order justification, but instead was the
consequences derived from two rival legal rulings. As a
critical point, it is important to emphasize that this
comparison suggests a superficial plausibility to the
analogy between scientific testing and legal justification.
MacCormick did not intend the analogy to be taken seriously
on all points. Nonetheless, in this section, I want to
examine the differences between testing in science and
legal justification.
(a) Hypotheses/Rulings
Although MacCormick presents rival legal rulings and
competing scientific hypotheses as analogues in that they
both must be subject to a testing process before accepting
one rival and rejecting the other, legal rulings and
scientific hypotheses are different in an important way.
The nature of the rivalry between two scientific hypotheses
is different from the nature of the rivalry between two
legal rulings. Two scientific hypotheses are rivals in the
sense that a scientist must decide which hypothesis is
corroborated by the experimental results and which
hypothesis is not. Experimental results are used to settle
the rivalry insofar as they corroborate one hypothesis and
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not the other. Moreover, one common set of experimental
results is used to settle the rivalry between hypotheses.
Although two legal rulings are rivals in the sense that
they are alternatives that compete for acceptance by a
judge, there is a more significant type of rivalry that has
not been noticed. The conseguences of each ruling are also
rivals. The judge must decide which consequences are
preferred - those of ruling A or those of ruling B. To be
more specific, the evaluation of the pros and cons of the
consequences of ruling A competes with the evaluation of
the pros and cons of the consequences of ruling B. Hence
the significant rivalry in the legal context is between the
results of two separate test results - results of the test
of the consequences of ruling A and the results of the test
of the consequences of ruling B. This type of rivalry is
not found between scientific predictions deduced from
competing theories. The rivalry between predictions in
science is settled by one common set of test results,
whereas rival consequences in law that have been tested are
still rivals because the test results themselves compete.
For example, Ruling A may "test well" or "score high" on
public benefit, but Ruling B may "test well" on justice.
The judge must still choose which ruling to accept. In
this way, the test results themselves are rivals? public
benefit competes against justice. (This issue will be
addressed later in Chapter Six concerned with practical
reasoning.) The rivalry between rulings is not settled
84
until the judge judges that one set of tested consequences
is preferred to another set and chooses to accept the
ruling that has those particular tested consequences. In
short, the rivalry between scientific hypotheses is over
which hypothesis is better supported by what, in fact, are
the experimental results. But the rivalry between legal
rulings remains unresolved, even after testing, until a
choice is made between two sets of test results.
(b) Predictions/Consequences
Although MacCormick presumably equates predictions with
consequences in that both are derived from universal
statements, there are significant differences in the way
they are derived and tested. For Popper, predictions are
derived by deducing them from rival hypotheses.
Predictions amount to particular statements deduced from
universal hypotheses. The process of deduction moves from
a universal to particulars. Although MacCormick speaks of
the "logical ana probable" consequences of a legal ruling,
consequences are not derived from a legal ruling in the
same way as predictions are deduced from universal
hypotheses. Consequences are not derived through
syllogistic deduction. Consequences are derived through a
process of universalizing that involves considering the
effect of the ruling in similar cases. The judge
presumably wants to know the consequences that the legal
ruling logically implies and would probably bring about in
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hypothetical cases which might occur and would come under
the terms of the ruling.17 In other words, conseguences
are understood as the outcome of universalizing.
This explanation is guite different from Popper's
explanation of the deduction of predictions from hypotheses
in two ways. One, the process of deduction in science
moves from universal to particular, that is, from an
universal hypothesis to a particular prediction, whereas in
law the process moves from a particular to a universal,
that is, from identifying the particular consequence of a
legal ruling in the case at hand to universalizing or
generalizing the consequences in hypothetical situations.
Second, consequences are not particulars, whereas
predictions are particular. Consequences consist in a
universalized or generalized state of affairs, not in
particular concrete effects or results. Consequences
understood in terms of arguments about "floodgates" and the
"justice" of deciding similar cases in a specific way are
quite different from predictions such as "A load of 2
pounds will break the thread." Predictions, then, are
unlike consequences in that predictions are particular and
consequences are universal.
Although deducing predictions from theories and hypotheses
and then testing them is vital to Popper's explanation of
testing, no analogous process of deduction can be detected
ibid., 105.
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in MacCormick's account of legal justification. Despite
the fact that deduction is a crucial part of first-order
justification, first-order justification is not part of the
science-law analogy and deduction in first-order
justification has nothing to do with deriving predictions
or consequences. However, in second-order justification,
where predictions are presumably analogous to consequences,
it turns out (1) that predictions in science are particular
but consequences are universal and (2) that predictions are
deduced but consequences are universalized.
(c) Hypotheses/Rulings Must Make Sense in the System.
The first stage of testing that I identified in Popper's
account of scientific testing consists of a set of tests
that precede a second stage of empirical testing. I have
already considered and cast doubt on MacCormick's
construction of a legal equivalent to Popper's first stage
of testing when I contrasted predictions and consequences.
But MacCormick invokes other aspects of the first stage of
scientific testing, namely a determination of the logical
relations among predictions and other theories. The legal
analogues are the requirement of consistency and the
requirement of coherence. However, after analysing the
comparison, the analogy seems weak.
Popper writes about assessing the consistency among
predictions deduced from a theory or hypothesis. The aim
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is to determine if the predictions are logically
equivalent, derivable, and compatible with each other.
But, for MacCormick, the logical relations among
consequences (the analogues to predictions) are not tested
at all. Instead, the requirement of consistency is
concerned with testing whether a legal ruling is consistent
with other valid and binding rules of law, that is, it
makes sense in the system. Thus the science -law analogy
drawn by MacCormick is between predictions and legal
rulings, between particulars and universals, and not
between predictions and consequences as one might
anticipate.
MacCormick's explanation of the requirement of coherence,
according to which a legal ruling cannot conflict with
valid legal principles of the legal system, resembles
Popper's requirement in the first stage of testing that the
relation between a new theory or hypothesis and the
existing body of scientific knowledge must be examined.
For Popper, spelling out the relation between a new theory
or hypothesis and other scientific theories and hypotheses
is a vital part of the testing process. The requirement of
coherence, on the other hand, is not part of a procedure
for testing whether a legal ruling is testable. Instead,
the test of coherence is an important part of testing
whether to accept the ruling at all. Coherence is not a
test of the testability of a ruling.
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As part of the process of testing whether a new theory or
hypothesis is testable, a new theory or hypothesis must be
examined to assess whether it has any meaningful
implications for the body of scientific knowledge in the
sense of whether the theory or hypothesis would be an
advance in understanding if it is not falsified by
empirical testing. By contrast, questions about whether a
legal ruling would be some sort of "advance" in the legal
system are not raised by MacCormick. In fact, MacCormick
does not raise questions about testability in the legal
context. Apart from the requirement that legal rulings
must be universals, he does not discuss whether there are
any pre-requisites that must be satisfied before testing
the consequences of a legal ruling. In contrast, for
Popper, a theory or hypothesis is testable only if it has
some form that can be empirically tested. Some theories
such as Marxism, psychoanalysis, and astrology are so vague
that opposite predictions can be deduced from them. Such
theories are empirically untestable. If a theory or
hypothesis is to rank as science it is essential that only
one element in a set of opposites can be deduced from the
theory or hypothesis.
(d) Hypotheses/Rulings Must Make Sense in the World
Although both hypotheses and legal rulings, and hence
predictions and consequences, must be tested to determine
whether or not they make sense in the world, the method of
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testing is fundamentally different in science and law.
Predictions are tested by comparing them to actual
observable situations by experimentation. Deciding whether
to accept or reject a prediction depends on whether the
prediction corresponds to observed events. In contrast,
consequences are tested by examining how they are related
to values such as justice, common sense, public benefit,
and convenience. The findings of such an analysis are then
compared in order to decide which set of consequences is
more acceptable and, in turn, which ruling is preferred.
This type of testing amounts to a thought-experiment.
Testing involves thinking of a case, working out the
logical and probable consequences of that case and other
cases and testing the consequences by thinking about them.
Further, in science the decision whether or not to accept
a prediction depends on whether the prediction agrees with
the observed events, but in law the decision to accept a
consequence rests, not on observations, but on an
evaluation of the consequences. In science, testing
predictions can be summed up by the question, "Do these
predictions agree with the experimental results?" but in
law the question is "Do I prefer these imagined
consequences which "score high" on public benefit or those
imagined consequences that "score high" on justice.
In science, the decision to accept an hypothesis and the
evidence for it are open to inspection by others. The
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experiment can be repeated to check if the observed events
occur and the conclusion can be checked in light of the
observed events to determine if the observed events are
sufficient to support the conclusion. In science, the
decision to accept a hypothesis must be supported by
sufficient evidence. However, in law it is more difficult
for others to evaluate whether the decision to accept a
legal ruling is adequate. The specific "thought-
experiment" of a judge cannot be precisely replicated by
another person. The factors that one judge even thinks
about, the factors one judge considers pertinent, and the
factors that are considered sufficient for accepting a
ruling can vary from judge to judge. Hence, in order to
evaluate the decision to accept a legal ruling, another
person cannot re-do the original tests performed by the
first judge. Instead the second person must perform an
evaluation of the case for oneself, which will be
influenced by one's own knowledge and values. In short,
the decision whether or not to accept a legal ruling
depends more on the knowledge and values of an individual
judge than the decision to accept a hypothesis made by a
scientist.
MacCormick accepts Popper's account of falsifiability and
suggests that a theory or hypothesis that is not falsified
is similar to a ruling that has been accepted. In Popper's
model, despite the fact that a theory may be thought to be
a better explanation than a rival, it is not verified in
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the sense of being true. It has only been shown that, so
far, the theory is not false. In contrast, the legal
ruling which is chosen over a rival is the one that "ought
to be given" and the ruling which is considered to be
"just" and "right". From this perspective, the acceptance
of a legal ruling is more conclusive than the non-rejection
of a theory or hypothesis. One might even go so far as to
say that a legal ruling is a true statement of the law at
that particular time and in those circumstances. On the
other hand, the legal ruling could be considered as not yet
falsified in the sense that disadvantages of the ruling may
become evident in the future and the law may need to be
modified. But these issues are not raised by MacCormick.
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6. Re-considerina The Analogy Between Science and Law
I have indicated many points of asymmetry and lack of fit
between what initially was presented as a plausible analogy
between testing in science and legal justification. Some
differences between testing in science and testing in law
are fundamental while other differences are less
significant. However, collectively they cast doubt on the
appropriateness of the attempt to use testing in science as
a way of understanding and legitimating the process of
legal justification. The analogy drawn between science and
law cannot be defended by arguing that the analogy is only
meant gesturally for two reasons. One, by identifying law
with science, the prestige of science in the intellectual
community helps bolster and enhance the attractiveness of
MacCormick's account of legal justification. In this
sense, the analogy helps quell doubts about the absence of
limitations and constraints on judicial decision-making.
Decision-making is not out of control, but is
"scientifically managed". Second, the plausibility of the
analogy seems to depend on not taking the analogy
seriously. Although analogies are drawn between hypotheses
and rulings, between the derivation of predictions and
consequences, between the idea of empirically testing
predictions and consequences, and between the body of
scientific knowledge and the body of rules that constitute
a legal system, the analogy breaks down at almost every
point of comparison when subjected to a detailed analysis.
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Up to this point in the chapter, I have accepted the idea
that, in principle, an analogy can be drawn between testing
in science and legal justification. But this idea can be
questioned. Legal positivists draw an analogy between
science and law by claiming that discovery and
justification in science and in law are distinct and
independent processes. However, even in its own terms,
Popper's model indicates more connections between discovery
and justification than are currently recognized by legal
theorists. Moreover, in law there are also more
connections between discovery and justification than the
legal positivists' versions of legal reasoning admit. I
will now identify a number of links between discovery and
justification.
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(1) Connections Between Discovery and Justification
The rigid separation of discovery and justification is
problematic even in science. Paul Feyerabend, for example,
thinks it should be abolished. He claims the traditional
view that there is a context of discovery which "may be
irrational and need not follow any recognized method"18 and
a context of justification, which "starts only after
discoveries have been made, and proceeds in an orderly
way"19 does not play a role in scientific practice and
mis-represents the roles of discovery and justification in
scientific research. For him, the important questions are
to what extent the distinction between discovery and
justification reflects a real difference and whether
science can advance without a strong interaction between
the separated domains, not how to make distinctions in a
complex process.
Feyerabend identifies a conflict between the explanations
of testing "reconstructed" by philosophers of science and
the actual procedures used by scientists in research. He
claims that if philosophers' accounts of criticism and
proof in the context of justification had been used,
science as we know it would never have been permitted to
arise. Moreover, in actual scientific research, the




procedures of proof have often been over-ruled by
procedures belonging to the context of discovery.20 In his
opinion, "in the history of science standards of
justification often forbid moves that are caused by
psychology, socio-economic, political, and other "external
conditions", but science survives only because these moves
are allowed to prevail."21 When inventing and
contemplating theories, scientists often make moves
forbidden by methodological rules when interpreting
evidence to fit fanciful ideas and refusing to take
difficulties seriously. He asserts that "science...could
not exist without a frequent over-ruling of the context of
justification.1,22
Feyerabend's version of the relations between discovery and
justification is that they involve different activities and
that both discovery and justification are equally important
to science. Although neither one is more important than
the other, sometimes there is conflict between discovery
and justification. In such situations, one can choose
"moves" recommended by either discovery or justification to
advance scientific research. In short, scientific research
does not advance by either the procedures of discovery
alone or alternatively, by the procedures of justification








a "single uniform domain of procedures which are equally
important for the growth of science."23
Although Popper treats discovery and justification as
separate processes, he does give some sense of what could
be called a process of discovery when he discusses "the
search for an explanation" in his book Objective Knowledge.
He discusses the role of the syllogism in inventing
hypotheses. The syllogism has a key role in a discovery
process which involves a search for premises - a search for
a universal law plus a search for initial conditions - from
which an already known conclusion can be deduced. A
scientific explanation takes the form of a syllogism and
consists of a universal theory and specific initial
conditions from which a conclusion can be deduced. Thus,
a particular phenomenon will be explained if it can be
deduced from the theory and initial conditions.
In the search for an explanation, the starting point is the
conclusion known by observation which is to be explained.
One searches for premises that will explain the conclusion.
In other words, one seeks the universal theory and the
initial conditions by asking "From what universal theory
and specific initial conditions could this observed
conclusion be deduced?" The syllogism defines the form in
which the results of the discovery process are presented.
ibid., 167.
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The syllogism can also be understood as part of the
strategy to discover premises. Knowing the form or
characteristics of the syllogism helps guide the inquiry
insofar as it directs one's attention to searching for
premises. Popper illustrates this account of the search
for an explanation by tracing the steps that are taken to
discover why a rat has died. If one stumbles upon a rat
that is lying upside down, one knows the rat is dead by
observation and may wonder why the rat is dead and seek an
explanation. The starting point is to state the conclusion
which is known by observation. Here, the conclusion is
"This rat is dead." This statement is the conclusion of
some syllogism in which the premises are, as yet, unknown.
One then asks, "What happened to the rat?" and searches for
a theory and initial conditions from which the conclusion
can be deduced. Discovering an explanation of the
conclusion includes trying out conjectural or hypothetical
explanations such as "The rat died of a large dose of rat
poison." Such a hypothesis can be used to help formulate
a major premise from which the conclusion can be deduced.
However, the conclusion of the syllogism cannot be deduced
from this statement because the statement is not universal.
An explanation requires the discovery of a universal theory
or law. Thus, a universal statement regarding the effects
of rat poison on rats is necessary, such as "If a rat eats
at least 8 grains of rat poison it will die within 5
minutes." In this way, the syllogism places limits on what
will be considered to be a possible major premise.
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An explanation also requires a statement defining the
initial conditions. Hence the initial conditions must be
discovered and formulated. This statement is the minor
premise of the syllogism. Popper suggests that "This rat
ate at least 8 grains of rat poison more than 5 minutes
ago" as a possible set of initial conditions. The
conclusion that "This rat died" can now be deduced from the
universal law and the initial conditions.
But we do not know whether the universal law or the initial
conditions are supported by empirical evidence. Perhaps it
takes 10 grains of poison to kill a rat within 5 minutes
and perhaps the rat did not eat any poison at all. The
universal law and the initial conditions must be tested
independently of the conclusion if a satisfactory
explanation of the observed conclusion is to be found.
So, even in Popper's writings, there is a recognition that
discovery and justification are inter-related to the extent
that the syllogism plays a key role in the discovery of
explanations.
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(2) "Justification" in The Process of Discovery
One important argument in the previous chapter and in this
chapter is that MacCormick's model of testing obscures and
ignores the role of discovery in legal reasoning. The fact
that he approaches legal reasoning through an analogy with
testing in Popperian science may help explain why his
theory is restricted to discussions about legal
justification. Nonetheless, some sort of discovery process
can be detected in his account of legal justification. The
use of deduction to discover premises in science has a
potential parallel in law. Indeed, Wasserstrom made this
point when he wrote about the process of justification
guiding the process of discovery. Although MacCormick does
not draw this particular analogy, not only can his
explanation of first-order justification be understood as
a process of justification, but it can also be understood
as a description of a search for a universal rule of law to
explain a particular decision.
Looked at more carefully, first order justification is
analogous to Popper's explanation of the search for a
scientific explanation. First-order justification can be
understood as some sort of process of discovery insofar as
the process of making a legal syllogism can be understood
as a process of discovery. The syllogistic form can play
a key role in the search for a rule of law. As in the
search for an explanation in which inventing a syllogism is
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a method of discovering a theory or hypothesis, the search
for a rule of law plus facts would begin with a known
decision and would then seek to discover an appropriate
major premise consisting of a rule of law plus an
appropriate minor premise consisting of facts. The
relevant question would be "From what proposition of law
and what particular proposition of facts can this legal
decision be deduced?" Judges would be using the syllogism
in the same way as scientists searching for an explanation.
MacCormick discusses discovery in general terms when he
alludes to strategies of discovery in science. Discovery
depends on one's previous knowledge. In his opinion,
except for revolutionary discoveries, "the making of
discoveries takes place within a body of scientific
knowledge."24 Knowledge is needed to identify the relevant
scientific questions and to understand "the shape of the
slot in the relevant branches of knowledge into which the
explanation has to fit." 25 He says that a person's
existing knowledge gives one "leads" which are worth
thinking about and trying out. He claims that "you have to
know a lot before you even know what sort of thing you are
looking for"26 and that "even the most striking and
brilliantly creative discoveries necessarily involve








determined by the body of existing theoretical
knowledge."27
Although MacCormick does not link the discussion above to
discovery in law, an analogy can be drawn between using
one's knowledge of science and using one's knowledge of law
in order to make discoveries. Thus, I want to examine how
the requirements of consistency and coherence can also play
a role in the process of discovering legal rulings. The
reguirements of consistency and coherence can be understood
as guidelines to follow when attempting to discover or
invent legal rulings in that they help direct one's
attention to a limited line of inquiry or restricted range
of questions by placing restrictions on what will be
considered relevant in a search for possible rulings. One
begins the search for rulings knowing that one is searching
for rulings that will be coherent and consistent with the
rules and principles of the legal system. The discovery
process can begin with one knowing, in general terms, what
one is seeking. This strategy aids the task of discovering
and selecting legal rulings insofar as one can identify a
range of rulings that ultimately can be subject to stricter
testing. Hence the requirements of coherence and
consistency can be used to limit one's search to rulings
that satisfy those conditions.
But the requirement of coherence can also be used as a
ibid., 103.
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source of inspiration in the search for a solution to a
case. Solutions to one type of situation may serve as
clues to discovering or inventing a solution to a different
type of case. Analogy can be used as a method of
discovery. Edward Levi's discussion28 of the development
or transformation of the category of "imminently dangerous"
things which included loaded guns, defective guns, and
poison into the category of "probably or simply dangerous"
things, which includes cars, is an illustration of the
creative use of analogy to discover a solution to a
problem. The problem in the case of MacPherson v Buick
Motor Co.29 was whether the manufacturer of a car would be
held liable for the injury to the car owner caused by a
defective wheel. The solution was reached by comparing
guns, poison, and cars. Loaded guns and poison are similar
to cars in that "the nature of the thing is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril, when
negligently made..."30 Another example would be the use of
analogy to find a solution to the problem whether parents
of children who died in the Hillsborough disaster and who
suffer from nervous shock after watching the disaster on
television could recover for nervous shock. Both the trial
judge and the Appeal Court judges in the Hillsborough case
compared other cases of nervous shock in which parents were
E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. (London:
University of Chicago Press, 1949), 9-24.
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
ibid., 23.
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"within sight and hearing of an accident" or witnessed the
"immediate aftermath" of an accident to watching the
disaster on television in order to help them find a
solution to the case.
As in first-order justification where the syllogism has two
jobs - justifying and discovering - consistency and
coherence have two roles in second-order justification.
MacCormick identifies their role in justifying legal
rulings, but they also play a role in guiding the process
of discovering legal rulings insofar as they are the
criteria used to help select possible legal rulings for
testing. This analysis helps explain Wasserstrom's and
Bankowski's point that the criteria of justification guides
the discovery process.
Although discovery is not discussed in detail by MacCormick
in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, discovery is an
important part of second-order justification. Some type of
discovery occurs in the process of justifying legal
rulings. The consequences of a legal ruling in a
particular case and in hypothetical cases must be
discovered or invented. The consequences are neither given
nor do they have some sort of independent existence.
Evaluating the consequences also involves some sort of
discovery in that the criteria - sense of justice, common
sense, public benefit, and convenience - are general in
form. They do not exist in some specific and definite
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form. In each particular case the relevance of each
criterion or value must be specified. Such specifications
would seem to amount to discoveries or inventions.
The accepted view that there is a clear distinction between
discovery and justification in science and in law cannot be
supported when the writings of those theorists that espouse
that position are examined in detail. My discussion of the
syllogism, consistency and coherence, and conseguences
indicates that not only do elements in the process of
justification have justifying roles, but they also have
what appears to be roles in the process of discovery.
Moreover, the discussion indicates that the strategies,
procedures, and technigues of discovery that a judge may
use are not inherently arbitrary, irrational and
uncontrollable, but instead seem to be intelligent and
deliberate. In the following chapters, I examine a less
positivist model of science formulated by Bernard Lonergan.
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7. Conclusion
The analogy between science and law, the clear distinction
between discovery and justification, and understanding
legal justification as testing involves accepting the
plausibility of a comparison between the "empirical" field
of science and the "evaluative" field of law. Yet in many
contexts, the comparison between science and law breaks
down, especially the analogy between Popper's model of
testing and MacCormick's account of legal justification.
The asymmetry between predictions and consequences and
between empirical testing and evaluations of justice,
common sense, public good, and convenience challenges the
plausibility of comparing empirical and evaluative domains.
Recognizing that scientific testing involves discovery also
challenges the model of science which forms the basis of
the analogy drawn between science and law. The
conventional analogy between discovery and testing in
science and in law in which discovery and testing involve
different types of process may be too simple a position.
Justification seems to play a role in discovery. In the
following chapters, I attempt to overcome the evident
limitations of this analogy by using Bernard Lonergan's and
Garret Barden's writings to pose questions about the role
of the process of discovery and testing in science and in
law. The next chapter introduces Lonergan's approach to
studying discovery and testing.
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Chapter Three
Bernard Loneraan on Insight in Theoretical1 and Practical
Reasoning
1- Introduction
The process of discovery has not been investigated in
detail. Although the writings of the legal realists,
especially Frank and Dewey, point to the significance of
"discovery" in the decision process, their studies do not
amount to comprehensive investigations. They do little
more than name the relevant elements which constitute
"discovery" in law. Identifying elements such as puzzling,
brooding, hunches and intuitions does not explain how these
activities are performed. Furthermore, the tendency of
modern legal theorists to present "discovery" in terms of
irrational and arbitrary factors that are beyond the
concerns of jurists helps support the assumption that
"discovery" cannot be analysed. However, the work of B.
Lonergan on insight suggests otherwise. In fact, his study
of insight in theoretical and practical reasoning as a
problem-solving process is relevant to questions about both
1 Throughout this thesis, I use the term "theoretical"
reasoning to emphasize the common structure of direct
insight in different contexts and to distinguish
between theoretical and practical reasoning. I do not
use the term "theoretical", in Lonergan's more precise
sense, to distinguish between the domains or horizons
of "theory" and "common sense".
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discovery and justification.
Bernard Lonergan was a Canadian Jesuit (1904-1986) who
addressed questions regarding philosophy, theology, and
economics. Unfortunately, his work is relatively
unfamiliar to scholars outside the field of theology and is
unknown to most legal theorists. His major philosophic
works are Insight: A Study of Human Understanding2 and
Method in Theology3. Insight is primarily concerned with
analysing the role that questions and insights play in
human understanding and in determining its relationship to
philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, and theology. In short,
his book combines and extrapolates the Aristotelian and
European phenomenological traditions. In Method in
Theology. Lonergan develops the general method of analysis
used in Insight and discusses its implementation in
theology.
Insight is an exploratory study of a neglected region of
inquiry - the nature of insight in human understanding and
knowing. Despite the efforts of philosophers to study
human understanding they have not analysed insight; yet
for Lonergan, insight plays an essential role in human
knowledge. Insights are the source of knowledge and are
2 B. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding.
(London: Harper & Row, 1978).
3 B. Lonergan, Method in Theology f (London: Darton,
Longman, & Todd, 1971).
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also the source of novel rules and practices that can
improve or even replace established routines. As such,
insights are the source of new discoveries and inventions
in human affairs.
The primary reason Lonergan studies insight is that, for
him, the critical problem in philosophy is "the
question...not whether knowledge exists, but what precisely
is its nature."4 As part of that project he analyses acts
of insight of people in different fields - mathematics,
science, and practical affairs - in order to understand the
general structure of insight and to ascertain its
significance. Part One of Insight is an analysis of
insight first as a mental activity and second as an element
in the structure of human knowing. Lonergan's analysis of
insight focuses on "what precisely it is to understand,
what are the dynamics of the flow of consciousness that
favours insight, what are the interferences that favour
oversight, what, finally, do the answers to such questions
imply for the guidance of human thought and action."5
Insight is the key part of Lonergan' s general theory of
human understanding and knowing. It mediates his approach
to a wide range of philosophical and theological questions




philosophy and metaphysics. His philosophy, metaphysics,
ethics, and theology are derived from his analysis of
insight in human knowing. Insight is related to philosophy
in that it is the source of answers to guestions that lead
to human knowledge and new routines and rules. Hence, in
Lonergan's opinion, insight is the most significant
activity in his explanation of human understanding and
knowing. Insight is related to metaphysics insofar as the
nature and ground of specialized methods in various fields
are a specialized application of human knowing.
Specialized methods of inquiry, such as the scientific
method, are answers to questions that seek the best
approach to understanding the nature of unknowns in
different fields. For Lonergan, "an ethics results from
knowledge of the compound structure of one's knowing and
doing."6 Insight is related to ethics to the extent that
a person's insight into, or understanding of, a particular
situation can lead to the person wondering about and
discovering what one can and should do about the situation.
When solving practical problems, knowing what to do depends
on correctly understanding the situation and correctly
identifying problems.
Since his viewpoint is all-inclusive and comprehensive ana
his arguments complex, a summary of his philosophy would be
an inadequate way to introduce his position. However,
ibid., xxix.
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important aspects of his work can be identified, namely the
significance that insight plays in his cognitional theory
and his method of studying human knowing. Because insight
plays such an important role in knowing, its opposite, the
flight from understanding, is also very important in his
work. In order to promote and encourage knowing, Lonergan
not only studies the conditions that promote insight, but
also the conditions that suppress insights.
Lonergan diagnoses various manifestations of the flight
from understanding - psychiatric, moral, social, cultural,
and philosophic. Although the flight from understanding
takes different forms in different contexts, its general
nature is the suppression of questioning and the failure of
insights ... to occur. For example, the flight from
understanding in its philosophic form "appears to result
simply from an incomplete development in the intelligent
and reasonable use of one's own intelligence and
reasonableness."7 The flight from understanding is
manifest in confused and mistaken theories of knowledge.
He argues that insight into oversights will reveal what
activities are unintelligent and will explain the existence
of a multiplicity of philosophies and a series of mistaken
metaphysical and anti-metaphysical positions. He claims




Individual bias and group bias are part of the flight from
understanding. Individual bias is illustrated by the
person who solves one's own problems, but refuses to
consider guestions about whether the solutions can be or
should be applied in similar situations. Relevant
guestions that are outside the range of one's own selfish
interests are suppressed.9 Group bias is characterised by
loyalty to one group and hostility to other groups. It is
a flight from understanding in that the group suppresses
guestions and fails to have insights that would challenge
its own assessment of its well-being and usefulness.10 In
fact, the flight from understanding could be used to
characterize the dismissal of the discovery process insofar
as it is an oversight or error.
In the two previous chapters, I argued that (1) the legal
positivists have neglected to study the process of
discovery and testing in the decision-making process and
that (2) the clear distinction between discovery and
justification is problematic in that justification seems to
involve some sort of discovery. Although Lonergan does not





issues. He explicitly studies discovery or invention and
testing in various fields, particularly science, in terms
of puzzling, asking questions, experiencing insights and
testing hypotheses. Questions arise when one is puzzled.
Insights occur in response to questions. Insights lead to
the formulation of new ideas and then one tests them. But
as I will explain in this chapter, insights also occur in
testing. Because his concern is with insights as
discoveries of ideas and also with their role in testing,
the distinction between discovery and justification is not
as significant for Lonergan as it is for legal positivists.
Indeed, a clear distinction between discovery and
justification in his work cannot be found. Lonergan's
analysis of human understanding and knowing is neither
based on the assumption that there is a clear distinction
between the process of discovery and the process of
justification nor is he concerned primarily with the
process of justification. Lonergan's study is not an
examination of the process of discovery and justification
as they are understood by legal positivists. He neither
studies the psychology of decision-making nor attempts to
determine the unconscious processes and factors that
influence decisions. Lonergan's account of human knowing
is philosophical. In the following chapters, I will be
using his explanation of insight to help understand the
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process of discovery and testing11 in science and in law.
I use the term "testing" to refer to the actual
process followed by a judge when testing a tentative
solution in the decision-making process. On the other
hand, while "justification" includes aspects of
testing, it also involves the public exposition of the
solution or decision.
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2. Insight as an Act of Discovery or Invention in Solving
Problems and Answering Questions
Insight is the mental activity that discovers answers to
questions and solutions to theoretical and practical
problems. By the act of insight we discover possible
answers to questions when we want to understand an unknown
and we invent possible answers to our questions when we
want to know what to do. According to Lonergan, the act of
having insights is a common everyday occurrence in people
of all walks of life and circumstances. Insight is
involved in both mundane activities such as telling the
time and in great scientific achievements such as
discovering the molecular structure of DNA.
Lonergan explicitly analyses the essential role of insight
as an act of discovery in two modes or dimensions - (1)
theoretical reasoning and (2) practical reasoning. In
theoretical reasoning, insights can occur when a person is
understanding sense-experience and when a person reflects
on and discovers the truth or falsity of what one
understands. When solving practical problems, insights can
occur when a person discovers possible courses of action
and when an individual is deliberating about and discovers
which possible course of action is sufficiently appropriate
to perform in the circumstances.
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Lonergan illustrates the distinct nature of insight as an
act of discovery by contrasting insight with vision,
wonder, or guestions that arise when reading a detective
story. He writes that:
In the ideal detective story the reader is given all
the clues yet fails to spot the criminal. He may
advert to each clue as it arises. He needs no further
clues to solve the mystery. Yet he can remain in the
dark for the simple reason that reaching the solution
is not merely the apprehension of any clue, not the
mere memory of all, but a quite distinct activity of
organising intelligence that places the full set of
clues in a unique explanatory perspective.12
One can stare at all the clues in a detective story
indefinitely and still not be able to solve the mystery
because the act of discovery, the insight, has not
occurred. The individual cannot discover the significance
of the clues by simply looking at them. Moreover, the
significance of the clues will not be discovered unless the
reader is wondering who the criminal is and asks pertinent
questions such as "Who is the criminal?" and "Is so-and-so
the criminal?" Insight is achieved after wondering,
puzzling, and questioning. Nonetheless, a person may be
puzzled and ask questions and still fail to spot the
criminal. As yet, insight has not occurred. A supervening
ibid., x.
116
mental synthesis of the clues is required if the criminal
is to be discovered. Insight is the act of catching on to
the identity of the criminal. Insight makes "the
difference between the tantalizing problem and the evident
solution.1,13
Lonergan portrays insights as acts of discovery that occur
in response to wondering and asking questions when
attempting to solve problems. As an act of discovery,
insight is a distinct activity that can be distinguished
from sense-experience, wonder, and questions. Although
insight depends on sense, wonder, and questions, it cannot
be equated with any of them. Insight is distinct from
sense-experience. Sense-experience can be illustrated by
imagining a person sitting on a beach staring at the clouds
drift by. The individual is doing little more than looking
at the clouds. The "looking" is simply sense-experience.
One is neither puzzled about clouds nor trying to
understand clouds. So far, insight has not been achieved;
the act of discovery has not occurred. Sense-experience
supplies no more than the raw materials for puzzling and
questioning.
Questions are essential to insight. Through questions, an
inquiry moves from sense-experience through insight to
judgment. The act of insight itself is neither the
ibid., xi.
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formulation of an idea or definition nor is it a direct
apprehension, perception, or intuition of the truth.
Insights must be tested in order to judge whether they are
true or false, probable or possible, impossible or
unreasonable, sufficiently suitable or unsuitable.
Lonergan analyses the role of insight as a distinct mental
operation in terms of its relation to other mental
activities in human knowing. Lonergan believes that, in
order to understand insight, one must also discover,
identify, and become familiar with the other mental
elements that compose the recurrent and related pattern of
mental activities that constitute knowing. He conceives
human knowing to be a structure that is a conjunction of
distinct cognitive operations. Lonergan's explanation of
human knowing is in terms of cognitive operations that can
be grouped according to three dimensions - (1) sensible
presentations or imaginative representations, (2)
understanding, and (3) reflection. Although his
terminology is shared by faculty models of knowing, his
conception of knowing is structural; it is not a faculty
model. Thus he criticizes and rejects theories that
consider knowledge to be the intuition of sensible objects.
Individuals are active knowers. Knowing consists of mental
acts that constitute experiencing, understanding, and
judging. Knowing is illustrated by mathematicians solving
118
equations and testing their answers, scientists
understanding their data and verifying their hypotheses,
and people of practical affairs finding alternatives and
evaluating them. Asking and answering questions is the
method by which people are and become attentive,
intelligent, reasonable, and responsible human beings.
They attend to sense-experience and circumstances,
correctly identify problematic issues, actively seek
answers to questions, have insights that are intelligent
solutions to problems, and critically test the truth and
falsity of their insights.
Lonergan's position includes a normative attitude toward
knowledge itself, in that individuals should actively seek
knowledge and should not be, for example, passive cloud-
watchers. He thinks people should be curious, should
wonder, should ask questions, should actively investigate
and seek answers to their questions and solutions to their
problems until they have insights. They should test their
insights to see if they are correct, and should not rest
until they have complete answers. In fact, Lonergan thinks
knowing is ever-questioning and characterized by an
unrestricted desire to understand.
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3. Insight in Theoretical and Practical Reasoning
There are two basic types of insight, (1) direct and (2)
reflective, and they both occur in two dimensions - (1)
theoretical reasoning and (2) practical reasoning. Both
theoretical and practical reasoning seek knowledge.
Theoretical reasoning seeks knowledge for the sake of
knowledge, but practical reasoning seeks knowledge for the
sake of knowing what to do. This section develops the
basic idea that insight is the activity that discovers
answers to questions and invents solutions to problems. I
will briefly explain the structure of insight and its role
in human knowing not only when a person discovers possible
answers to theoretical and practical questions, but also
when a person tests and evaluates his or her own answers to
theoretical and practical questions. Critical reflection
and evaluation occur in both theoretical and practical
reasoning. In discovering possible answers, either in
theoretical or practical reasoning, there are two distinct
orientations. Direct insight in theoretical reasoning is
analogous to practical insight in practical reasoning.
Both direct insight and practical insight are oriented
toward understanding or discovering possible relations
among data. As such, the contents of direct insights are
possible answers which could either be true or false and
the contents of practical insights are proposed courses of
action which may or may not be sufficiently appropriate to
120
perform in a particular situation. In other words, direct
insight itself is not concerned with truth, and practical
insight itself is not concerned with actuality. In
theoretical reasoning, direct insight is tested by
reflective insight and, in practical reasoning, practical
insight is evaluated by practical reflective insight.
Insight, in each context, does not occur in isolation.
Insight is related to, and depends on, other mental
activities such as puzzling, questioning, previous insights
and formulations, judgments of fact, judgments of value and
decisions. Reflective insight leads to a judgment
concerning truth and falsity and practical reflective
insight leads to a judgment of value concerning whether a
proposed course of action is sufficiently suitable.
In Lonergan's theory, the crucial activity in theoretical
reasoning is direct: insight. It occurs after wondering and
puzzling about sensible presentations, imaginations, or
memories. Puzzling in this context can be represented by
an individual asking What-questions that demand
definitions, explanations, or interpretations such as "What
is it?" "Why is it so?" For example, a person might ask
"What is a circle?" or "What is a cat?" What-questions
lead to direct insight. One has a direct insight when one
catches on, when the mind clicks, when one gets the idea.
Direct insights are not simply perceptions. They are the
consequence of interrogating one's sense perceptions. They
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go beyond mere perceiving to discovering the relations
among what is sensed, imagined, or remembered. Moreover,
direct insights are not definitions or interpretations.
Rather, direct insights are the mental activities that
definitions and interpretations are based upon; thus such
insights are pre-conceptual. Direct insights demand
formulation and are made explicit as definitions.
explanations. or interpretations. Direct insight is the
act of discovery that, for example, leads to formulating
the definition of a circle as the loci of a set of points
equidistant from a centre in the same plane.
In the theoretical context, just as understanding can be
represented as answers to questions such as What-is-it? and
leads to direct insight, critical reflection can be
represented by questions such as "Is-it-so?" that lead to
reflective insights involved in testing. According to
Lonergan, direct insights occur frequently and are "a dime
a dozen". But direct insights do not necessarily discover
truth. Some insights may be correct and others may be
wrong. Critical reflection in theoretical reasoning is
initiated by puzzling and by questions that ask "Is it
true?" "Is it so?" These questions lead to reflective
insights and judgments of fact. The attitude of the
inquiry is characterized by the question - "Is-it-so?"
Questioninq leads to reflective insights which discover the
link between prospective judgments and the sufficiency of
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the evidence for making judgments of fact regarding the
truth or falsity of direct insights and formulations.
Like direct insight in theoretical reasoning, practical
insight is the key activity in practical reasoning. As in
theoretical reasoning, a person who is involved in
practical reasoning wonders and puzzles, asks questions,
has insights, and formulates them. However, in practical
reasoning one wonders not only about sensible
presentations, imaginations, and memories, but also about
particular situations and circumstances. The mental
attitude in this context is not represented by questions
that ask "What-is-it?", but rather by questions that ask
"What-is-to-be-done?" This questioning attitude leads to
insights that discover the unity of proposed courses of
action rather than the unity in data. Just as direct
insights are formulated as explanations or interpretations,
practical insights are formulated as possible courses of
action. For example, a person may arrive at the scene of
a gruesome car accident and ask "What can I do?" Several
alternatives such as pulling the people out of the car,
calling an ambulance, or stopping other cars for help may
be discovered by practical insights. Or a person who
notices that his rowboat is sinking may ask "What am I to
do?" and may consider various options discovered by
practical insight such as bailing out the water, sending a
distress signal, rowing to shore, or going down with the
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ship.
In practical reasoning, testing and evaluating practical
insights and proposed courses of action lead to practical
reflective insights. Like direct insights that are
possible correlations, relations, links or unities that may
be correct or incorrect, practical insights discover only
possible courses of action. Some of those courses of
action may be impossible or unreasonable to perform. One
alternative may be preferred. The mental attitude of the
individual in this context can be represented by questions
that ask "Is-it-to-be-done?" and "Should the course of
action be performed?" When a person evaluates the
alternatives, practical reflective insight discovers the
relation between the significant factors of a particular
situation, the proposed course of action, and the
consequences and implications of the action. The person at
the scene of an accident who asks, for example, "Should I
first stop the bleeding or give artificial respiration?"
then discovers the victim may suffocate before he bleeds to
death. The rower who asks "Should I just row quickly to
shore or start bailing out the water?" discovers that if he
does not begin bailing immediately his boat will sink ana
he will never reach land. Practical reflection or
deliberation leads to a judgment of value that one course
of action is sufficiently suitable. The bystander judges
that one should perform artificial respiration first and
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the rower judges one should row rather than bail. A
decision to perform the course of action ends practical
evaluation. For example, "Yes, I will perform artificial
respiration first" or "No, I will simply row quickly to
shore."
Theoretical reasoning (which includes direct insight and
reflective insight) and practical reasoning (which includes
practical insight and practical reflective insight) are
related in a number of ways. Practical insights and
practical reflective insights depend on direct insights and
judgments of fact about concrete situations. In other
words, knowing what is the appropriate thing to do in a
situation depends on knowing what the situation is. For
example, a doctor's diagnosis precedes his judgment of
value concerning which treatment should be prescribed. In
the legal context, knowing that a situation is a case of
nervous shock precedes a judge's judgment of value
regarding what the solution to the case should be. Here,
theoretical reasoning precedes practical reasoning insofar
as understanding a particular situation leads to questions
concerned with what to do in the concrete situation. On
the other hand, practical reasoning precedes theoretical
reasoning when practical questions occur before the
situation is understood. A doctor may ask the practical
question "What should I do to help this patient?" and then
realize that a diagnosis must be made before prescribing a
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course of treatment. A judge may ask the practical
question "Should I allow this person to recover damages for
nervous shock?" and realize that the particular situation
and the relevant law must be understood before answering
the practical question. In these cases, the person tries
to understand the situation through the occurrence of
direct insights before judging what is the sufficiently
suitable thing to do in the circumstances.
The basic idea which I want to develop in the following
chapters is that theoretical reasoning is concerned with
interpreting situations and practical reasoning is
concerned with discovering or inventing what to do in a
situation. By theoretical reasoning one is able to
understand the facts of a situation in relation to the
relevant law and other cases. But at some point the judge
asks "What should I do to solve the problem?" Such a
question is a practical question. The judge via
theoretical reasoning may judge that the current case and
a previous case are similar in relevant ways and then reach
the same solution to the current case as the previous case.
Here, the judge is using theoretical reasoning to help
solve a practical question. On the other hand, the current
and previous cases may not be significantly similar and the
solution to previous cases may be inappropriate in the
current case. Here, the judge must engage in practical
reasoning to discover or invent a suitable solution to the
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current case. Practical reasoning can also lead to
theoretical reasoning when practical insights, practical
reflective insights, and judgments of value lead to the
creation of new situations which are understood by direct
insights, which in turn can lead to new questions about
what to do, new practical insights, and new judgments of
value.
Lonergan's analysis of insight in theoretical and practical
reasoning offers a novel approach to examining discovery
and testing. The activity at the centre of theoretical and
practical reasoning is insight, an activity that discovers
or invents possibilities and also tests them. Although it
is not surprising that insight, as an act of discovery, is
the crucial activity in the creation of ideas and courses
of action, one does not expect that insight also plays a
key role in testing and evaluating direct insights and
practical insights. But for Lonergan, insights are the key
activities in discovering new ideas and also in testing
them. Lonergan's position is distinct from the realists
and legal positivists in that he recognizes that the role
of reflective insights and practical reflective insights in
testing and evaluating is creative or synthetic insofar as
the contents of previous mental activities are considered
in a new way. To put it crudely, he examines the role of
discovery in justification. In other words, although
reflective insights and practical reflective insights test
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and evaluate direct and practical insights they are also
like direct and practical insights in that they transform
the raw materials they work on. Reflective insights
synthesize direct insights and what is sensed. Practical
reflective insights synthesize practical insights,
evaluations, and sense-experience. It is in this sense
that discovery is a significant part of testing in
theoretical and practical reasoning.
Lonergan's treatment of the nature of, and the relationship
between, insight in discovering possibilities and in
testing and justifying them further complicates the debate
concerning the distinction between discovery and
justification that became evident when the realists' and
positivists' writings were analysed in Chapter One. For
example, in contrast to the legal realists who simply claim
that puzzling and brooding lead to hunches, Lonergan
explicitly presents what would otherwise be known as
"decision-making" as a problem-solving process and argues
that particular types of questions demand particular types
of insights. Rather than speaking inarticulately of
hunches and intuitions, Lonergan analyses the role of
insight in human understanding and explains that direct and
practical insights discover possible relations and unities
in data. Rather than speaking vaguely about the process of
discovery and separating discovery and justification,
Lonergan explicitly distinguishes between two orientations
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or phases in reasoning - understanding and testing - and
argues that insight is the central activity in each
context. In marked contrast to legal positivists'
explanations of testing and justification, the creative and
synthetic aspects of insight constitute a significant part
of testing and evaluation.
Lonergan investigates what would otherwise be known by
Bankowski as the process of discovery inasmuch as
theoretical reasoning includes both procedures of discovery
and testing. He also investigates what would otherwise be
known by legal positivists as the process of discovery in
that he analyses the emergence of direct insights.
However, like the legal theorists discussed in Chapter One,
Lonergan's use of the term "discovery" is ambiguous. He
calls both unverified and verified hypotheses
"discoveries". Bankowski, by contrast, would reserve the
term "discovery" only for insights that have been tested
and found to satisfy the relevant truth-certifying
procedures.
It might seem appropriate to call the understanding phase
in Lonergan's version of theoretical and practical
reasoning "discovery" and to call the testing phase
"justification". And to do so would not be wrong.
However, in my opinion, this approach should be resisted.
Traditionally, "discovery" has been treated as an intuitive
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activity that is necessarily distinct from justification.
Yet the creative act of insight occurs in both the
understanding and testing phases of theoretical and
practical reasoning. "Discovery" could be reserved for the
activities involved in having an idea and "justification"
could be reserved for the activities involved in "testing"
it. Yet having an idea and testing it are both part of a
single comprehensive process, not independent processes.
To call the understanding phase "discovery" and the testing
phase "justification" would continue to mask the creative
role of insight in testing. To analyse reflective insight
and practical reflective insight and not to stress that
they are acts of "discovery" would mis-represent the
creative nature of testing.
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4. Loneraan' s Method of Examining Theoretical and
Practical Reasoning
Lonergan studies the process of discovery from the point of
view of those people who are actively engaged in solving
problems by asking and answering questions. He explicitly
examines the method scientists devise and follow to solve
their problems. The person engaged in seeking knowledge
for its own sake by asking and answering What-questions and
Is-questions is the knowing subject. A scientist searching
for the cause of ulcers is a knowing subject. On the other
hand, a person seeking knowledge in order to know what to
do in a situation is the ethical subject. A judge or jury
determining what punishment to give an offender would be
ethical subjects.
Lonergan's analysis concentrates on the knowing and ethical
subject actively engaged in seeking knowledge rather than
on what is known. He is concerned with the nature of
knowing rather than the existence of knowledge. In fact,
the first 315 pages of Insight are devoted to the question
"What is happening when we are knowing?" which he answers
by constructing an account of human knowing. He is not
"concerned with the objects understood in mathematics but
with mathematicians' acts of understanding, not with
objects understood in the various sciences but with
scientists' acts of understanding, not with the concrete
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situations mastered by common sense but with the acts of
understanding of men of common sense."14 His approach is
consistent with his conception of knowing as a structure of
cognitive operations performed by a subject rather than as
some sort of object that can be observed. His notion of
the subject as a questioner is apparent in the data he
chooses to study; he studies acts of insight, not what is
understood. For him, the subject as a questioner is not
conceived of as an object. Instead, the knowing and
ethical subject is conceived as being constituted by the
actual performance of cognitive operations.
The procedure Lonergan uses to study the nature of human
knowing is modelled on his understanding of himself as a
knower, as a person who experiences, asks questions,
understands, reflects, and judges. For Lonergan, it is by
attending to his own experiences of knowing that he has
come to understand how he understands and judges, and to
present his account of human knowing. Similarly, for
anyone else to understand the nature of human knowing, one
must be attentive to one's own experiences of sense-
experience, insights, and judgments. It is in this way
that Lonergan understands the structure of knowing to be a
conjunction of experiencing, understanding, and judging.
Although he refers to the familiar philosophical categories
- experiencing, understanding, and judging - they are
ibid., xi.
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understood as a unity or a structure constituted by a
recurrent pattern of cognitional activities. His procedure
of analysis is not to construct catalogues of abstract
properties of knowing conceived of as an object. He does
not regard knowing as the execution of "this or that
operation, but as a whole whose parts are operations."15
Human knowing is not like taking a look; it is not simply
understanding without judging; and it is not judging
without experiencing and understanding.
Although one may spontaneously perform the mental
activities that constitute knowing, one may not know what
they are. Furthermore, a person may be conscious of having
insights, but may not have any idea what an insight
entails. According to Lonergan, the effort to understand
the structure of knowing, which he calls self-
appropriation, leads to self-knowledge. Parallels between
the activities of knowing and self-knowing can be
identified. Just as human knowing "is not some single
operation or activity but, on the contrary is a whole whose
parts are cognitional activities",16 self-knowing is also
a whole whose parts constitute a dynamic pattern of
recurrent operations that are cognitional activities. Just
as knowing is not looking or like looking, imagining or
15 B. Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure", ed. P. McShane,
Introducing the thought of Bernard Loneraan. (London:
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968), 17.
16 ibid. , 18 .
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intuiting, self-knowing is not inward introspecting,
imagining, or a mystical experience. Instead, self-
appropriation is a matter of inguiry, of enlarging one's
interest, of discerning, comparing, identifying, and naming
the operations that compose the structure of human knowing.
Lonergan's procedure to understand human "knowing" is
derived from his conception of human knowing. Since he
conceives the structure of knowing as a conjunction of
experiencing, understanding, and judging, he infers that
the procedure used to know human knowing must be a re¬
duplication of that structure. Thus self-knowledge or
knowing knowing is:
"(1) experiencing one's experiencing, understanding, and
judging, (2) understanding the unity and relations of one's
experienced experiencing, understanding, and judging...",17
and (3) "judging one's experienced and understood
experiencing, understanding, and judging it to be
correct..."18 Lonergan calls this procedure self-
appropriation. His strategy in Insight is to invite and
lead the reader through a series of strategically chosen
instances so that one may personally make explicit one's









Lonergan notes that we experience our experiencing,
understanding, and judging every time we experience, or
understand, or judge. The elements of knowing are
conscious when one is experiencing (that is, when one is
seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, smelling),
understanding, and judging, but as such they are neither
understood nor known. Our attention is apt to be focused
on the object rather than on the activities of our
cognitive operations. In contrast, self-appropriation is
finding in oneself the conscious occurrence of the
cognitional activities whenever an object is seen,
understood, andjudged. It is by becoming familiar with
one's own performance of these mental activities that one
becomes able to understand the mental activities that
comprise theoretical and practical reasoning. In this way,
the individual's mental activities such as insight become
known to oneself.
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5. The Elements of Theoretical and Practical Reasoning
Lonergan's efforts of self-appropriation presented in
Insight and Method in Theology reveal thirteen elements or
basic operations that are employed in knowing and doing.
In the context of human knowing, experiencing involves (1)
sensitive or imaginative representations. Theoretical
understanding includes (2) What-questions. (3) direct
insights. and (4) formulations of definitions.
explanations. or interpretations. Testing includes (5) Is-
auestions. (6) reflective insights, and (7) judgments of
fact.
Practical understanding includes (8) What-is-to-be-done-
guestions. (9) practical insights, and (10) formulations of
proposed courses of action. Testing includes (11) Is-it-
to-be-done-questions. (12) practical reflective insights,
and (13) judgments of value. Decision. a separate mental
operation, ends practical reasoning. In other words,
insight occurs at two levels - understanding and testing -
but not at the level of sense-experience.
The relations among the cognitional activities in
theoretical and practical reasoning can be illustrated with
the following diagram20:
20 This diagram is adapted from the diagram in P.
McShane, Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations. (New
















































According to Lonergan, these thirteen elements constitute
the human cognitive structure. It is materially dynamic
since the distinct, irreducible mental activities
constitute a pattern that is a particular sequence. One
operation follows another and so on. The operations are
experienced not only singly but in their relations to each
other. Thus, there is a functional unity and relatedness
to the extent that, without sense, nothing can be
understood and, without sense and understanding, judgment
would be rash. The structure of mental activities "...is
formally dynamic inasmuch as it calls forth and assembles
the appropriate operations at each stage of the
process..."21 The completion of one operation leads to the
initiation of another. The dynamism that promotes or
drives this recurrent pattern of related cognitive
operations is human wonder. In the inquiring mind, sense-
experience provokes wonder. Puzzling shifts the inquiry
from sense-experience to understanding, and direct insight
goes beyond sense to grasp a synthesis in the data only to
call forth, and be called forth, by the exigencies of
reflection; this process is completed by reflective
insight and judgment of fact. The orientation of one's
questioning can shift to practical reasoning, that is,
puzzling about what to do. Practical insights discover
possible courses of action and deliberation enables the
Method in Theology. 13.
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sufficiently suitable solution to be discovered by a
practical reflective insight and then formulated as a
judgment of value. Finally, the pattern is completed when
a person decides or chooses to make the suitable option
actual.
Theoretical and practical reasoning are closely linked with
respect to the execution of their functions in the
cognitive structure. Practical reasoning completes the
pattern of cognitive operations insofar as it includes and
goes beyond knowing, resulting in action. Theoretical
reasoning grounds practical reasoning inasmuch as you must
know in order to do. Theoretical reasoning provides the
factual data which practical reasoning must take into
account. With the question "What-is-to-be-done?", the
context of the inquiry moves from theoretical to practical
reasoning and the formulation of practical insights is
demanded. Once satisfied, the inquiring mind, ever alert,
moves to the next context - "Is-it-to-be-done here and
now?" Practical reflective insight answers the question
only to the point where a decision is made. In Insight.
the procedure of self-appropriation is also used to analyse
the structure of doing. The result of such self-
appropriation adds a fourth level to the cognitive
structure. Self-appropriation of practical reasoning
involves "deciding to operate in accord with the norms
immanent in the spontaneous relatedness of one's
139
experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing,
understanding, judging, and deciding."22
Lonergan wants to promote the operation of knowing in human
affairs by explaining its operation and having people know
how they understand, judge and decide. His position is
normative insofar as he thinks knowing can lead to
intelligent and reasonable explanations and responsible
actions. For Lonergan, the performance of knowing is good
because it can be attentive to circumstances, can discover
intelligent answers to questions, can make reasonable
judgments, and can discover and execute responsible actions
in appropriate circumstances. Moreover, knowing can
identify inattention, obtuseness, unreasonableness, and
irresponsibility. The operation of knowing is the method
that can help arrest the flight from understanding.
Through knowing, the occurrence of insights can be promoted
and the factors that lead to mistaken insights or
suppressed insights can be identified and eradicated.
Problems in any field, for Lonergan, can only be solved if
their solutions are actively sought.
Lonergan admits that his perspective on cognitional theory
is difficult to understand because it requires the reader
to familiarize oneself with Lonergan's terminology, to
evoke the relevant operations in one's own consciousness
ibid., 15.
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and to discover in one's own experience the dynamic
relationships leading from one operation to the next.23 He
asserts that, if one is to understand knowing and doing as
he conceives them, one must practise self-appropriation
oneself; without doing that, one can no more know knowing




The notion of insight presented so far has been rather
static. However, it is necessary to appreciate the nature
of insight as an active mental element in theoretical and
practical reasoning in judicial decision-making. The
following two chapters analyse in detail insight so that
the structure and role of insight in relation to the
functions of the other mental activities that constitute
theoretical and practical reasoning can be examined.
Direct insight, reflective insight, practical insight, and
practical reflective insight will be studied in order to
understand what it means for each type of insight to say
that it "discovers" or "invents" such-and-such a relation.
Chapter Four is an analysis of understanding and testing in
the process of solving theoretical problems in the legal
context. Chapter Five is an analysis of understanding and
testing in the process of solving practical problems in the
legal context. Lonergan's work raises fundamental
questions about the nature of discovery and testing that
are not raised by and cannot be adequately answered by
examining the writings of modern legal theorists.
Chapter Four
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"Discovery" in Theoretical Problem-Solving
1. introduction
In Chapter One, I noted that the nature of the process of
discovery is not settled and pointed out that how a judge
actually tests hunches/insights has not been examined in
detail. I also questioned the clear distinction between
discovery and justification in light of conflicting
versions of legal reasoning. In Chapter Two, I cast doubt
on the clear distinction between discovery and
justification by suggesting that justification is involved
in the process of discovery. I concluded both chapters by
claiming that, in order to address these issues, the actual
decision-making or judging process should be investigated
in detail. The aim of this chapter, and the following two
chapters, is to examine "discovery" in theoretical and
practical problem-solving in legal decision-making. The
nature of "discovery" is analysed in both the understanding
and testing phases of theoretical and practical problem-
solving.
Conventional accounts of legal reasoning portray legal
reasoning in terms of theoretical (empirical) reasoning or,
alternatively, as practical reasoning. Theoretical and
practical reasoning are presented as each having their own
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mutually exclusive spheres of operation in the sense that
legal reasoning is understood as a specialization of either
theoretical qe practical reasoning. In these accounts,
theoretical reasoning would be concerned with establishing
the facts in a particular case, describing valid law, and
predicting the behaviour of judges.1 Theoretical reasoning
also seems to include "decisions on the facts".2 In such
cases, the validity of the rule of law comprising the major
premise of the legal syllogism is not in question. Rather
the problem is to prove the particular facts of the case or
to classify the facts according to a legal category that
comprises the minor premise of the legal syllogism.
On the other hand, practical reasoning involves solving
practical questions regarding "what should or may be done
or not done."3 It is concerned with establishing the legal
validity of universal propositions, ie. "legal rulings or
norms". The problem practical reasoning must solve is to
decide which rival universal proposition will comprise the
major premise of the legal syllogism.4 Practical reasoning
both tests and justifies legal rulings in order to
R. Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation . (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989), 213; Also see Legal Reasoning
and begfrl Theory, 103-104.
Legql Reasoning and begel Tfrqory, 86-97.
A Theory of Legal Argumentation. 213.
Indeed, it is this problem regarding how to test and
justify rival rulings that frames the debate concerning
the nature of discovery and justification.
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determine which universal legal ruling will be followed in
a case and in similar cases that may occur in the future.
Thus, it can be seen that, despite differences in
orientation, conventional accounts of the structure of both
theoretical and practical reasoning are dominated by
analyses of the legal syllogism and universal rules or
norms in the context of the process of justification.
In contrast to conventional accounts of theoretical and
practical reasoning, in this chapter and the following
chapter, I use Lonergan's work to offer an explanation of
theoretical and practical problem-solving in legal
decision-making that is neither dominated by the legal
syllogism nor by universal rules or norms. Rather,
questions and answers are the key elements in the analysis.
"Discovery", not justification, is the focus of the
inquiry. The actual decision-making process, understood
from this perspective, involves both theoretical and
practical problem-solving.
But before analysing "discovery" in legal decision-making,
the relation between theoretical and practical problem-
solving, as understood from Lonergan's perspective, must be
briefly examined. As stated in Chapter Three, theoretical
and practical reasoning are concerned with answering
different types of questions. In general terms, in the
legal context, theoretical problem-solving is oriented to
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discovering and testing what the particular situation and
relevant law, in fact, are. Questions about the
interpretation of a situation and relevant law is therefore
part of theoretical problem-solving. For example,
theoretical reasoning would be concerned with interpreting
situations as cases of "manslaughter", "nervous shock", or
"pure economic loss" by judging that one case was
relevantly similar to other cases of that type or category.
On the other hand, practical problem-solving is oriented to
discovering and evaluating what should be done in a
particular situation. Practical questions are be asked in
order to find a solution to a case when one cannot be
discovered by comparing the case to other cases.
In an effort to minimize confusion between Lonergan's
versions of theoretical and practical problem-solving, in
Chapter Three, I presented theoretical and practical
problem-solving as if theoretical problem-solving always
precedes and leads to practical problem-solving in an
orderly progression. And in the paragraph immediately
above, I portrayed them as distinct methods of problem-
solving. However, the interplay between them is much more
complex and messy than I have indicated. Not only is
practical reasoning involved in cases where rulings compete
with each other, but all legal decision-making involves
both theoretical and practical reasoning to some extent.
Both types of problem-solving complement each other in the
decision-making process.
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However, understanding precisely the relation between
theoretical and practical problem-solving in legal
decision-making is problematic. At least three possible
general lines of problem-solving can be identified in the
legal context. One is theoretical problem-solving. As
mentioned above, it can precede practical problem-solving.
Practical reasoning begins when theoretical reasoning
stops. A judge may use theoretical reasoning to interpret
a situation as a case of manslaughter and then through
practical reasoning discover the appropriate punishment.
This approach is consistent with the view that, in order to
know what to do in a case, one must first understand the
situation and the relevant law. Two. practical questions
may guide theoretical problem-solving. A judge may ask the
over-arching practical question "What should I decide in
this case?" and then use theoretical reasoning to compare
the case to other similar cases in order to discover the
answer to the over-arching practical question. Three.
practical problem-solving can be an alternative to
theoretical problem-solving. In cases in which a solution
cannot be discovered by comparing cases, it may be
necessary to discover or invent a solution by practical
reasoning.
However, the other possibility is that when a judge is
actually solving a problem, theoretical and practical
problem-solving are inter-related throughout the decision¬
making process. A judge's attention may shift from
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theoretical to practical problem-solving and from practical
to theoretical problem-solving more or less continuously.
Attention would alternate between theoretical questions
such as "What is it?" and "Is it so?" to practical
questions such as "What is to be done?" and "Should it be
done?" This process would lead to a complex inter-related
set of insights, judgments of fact, judgments of value, and
finally a decision.
But the primary aim of this chapter and the following
chapter is to investigate "discovery" in legal decision¬
making, not to determine the relation between theoretical
and practical problem-solving. Despite the apparent
complexity of theoretical and practical problem-solving in
legal decision-making, they can be examined separately
insofar as they each involve different types of questions
and answers. Thus, in this chapter, I analyse "discovery"
in theoretical problem-solving and, in the following
chapter, I analyse "discovery" in practical problem-
solving. These two chapters are a more detailed study of
problem-solving than that of Chapter Three. I will return
to the issue regarding the relation between theoretical and
practical problem-solving in legal decision-making in
Chapter Six, when I identify two general strategies of
problem-solving in Barden's writings.
2. Theoretical Problem-Solving
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Lonergan's work can be understood as an investigation of
the nature of "discovery" in that he carefully articulates
the nature of insight through his explanation of
theoretical reasoning. As outlined in Chapter Three, two
types of "discovery" occur in the process of solving
theoretical problems: (1) direct insight and (2)
reflective insight. Direct insights are the creative and
synthetic acts that discover tentative answers to
questions; reflective insights are the creative and
synthetic acts involved in testing these answers.
In this chapter, I examine Lonergan's explanation of
theoretical reasoning as a dynamic problem-solving process.
I explicitly distinguish between two phases in theoretical
problem-solving: (1) the understanding phase and (2) the
testing phase. In the understanding phase, one has hunches
and insights and discovers hypotheses and explanations.
The aim of analysing this phase is to explain the nature of
hunches and insights. The understanding phase would
otherwise be known by legal positivists as the process of
discovery. Although calling it the "discovery" phase,
rather than the "understanding" phase, would be in line
with conventional terminology, as I stated in the previous
chapter, using the term "discovery" to refer to untested
hunches and insights would mask the fact that "discovery"
also occurs in testing. I use the terra "discovery" to
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emphasize the creative nature of both direct insight and
reflective insight. The understanding phase involves: (a)
sense-experience. (b) wondering and puzzling. and asking
What-guestions. (c) having direct insights. and (d)
formulating or expressing direct insights as hypotheses.
definitions. explanations, diagnoses. or interpretations.
In the testing phase, one is concerned with testing and
verifying hypotheses, definitions, explanations, diagnoses,
and interpretations. This phase involves (a) asking Is-
auestions. (b) having reflective insights, and (c)
formulating judgments of fact. Contrary to expectation,
"discovery" is a crucial part of the testing phase. The
aim of the analysis of testing is to examine the extent
that the testing phase involves "discovery".
Unfortunately, Lonergan does not examine problem-solving in
the legal context. He investigates discovery and testing
in science and other fields. To the extent that various
contexts involve direct insight and reflective insight,
they can help us understand the general characteristics of
insight in the legal context. Moreover, I will suggest
that the distinctions that can be identified between
insights in different fields are of some significance.
Hence, throughout this chapter, I draw analogies between
medicine and law in order to illustrate the general
procedure whereby theoretical problems are solved. I note
the similarities in the problem-solving procedures followed
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by physicians and judges, especially the similarities among
What-questions and Is-questions and the direct insights and
reflective insights those questions demand. I would like
to stress that I am not analysing Lonergan's explanation of
theoretical reasoning to construct a new analogy between
science and law. Rather, the aim is to investigate the
nature of "discovery" in judicial decision-making.
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3. The understanding Phase in Theoretical Problem-Solving
(i) introduction
Doctors and judges follow the same general method when
solving problems or searching for answers to questions. In
the understanding phase, they both ask What-questions that
call for direct insights and formulations. The
understanding phase begins when a doctor or judge wonders
or puzzles about sense-experience. A physician may wonder
about why the patient complains about stomach cramps and a
judge may puzzle about the course of events that led to a
person's death or whether a situation amounts to a case of
murder. The doctor and judge ask questions in order to
understand the situation. The type of questions they pose
are What-questions. A physician consulted by a patient
asks the over-arching question "What is the situation?" or
"What is the problem?" and then searches for an
explanation. Similarly, a judge listening to lawyers'
arguments and witnesses' testimony, asks "What is the
situation?" or "What is the problem?" and seeks an answer.
Such questions lead to direct insights into particular
situations. The physician's direct insight is into a
particular problem experienced by a particular individual.
The answer is a direct insight that discovers the
connections among the doctor's understanding of relevant
symptoms, diseases, and previous diagnoses, and the
patient's complaints and symptoms. Similarly, a judge has
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a direct insight into a particular situation or course of
events that occurred at a particular time and place. The
judge experiences a direct insight that discovers the
relation among the judge's understanding of the situation
as potentially defined by legal categories and previous
cases, lawyers' arguments, and witnesses' testimony.
Direct insight is an act of discovery or invention in that
it discovers relations among data that were previously not
understood to be related. Direct insight transforms sense-
experience and What-questions by considering sense-
experience in a new way. It discovers a unity among data
that can include sense-experience, imaginations, memories
or any raw materials such as direct insights and judgments
of fact. Direct insights into concrete situations are
formulated by physicians as explanations or diagnoses and
by judges as interpretations. The doctor formulates this
direct insight as a diagnosis of the situation or problem
such as "This person has an ulcer." The judge formulates
direct insights as a tentative interpretation of the
situation or case such as "This is a case of murder" or
"This is a case of nervous shock".
The aims of this section are (1) to analyse the relations
among the elements in the understanding phase of
theoretical problem-solving, (2) to explain the extent to
which direct insight is an act of discovery, and (3) to
illustrate the conscious and deliberate nature of the
understanding phase.
(2) Elements in The Understanding Phase
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(a) Sense-experience
Imaginings, memories, sensible presentations such as
colours, shapes, sounds, odours, and tastes are the raw
materials of direct insights. According to Lonergan,
direct insight depends on sensible presentations and
memories for its object. Sensible presentations represent
a link between outer circumstances and mental activity.
Unlike other mental activities which are not directly
dependent on outer circumstances, sensible presentations
depend on outer circumstances to the extent that "the
occurrence and the content of sensation stand in some
immediate correlation with outer circumstance."5 For
example, "unless you are deaf, you cannot avoid hearing,
and unless you are blind, you have only to open your eyes
to see."6 As already mentioned in Chapter Three, sensation
is distinct from direct insight. A person lying on a beach
gazing at the clouds is not puzzled about clouds.
Similarly, there is no effort to understand when we are
remembering past experiences, imagining other places and
times, or telling stories. These examples are simply
presentations. No synthetic activity is occurring. The
attitude of the curious, puzzled, inquiring mind is not
5. B. Lonergan, Insight: A Study in Human Understanding,
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1978), 5.
6 ibid., 5.
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present. Perception by itself, in Lonergan's view, never
leads to direct insight. By itself, presentations yield
nothing more than uninterrogated sense-experience.
(b) Wondering, Puzzling and Asking What-auestions
But, one can see, hear, taste, touch, smell and also be
wondering about what one sees, hears, tastes, touches,
smells, remembers, or imagines. One may be puzzled; one
may wonder about something; one's curiosity may be
sparked. A physician may be puzzled about how a patient's
complaints are linked and a judge may be puzzled about how
the testimony of witnesses is related. The attitude of the
inquiring mind has replaced the passive observer and one
may express one's puzzlement as "What is it?" "Why is it
so?"
According to Lonergan, wonder is the root of all questions,
not a question in words or concepts, but just the effort to
understand without any formulation.7 For him, inquiry is
the element of intellectual alertness. It is a questioning
attitude which is oriented toward understanding. One is
trying to get hold of something but as yet one is not
understanding anything; one is puzzled. The desire or
effort to understand what one sees or remembers is driven
B. Lonergan, Understanding and Being: An Introduction
and Companion to Insight, ed. E. Morelli & M. Morelli,
(New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1980), 41.
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forward by the dynamism of the inquiring mind and is
represented by questions that seek understanding such as
"What is it?" For example, "What is a circle?" "What is
cross-eyedness?" "What is a house?" "What is the
patient's problem?" "What type of legal situation is
this?"
What-questions are posed in two contexts - the context of
everyday speech and the theoretical context. Hence two
types of answers can be given to the same question. One
can ask "What is a circle?" and be satisfied with the
answer, "Something round". One can ask "What is the
patient's problem?" and be satisfied with naming the
patients's problem "a duodenal ulcer" and yet have no
understanding of the ulcers at all. One can ask "What type
of case is this?" and be satisfied with naming the
situation "murder" and yet have no knowledge of the
elements of the crime of murder or how they are relevant in
the concrete situation. Such answers simply involve
pointing or naming and are insights into the use of
language.
But a person may not be satisfied with answers that simply
point or name. What-questions can also demand definitions,
explanations, and interpretations. When you ask "What is
a circle?" you seek the definition of a circle. When you
ask "What is strabismus?" you seek an explanatory account
of cross-eyedness. These are what Lonergan would
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understand as typical "scientific" questions. But even
when you ask "What is a house?" you seek an explanation of
how the parts constitute a unity or whole. And when you
ask "What is the patient's problem?" you seek an
explanation of how the symptoms are related. When you ask
"What type of legal situation is this?" you seek an
interpretation of the situation that relates the facts of
the case to previous cases, legal categories, and relevant
law. These types of questions, called "What-questions",
ask for a cause, a reason, a correlation, a unity, an
explanation, or an interpretation.
Sometimes, according to Lonergan, the two questions "What?"
and "Why?" turn out to be the same. For example, the
questions "What is rain?" and "Why does it rain?" turn out
to be one and the same. The answers to both questions
involve an explanation of evaporation and condensation.
Lonergan writes that Aristotle's example, "What is an
eclipse of the moon?" and "Why is the moon thus darkened?"
are not two questions, but one and the same because if you
"Say that the earth intervenes between the sun and the
moon, blocking off the light received by the latter from
the former... at once you know why the moon is thus
darkened, and what an eclipse is."8 They are the same
question because both questions represent the orientation
of the inquirer toward understanding the nature of eclipses
3 B. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aauinas. (Notre
Dame: University Press of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 35.
157
and because the same answer satisfies each question. In
the legal context, the question "What caused this person's
death?" and "Why did this person die?" turn out to be the
same question. They both demand an explanation of the
course of events that led to someone's death.
Unlike sensible presentations which depend on outer
circumstances, the emergence of What-questions depends on
presentations insofar as a person is attentive to what one
sees, hears, etc., but What-questions are also free from
outer circumstances in a way that the raw materials of
inquiry, sensible presentations, are not. Although
sensible presentations have some immediate relationship to
outer circumstances, What-questions can occur or not occur.
What-questions are concerned with what is sensed, yet they
move beyond sensible presentations to ask about what is
sensed, imagined, or remembered. The inquirer asking
questions arranges particular aspects of the materials
presented by sense and imagination in a new way. The
creative element in this activity is the emergence or
creation of the question itself from the raw materials of
sensible and imaginative presentations. Questions focus
attention on particular aspects of the data.
Answers will not occur unless questions are asked. For
example, if King Hiero had not asked Archimedes to
determine whether the crown was pure gold, Archimedes
probably would not have thought about the problem and
probably would never have reached his insight.
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Answers to What-questions depend on the accurate
presentation of questions and problems. Questions and
answers form a context and until the question or problem is
accurately and precisely formulated, an answer, which is a
related insight or a related set of insights, will not be
immediately forthcoming. Problems will not be solved until
the appropriate questions are asked. Insights depend on
the particular questions that are asked. For example, the
motion of falling bodies was not understood until the
impetus theories of the Aristotelians were replaced by
Galileo's inquiry into the relationship between the
distance and time of falling objects. Galileo's insights
depended on him specifically asking "What is the
relationship between distance and time when objects fall?"
For Galileo, the particular problem was not to describe the
trajectory of the object but to correlate the distance and
time of falling objects.
But solutions to problems that represent great advances in
science are not the only insights that depend on precisely
formulated questions. Solutions to familiar problems and
questions also depend on questions being accurately
formulated. For example, wanting to know the time at this
moment depends on posing the question "What is the time?",
not on asking "What day is it?" Similarly, wanting to know
someone's birthdate is not met by asking "What is your sign
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of the zodiac?", but by asking "What is the date of your
birth?" A physician wanting to understand why a patient
cannot read an eye chart will ask specific questions such
as "Does the person have cataracts?" and "Does the person
have glaucoma?" Asking questions about the patient's teeth
will not help the doctor understand the patient's eye
problems. Similarly, a judge may ask specific questions
about the order in which events occurred in a case in order
to understand a particular case.
The fact that direct insight depends on an accurate
formulation of the question not only illustrates the fact
that the question focuses attention on particular aspects
of data that will be considered relevant to answering the
question. Framing the question accurately narrows the link
between the question and answer to be discovered by direct
insight. The question can place limits on the direct
insight inasmuch as it focuses attention on particular
aspects of the data and creates the context in which
answers will be relevant. Questions, then, guide the
inquiry toward answers and solutions to problems.
However, the relevance of questions to a problem can depend
on the previous occurrence of direct insights. Previous
questions and direct insights may be required in order to
answer a question or solve a problem. For example, the
emergence of questions about molecular formulae depend on
understanding the periodic table. The questions asked by
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a physician about a patient's symptoms depend on a doctor's
understanding of disease, similar symptoms encountered in
previous patients, and previous diagnoses. Previous
knowledge helps a doctor pose the pertinent questions in
that an experienced doctor can probably detect what is
relevant and what is irrelevant to the inquiry. Similarly,
questions asked by a judge about a particular case depend
on the judge's knowledge of law and similar cases and their
relation to legal categories. An experienced judge is more
likely to ask the relevant questions in order to understand
the relevant aspects of a specific case.
Insight is not restricted to the raw materials of sense
perception. Not only do insights occur in the context of
presentations, What-questions, and formulations, but
insights are also related to other insights. According to
Lonergan, insights do not occur in isolation. In the
scientific context, "A single insight yields an object of
thought; a conception yields a definition; and from a
cluster of insights, one builds up a system of definitions,
axioms, postulates, and deductions..."9 According to
Lonergan, Euclid's geometry and subsequent developments and
the periodic table in chemistry are examples of related
insights. He writes that we learn inasmuch as we can add
insight to insight, inasmuch as the new does not exclude
the old but complements and combines with it.
Understanding and Being. 61.
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Understanding concrete situations, such as those
experienced by doctors diagnosing ailments and judges
interpreting situations, also depends on the relation of
sets of related insights. A doctor builds on his or her
understanding of a patient's complaints by asking questions
in order to rule out potential diagnoses and to narrow down
the possible diagnoses as much as possible. In this way
the doctor adds insight to insight until the doctor has a
supervening insight (formulated as a diagnosis) that
encompasses the previous insights. Similarly, a judge
interpreting a case asks question after question about the
law, previous cases, and the events that took place,
thereby building on his previous knowledge of the law and
the case until a supervening insight that encompasses and
synthesizes the previous insights is reached and formulated
as an interpretation of the situation.
(c) Direct Insight: The As£ of Disggvery la ThQ
Understanding Phase
What-questions lead to direct insights. In Lonergan's
words, "The insight is the click, the grasp, the discovery,
what is added to one's knowledge when one sees the "must"
in the data."10 A doctor's insight into a problem is a
discovery of the unity in the symptoms, that is, how the
symptoms "must be" linked together. Similarly, a judge's
ibid., 41.
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insight into events discovers the unity in the events, that
is, how the event "must be" linked together. But the
"must" that is discovered is not a "must" that is concerned
with truth. Instead, it is a definition, explanation,
unity, or interpretation that, as yet, is not known to be
correct or incorrect, true or false. The doctor's
diagnosis and the judge's interpretation, at this point,
are possibly correct.
But to what extent is direct insight an act of discovery?
The nature of the discovery that occurs in direct insight
can be introduced by considering simple examples such as
jokes and crossword puzzles. Direct insight occurs when
you "get" the punch line of a joke. The act of discovering
the relationship between the question and the punch line is
the insight. "Do you know why mice have such small
balls????????????????? "Because not many of them dance."
In this example, "getting the joke" depends on an insight
that discovers the link between the ambiguous meaning of
the word "balls" and dancing. Put crudely, this section is
concerned with what it is to "get" a punch line of a joke.
In other words, the goal of this discussion is to explain
the structure of the "get" or the "discovery" in human
understanding. Similarly, people doing crossword puzzles
also have insights. They are provided with clues in the
form of obscure phrases, letters they have already filled
in, and boxes indicating the length of words. Insights
discover possible solutions to a puzzle.
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So what does it mean to talk about direct insight as
discovering relations immanent in data such as sensible
presentations or imaginative representations? The best
way to answer this question is to begin by discussing what
Lonergan thinks direct insight is not- Just as Lonergan
distinguishes insight from sensible presentations, he
distinguishes insight from formulations of insight. The
activity of insight, according to Lonergan, is pre-
conceptual? that is, it occurs before expression. Insight
is not expression, ie. stating the contents of the insight.
Insight is the basis of concepts; it is not the
formulation of what it discovers. The insight is the act
of discovery which is prior to stating the content of the
discovery as a concept, correlation, definition,
hypothesis, explanation, interpretation, or unity.11
The difficulty of explaining what it means to discover
relations in data or to grasp the "must" in the data is due
to the fact that explanations of what insight discovers
depend on and occur after insight has occurred, but the
resulting explanation of the nature of insight as an act of
discovery must be used to explain the discovery that
occurred as insight prior to its formulation. So, to
explain insight in terms of an act of discovery is to go
beyond the insight, the mental activity, to a formulation
or explanation of the insight. Hence, defining the
ibid., 47.
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structure of discovery or the grasp of the "must" is
difficult, but not impossible.
Because the contents of the discovery can only be
understood in light of a formulation of an insight, the
study of the grasp of the "must" must use particular cases.
The notion of "discovering relations" or "seeing the must
in the data" cannot be understood apart from particular
data since it is meaningless to talk about "discovering
relations" in the absence of data. Insights are into data
and do not occur unless there are raw materials that can be
interrogated. Hence, the search for a universal definition
of "what it is to grasp relations" will be in vain.
Although some general characteristics of "grasping" can be
formulated, the study of the act of discovery is restricted
to particular examples and it must be acknowledged that the
data for studying what is a pre-conceptual activity are
based on and depend on the activity being studied. In
other words, to study the activity, the expression of the
activity must be examined. The methodological problem lies
in the fact that the expression of the insight is not the
activity of the insight and yet we want to study the
activity of insight itself. Consequently, we must rely on
inferences regarding the structure of "grasping" or
discovering.
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The nature of discovery as "grasping the must"12 cannot be
over-emphasized. Direct insight is into particular data
and leads to the expression of particular links and
particular relations among data. A doctor's insight into
symptoms is a discovery of what the relation among the
symptoms "must be". This discovery does not alter the
symptoms in any way. The patient still feels ill. A
judge's direct insight into legal arguments and testimony
is also a discovery of what "must be" the relation among
data. A judge's interpretation of arguments and testimony
does not alter what a judge has heard. Although insight
depends on data for its contents and will not occur without
particular data, insight does not change sensible
presentations. It does not add anything to the
presentations. Rather, insight grasps relations immanent
in the data.
Insight can be understood as the nexus between particular
What-guestions and answers. One can ask "What is
strabismus?" which is answered by discovering and
formulating a definition or an explanation. From this
point of view, the activity of insight - "discovering" -
can only be understood and specified if the questions and
answers have particular contents. Insight discovers
particular relations in data. Consequently, it is
necessary to analyse the structure of insight in particular
12. Remembering, of course, that the "grasp of the must" can
be mistaken.
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situations to understand the act of discovery that occurs
in the act of insight. I have chosen to discuss Lonergan's
analyses of geometrical insights, scientific insights, and
insights that grasp the concrete unity in data. While both
the contexts in which these insights occur and the nature
of the discoveries made by these direct insights differ,
all three types of direct insight have the same structure
in that they all "grasp" or "discover" the relations or
links among raw materials that would otherwise be unknown.
Direct insight in geometry discovers the relations among
the data that are necessary and also the relations among
the data that are impossible. The scientific direct
insight discovers possible relations between independent
and dependent variables. Direct insights that discover a
concrete unity discover how data are related to each other
to form of a unity or whole. For example, direct insight
in medicine discovers how a patients's symptoms are related
to disease and previous diagnoses. Similarly, direct
insight in law discovers how particular events and law are
related as, for instance, a case of murder.
Lonergan illustrates the geometrical insight by explaining
how one comes to understand the definition of a circle. In
Insight. Lonergan considers how one discovers the
definition of a circle in detail. He summarizes the
process of discovery in Understanding and Being in the
following manner: "The What-guestion he answers is "What
is a circle?" in his own words,
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We start with the cartwheel and draw the radii. We
see that if any of the radii are unequal, there are
bound to be either bumps or dents in the perimeter.
If one radius is a little too long, we have to bring
the perimeter out, and if one is a little too short,
we have to bring the perimeter in. However, if one
considers that the radii are infinite in number and
that they are exactly the same length, then the circle
is bound to be perfectly round. That is the insight.
What the insight grasps is necessity and impossibility
- the necessity of the circle being perfectly round
and the impossibility of the circle being perfectly
round if any radii are unequal.13
Lonergan says that the insight in this case grasps a
necessary relation in the sensible presentation. The
sensible presentation consists of imagining the perfect
roundness of this curve, and supposing an infinity of radii
belonging to this curve. The insight adds to the sensible
presentation, that in order for the curve to be perfectly
round, all the radii must be equal. This is a necessary
relation. The impossible relation is that, if any of the
radii are unequal, it is impossible for the curve to be
perfectly round. The geometrical insight grasps necessity
and impossibility immanent in the data. This type of
insight grasps that, if a particular relationship among
ibid., 46.
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data exists, it is impossible for certain other
relationships among the same data to exist.
The scientific insight will be analyzed by considering an
ophthamologist's desire to understand strabismus (cross-
eyedness). This type of insight discovers an explanation,
a cause, a reason, or a correlation. For example, an
ophthamologist may want to know about crossed eyes and may
ask "What is strabismus?" The researcher seeks an
explanation of strabismus. He begins his investigation by
distinguishing between different types of strabismus and
the various degrees of each type, the relative lengths and
strengths of opposed sets of eye muscles. The researcher
relates his findings to critical periods in eye development
and correlates these critical periods to the presence or
absence of particular growth factors, chemicals, hormones,
environmental factors, and investigates the relationship
between strabismus and recessive autosomal genes. For
example, he may compare the incidence of strabismus with
the occurrence of a particular recessive autosomal gene and
find a positive correlation. His insights grasp the
possible relations among the two sets of data. Insofar as
new developments in technology or research strategies could
revise or even supercede his insights, his insights grasp
possibilities inherent in the data such as the possibility
that there is a positive correlation between the incidence
of strabismus and the existence of a particular gene. The
relations he grasps are not "necessary" since they could
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later be revised.
Direct insight can discover a concrete unity in sensible
presentations. Insight grasps the concrete unity or
wholeness in the data. Lonergan notes that an insight into
what is a house is not a combination of separate analyses
of walls, roof, foundation, windows, and doors. Instead,
this type of insight grasps that the relations among these
parts constitute a concrete unity or whole - a house. P.
McShane illustrates this type of insight with the tale of
Jonah who
...woke up lying on his back feeling sick. The place
is pitch dark, smelly, damp. He feels with his hands
the damp, mossy surface around him. He gets to his
feet and the whole place sways about. He shines his
pocket torch around: He is in some sort of cave,
reddish coloured, with odd projections and pieces of
bone around. Then it dawns on him... "I'm in a
whale." Now, note that the "dawning" added nothing to
the data beyond the unity-identity-wholeness of one
thing [that was discovered]. (We speak loosely -
obviously it pulls in his understanding of whales.)14
P. McShane, Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations. (New
York: Exposition Press, 1975), 28.
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Jonah is not the only one to have a direct insight that
discovers the unity in sensible data. Doctors and judges
also discover the concrete unity in sensible presentations.
A physician discovers that the particular symptoms of a
patient are related as a disease. Similarly, a judge
discovers that particular elements in a case are related to
each other as a whole or unity in that they constitute a
crime. The discovery that a situation amounts to murder
involves discovering the relation among the significant
events of the case, the relevant law, and previous cases
that amount to murder.
A few observations can be made about these examples. The
first is that the relations discovered by the three types
of insight are different. Geometrical insights discover
necessity and impossibility in the data and are expressed
as abstract definitions. Scientific insights discover
possible relations among the data that are formulated as
abstract explanations and definitions. Insights in
concrete circumstances discover that the data constitutes
a concrete whole. As I have indicated at various points,
legal decision-making primarily involves direct insights
that discover the concrete unity in data. But this is not
to say that direct insight in law does not resemble
scientific insights. Many legal academics are engaged in
searching for and formulating legal principles and legal
definitions.
171
However, it is equally important to note that direct
insight has the same basic structure in all contexts. The
particular relation discovered by direct insight depends on
the specific question asked and the type of data that is
being interrogated. These differences result in the
differences among the three types of insight. Despite the
fact that the nature of the grasp of insight is only
meaningful in relation to particular questions and data, it
seems that the activity of insight can discover relations
in data that are very diverse. Insight is an adaptable
activity capable of coping with unfamiliar and changing
data.
There are no rules that will automatically lead to a
discovery if they are followed. Lonergan claims that
insight is not reached solely by learning rules, following
precepts, nor by studying any methodology. A doctor may
have rules of thumb that are followed in order to make a
diagnosis, but a problem is not understood because the
doctor follows a set of rules. A diagnosis is made if
relevant questions are asked. Similarly, while a judge
follows rules regarding the order in which testimony can be
presented and rules concerning, for example, hearsay
evidence, such rules do not guarantee that a judge will
discover how the testimony of the witnesses fits together
or how the events and the law are related. The judge must
ask pertinent questions in order to interpret the
situation; these questions are not pre-determined and do
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not necessarily arise in an orderly fashion. Solving legal
problems is primarily a matter of trial and error. In
Lonergan's opinion, "Were there rules for discovery, then
discoveries would be mere conclusions."15
Although the process of reaching direct insights is not
determined by following rules or by logical deduction, this
does not mean that the process is essentially arbitrary and
irrational. On the contrary, the process is conscious and
deliberate. Questions are deliberately and consciously
asked in order to have direct insights. Moreover, if one
wants to understand the nature of something, one identifies
the end that is desired and then devises a strategy to
reach that end. For example, if a doctor wants to
understand the nature of a patient's complaints such as a
stomach ache and vomiting, the doctor's strategy might be
to feel the person's abdomen and perform an ultra-sound
examination. The doctor knows that these methods have
successfully led to a diagnosis on previous occasions. If
a judge wants to discover if a person is guilty of some
crime, the strategy that has been devised is a trial where
the evidence and arguments by opposing counsel is subject
to strict rules and procedures that help the judge or jury
reach an unbiased verdict. This trial method is used
because it has helped solve legal problems on previous
occasions. Although these strategies involve trial and
Insight. 4.
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error they are not essentially irrational nor arbitrary,
but are conscious, deliberate, and intelligent.
Insight is the source of all learning and knowledge.
"Discovery is a new beginning. It is the origin of new
rules that supplement or even supplant the old. Genius is
creative. It is genius because it originates the novelties
that will be the routines of the future."16 Although
Lonergan writes here as if insight leads only to major
discoveries that might be considered as representing
paradigm shifts in science, he also thinks that insight
occurs as a normal activity in science and indeed in all
areas of inquiry.
(d) Formulation or Expression
As noted above, insight is different from expression, but
it leads to it. Direct insight leads to the distinct
mental activity of formulating and expressing the insight.
The act of direct insight discovers the particular relation
that can be expressed or considered and transformed into a
general expression. For Lonergan, an insight is distinct
from a formulation of a definition or explanation. A
direct insight is into a particular case, set of data, or
circumstances. In medicine, the doctor's insight is into
a particular patient's problem and can be expressed as a
ibid., 4.
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diagnosis of one patient's problem. A judge's insight is
into a particular case and can be expressed as an
interpretation of one particular situation. For example,
"This particular situation is a case of murder."
Lonergan writes that "...one has to do some further
thinking if one wants a conception, an expression, a
general formulation of that insight."17 in science, "One
has to take time out to think out a general formula that
adequately expresses the insight."18 Archimedes' insight
about weighing the crown in water is expressed in terms of
scientific generality as the relation between specific
gravity, mass, and volume. Such a definition holds for
different fluids. If a doctor wants to formulate a general
definition of ulcers, this is done by expressing the
relevant similarities among ulcers. If a judge wants to
formulate a general definition of murder, the judge must
express the relevant similarities among cases of murder.
Formulating the insight completes the pattern of mental
activities involved in the process of discovery in the
understanding phase of theoretical reasoning.
Lonergan uses Archimedes' solution to Hiero's problem to
illustrate how insight is a pivot between the concrete and
the abstract. Lonergan says Archimedes had a concrete
Understanding and Being, 41.
ibid., 41.
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problem - "to settle whether a particular crown was made of
pure gold-"19 Lonergan says Archimedes' concrete solution
was to weigh the crown in water. The abstract part of the
procedure includes the abstract formulations of the
principles of displacement and of specific gravity that are
derived from the concrete problem and solution. The
scientific importance lies in the abstract formulations
that can be applied to solve other problems. The direct
insight was into one particular problem and the solution
concerned one particular crown. Archimedes' direct insight
was into his particular situation. However, because the
formulation of his direct insight as an abstract law can be
applied to other situations, Lonergan understands the
scientific direct insight, as he does all types of insight,
as a pivot between the concrete situation and the abstract
formulation.
Lonergan notes that defining what is necessary and
sufficient to the insight may be tricky because attention
to the general case may not be automatic. The act of
formulating the direct insight involves picking out
everything that is sufficient and necessary to the insight
and leaving out what is not necessary for having the same
insight again. In Lonergan's words, "...one selects what
is essential and omits what is incidental; one selects
19. Insight, 5.
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what is significant and omits what is negligible."20 He
says that "We formulate generally what is necessary in the
presentations to have the insight."21 In a general
definition, only the necessary conditions for the
definition of a circle are formulated. The incidental
elements are excluded from the general definition. Whether
the particular circle that is analyzed is blue or red, big
or small, bright or dull is irrelevant to the definition of
a circle. These factors do not play an essential role in
the genesis of the definition of a circle. The same
process occurs when formulating insights into particular
concrete situations. The physician discovers the relations
among the patient's symptoms and grasps the link between
the symptoms and ulcers in order to make a diagnosis. The
patient's height, address, or hair colour are irrelevant to
the formulation of the insight and are omitted from the
explanation. The person may have blue eyes but eye colour
is not relevant to the explanation. In the legal context,
the judge presents an interpretation of the events which
includes events that are, for example, relevant to
understanding causation in a murder case, but excludes
events that are not relevant to the interpretation. For
example, the fact that the victim died from stab wounds
made by a knife would be relevant to establishing the cause
of death, but the colour of the knife's handle probably
Understanding and Being. 48.
ibid., 133.
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would not be relevant to the question of causation. In
Jonah's case, it is irrelevant to his insight whether the
whale is a humpback or a blue whale, male or female. What
is necessary for the insight into the concrete situation is
the relationship between the damp, cold, dark, place where
Jonah is situated and his understanding of whales.
Likewise, the colour of a house, the height of the walls
and the type of roof are irrelevant to the insight that
grasps these elements - walls, a floor, and a roof - as
part of a concrete unity, a house.
Attempts to formulate the insight in general and abstract
terms reveal that direct insight "pivots between the
concrete and the abstract."22 The concrete nature of
direct insights is due to the fact that direct insights in
theoretical reasoning discover the relations among sensible
presentations and imaginative representations. Scientists
have insights into sensory presentations. Because what
insight adds to sensible presentations can also be
formulated in abstract terms, Lonergan says that direct
insight, by its nature, is the mediator, the hinge, the
pivot between concrete sensible presentations, specific
questions and abstract formulations that not only cover the
particular data studied but also other similar data. If
the data are similar, a different insight is not required
to understand them. This function of insight places it at
Insight. 5.
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the centre of the process of human discovery and
illustrates its significance and its relevance in
understanding similar situations.
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4. The Testing Phase in Theoretical Problem-Solving
(1) Introduction
Questions about truth are not part of the understanding
phase of problem-solving. First we understand and then we
judge. Thus a testing phase follows direct insight and
formulation. The testing phase is concerned with notions
of truth and falsity, certitude and probability. The
function of the testing phase is to test whether or not
direct insights and formulations are correct. A physician
tests whether the diagnosis of the symptoms is correct and
a judge tests whether the interpretation of the situation
as a case of murder is correct. In each scenario,
sufficient evidence for a judgment of fact is sought.
The testing phase begins when a doctor or judge wonders or
puzzles about whether their diagnosis or interpretation of
the situation is correct. Such wonder and puzzling become
focused when the physician and judge ask questions. The
type of questions they ask are Is-questions such as "Is the
diagnosis correct?" and "Is this a case of murder?" This
type of question leads to reflective insights. Reflective
insight is the act of discovery in the testing phase.
Reflective insight discovers the relations among a proposed
judgment of fact, the conditions that are sufficient for
making the judgment, and whether or not the conditions are
satisfied. A doctor discovers, by reflective insight,
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whether or not the symptoms of the patient are sufficient
for making the judgment that the diagnosis is correct. A
judge discovers, by reflective insight, whether or not the
evidence is sufficient for judging that the interpretation
of the case is correct. Reflective insights are formulated
as judgments of fact. A doctor may state, "Yes, this is a
case of an ulcer", and a judge may write, "No, this
situation is not a case of murder."
The aims of this section are: (1) to analyse the role of
questions in testing definitions, hypotheses, explanations,
diagnoses, and interpretations and (2) to explain the
extent to which reflective insight an act of discovery in
the testing phase.
(2) Elements in The Testing Phase
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(a) Is-questions
As What-questions characterize a shift in the context of
inquiry from mere sensible and imaginative presentations to
a desire to understand, so Is-questions signify a shift in
the focus of the inquiry from understanding presentations
to a concern with reflecting upon and testing whether one's
understanding is true or false. In this new context, the
orientation of the questioner is toward judging whether
one's direct insight, concept, definition, explanation,
diagnosis, or interpretation is correct or incorrect, true
or false. According to Lonergan, the expression or
formulation of a direct insight can be a nominal definition
or an explanation, a hypothesis, or a whole theory. But is
it true? Is it correct? Are our definitions,
explanations, theories, or interpretations simply bright
ideas? Our concern has shifted from the questions, "What-
is-it?" and "Why-is-it-so?", which ask for some sort of
tentative or definitive explanation to questions such as
"Is-it-so?" "Is-it-correct?" "Is-it-true?" We ask
questions such as "Is the definition of a circle the loci
of a set of points equidistant from the centre?" "Is it
raining?" "Is Jonah correct when he declares he is inside
a whale?" "Does the person suffer from an ulcer?" "Is
this situation a case of murder?" These questions, called
Is-questions, portray the mental attitude of an inquirer
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seeking truth. They are fundamentally different from What-
questions. They are not concerned with questions that ask
"What?" or "Why?" and seek a tentative discovery. Is-
questions stand in need of sufficient evidence in order to
make reasonable judgments.
(b) Reflective Insight: The Act of Discovery in The
Testing Phase
Reflective insight is the mental activity that mediates
between Is-questions and judgments of fact. It transforms
Is-questions into judgments of fact. As such, reflective
insight is an answer to a question, a solution to a problem
about whether or not a formulation is correct. Both direct
and reflective insights are insights into data. Whereas
direct insight is into sensible presentations and
imaginative representations, reflective insights are
insights into a conjunction of presentations and
conceptions, explanations, definitions, diagnoses, and
interpretations. Direct insights and presentations are the
raw materials for reflective insight. For the doctor,
reflective insight grasps the relation among symptoms and
the diagnosis. The reflective insight reached by a judge
grasps the link among oral testimony, legal arguments, and
the judge's interpretation of the situation. The mental
attitude of the inquirer in this context can be represented
by the questions "Is-it-true?" "Is-it-so?" Is-questions
initiate reflection by demanding reflective insight.
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Both direct insight and reflective insight involve
discovery. As direct insight discovers causes,
correlations, definitions, explanations or unities,
reflective insight discovers "the sufficiency of the
evidence for a prospective judgment."23 The reflective
insight itself discovers whether or not the evidence is
sufficient as a basis for making a judgment of fact, that
is, whether the patient's symptoms or the oral testimony of
witnesses are a sufficient basis for making the diagnosis
or the interpretation. The questions I want to answer in
this section are: "What does it mean to discover the
sufficiency of the evidence for a judgment?" "What is the
nature of the discovery that occurs?"
An individual begins the process of reflection by
formulating a prospective judgment that "Such-and-such is
correct" or "Such-and-such is incorrect". This judgment is
prospective in the sense that it is a potential or possible
judgment. A judgment will be made after a reflective
insight has occurred. Hence, at this stage, a judgment has
not yet been reached. A judgment that "Such-and-such is
correct" has conditions which must be fulfilled if the
judgment is to be correct. The judgment must be supported
by sufficient evidence.
Both the conditions for making the judgment and whether or
ibid., 279.
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not they are supported by evidence must be discovered.
Hence, reflective insight involves two types of discovery.
First, the individual discovers the link or relations
between the prospective judgment and the conditions that
are sufficient for making that judgment. In other words,
in reflective insight one discovers the conditions or
criteria that are sufficient, if fulfilled, for making the
prospective judgment. Second, one discovers whether or not
the conditions for making the prospective judgment are
actually fulfilled or satisfied.24
In a single act, the reflective insight itself discovers
(1) the link between the prospective judgment and the
conditions for that judgment and (2) whether or not these
conditions are fulfilled. Lonergan summarizes the general
form of critical reflection as the occurrence of
...a reflective insight in which at once one grasps:
(1) a conditioned, the prospective judgment that a
given direct or introspective insight is correct,
(2) a link between the conditioned and its conditions,
and this on introspective analysis proves to be that
an insight is correct if it is invulnerable and it is
invulnerable if there are no further, pertinent
questions, and
(3) the fulfilment of the conditions, namely that the
P. McShane calls these latter two discoveries pre-
judgmental insights in Wealth of Self and Wealth of
Nations, 36.
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given insight does put an end to further, pertinent
questioning and that this occurs in a mind that is
alert, familiar with the concrete situation, and
intellectually master of it.25
Let's examine a simple example. Suppose I am about to
leave my flat and as I gaze out of my third floor window I
ask myself "Is it raining today?" The prospective judgment
I might formulate is "Yes, it is raining." But I have not
yet made this judgment; it is only a prospective or
potential judgment.
I must discover the conditions or criteria that, in my
opinion, are sufficient for making this judgment. The
conditions that, in my opinion, are sufficient for the
prospective judgment are: (a) that people on the pavement
have their umbrellas open and (b) that cars on the road
have their windshield wipers operating. I have discovered
the first element of reflective insight, the link between
the prospective judgment and the conditions that are
sufficient for the judgment.
Next I look out the window and see that umbrellas are open
and windshield wipers are operating. I discover that the
conditions for the judgment are satisfied. The fulfilling
conditions are on the level of sense-experience. I have
Insight. 287.
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relied on acts of seeing but these sense-presentations are
not judgments.26
Reflective insight, in a single moment or instant,
discovers that the prospective judgment that "It is
raining" is correct, that seeing umbrellas open and wipers
operating is sufficient for making the judgment that "It is
raining", and that the two conditions are satisfied -
umbrellas are open and wipers are operating.
A doctor discovers the conditions that are sufficient, if
fulfilled, for making the judgment that the diagnosis of a
stomach ulcer is correct. The conditions that must be
fulfilled, that is, the symptoms that are sufficient,
consist in sense-experience and previous judgments. In the
"discovery" phase, the doctor listens to the patient
complain about stomach aches and vomiting and feels the
patient's enlarged stomach. What the doctor hears and
feels is sense-experience. A direct insight is reached and
formulated as the diagnosis that this patient has a stomach
ulcer. But is this diagnosis correct? The doctor tests
whether the three symptoms - the stomach ache, vomiting,
and enlarged stomach are sufficient conditions for making
the diagnosis. Whether the three symptoms are a sufficient
basis for the diagnosis is discovered by asking relevant
questions such as "Could the symptoms support a different
ibid., 282.
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diagnosis?" If the symptoms can also support the diagnosis
of a duodenal ulcer, then the three symptoms are not
sufficient for diagnosing a stomach ulcer. Further
conditions must be satisfied, but what are they? Perhaps
an ultra-sound test will resolve the doubt about the
diagnosis. The point is that, when there are no more
pertinent guestions about the conditions for making the
diagnosis, then the sufficient conditions (if fulfilled)
for making the judgment have been discovered.
But so far the physician has discovered that only three
conditions have been fulfilled. The patient has stomach
aches, vomits, and has an enlarged stomach. The fourth
condition that must be satisfied is that some aberration of
the stomach must be detected by ultra-sound. Hence the
physician must perform an ultra-sound test and then
identify the aberration in order to judge whether the
diagnosis is correct or mistaken.
Similarly, a judge's verdict of guilt in a murder case
depends on a judge discovering which conditions must be
satisfied and also whether the conditions are fulfilled.
The task is aided by the fact that the conditions that must
be satisfied are stated as law. The accused must "intend
to cause death or grievous bodily harm". However, the
judge must discover what the particular conditions are, in
this particular case, that are sufficient for judging
guilt. The judge must also discover whether or not the
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conditions that are sufficient for a guilty verdict are
actually fulfilled.
In terras of Lonergan's version of theoretical reasoning,
the analogy between testing a hypothesis, diagnosis, or
interpretation is whether the evidence is, in fact,
sufficient to support the hypothesis, diagnosis, or
interpretation. The scientist reflects on whether the
experimental results are sufficient to support the
hypothesis. The doctor reflects on whether the symptoms
and test results are sufficient to support his diagnosis of
a duodenal ulcer. The judge reflects on whether the
circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the scene of
the crime is sufficient for a judgment of guilt.
However, there is a difference in the aims of theoretical
problem-solving in science and in law. The goal of
scientists is a complete explanation of their data, to know
everything. In contrast, the goal of theoretical inquiry
in law is not a full understanding of the circumstances.
Instead, the aim in the legal context is to attain a
sufficient understanding to enable one to tackle or solve
a particular problem. One way this is accomplished is by
judging the similarity among cases. Cases are not judged
to be similar in all respects. The similarity among cases
depends on what features of the cases are considered to be
relevant to a particular question or problem posed by a
judge. The judge is not concerned with finding out all the
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ways the cases could be similar. If the cases are similar
in the way the judge considers relevant, then that is "good
enough". The cases are judged to be sufficiently similar
with respect to the question the judge considers relevant.
But it is when one considers rival rulings that the
limitations of the purely theoretical analysis becomes
evident. Theoretical problem-solving is not concerned with
judging which rival ruling to accept. Judging which rival
ruling to accept not only depends on sense data, but also
on an evaluation of aims, purposes, and values. From this
point of view, an evaluation of competing rulings would be
an aspect of practical reasoning insofar as practical
reasoning is concerned with judging what should be done,
rather than with judging whether an interpretation of a
particular situation is supported by sufficient evidence.
The point I want to make here is that the conditions that
one considers sufficient for a prospective judgment of fact
are discovered by asking relevant questions. The key
question is "Are the conditions, if fulfilled, sufficient
for the prospective judgment?" The criterion for the
sufficiency of the conditions is that there are no further
pertinent questions. Testing whether the conditions for a
judgment are sufficient is a process of discovery insofar
as it involves posing questions and discovering answers to
them. It is in this sense that justifying the link between
the prospective judgment and its conditions involves
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discovery.
Whether an explanation or interpretation is correct does
not depend on rules. Rather, the criteria for a judgment
of fact is the absence of further relevant questions that
occur to the person engaged in problem-solving. Hence all
judgments of fact are neither absolutes nor certainties.
Judgments of fact are grounded on evidence that is
considered sufficient or good enough for the specific
judgment. The evidence may be sufficient for a judgment of
manslaughter, but not for murder.
Lonergan's explanation of the correctness of direct and
reflective insights - as discovered in testing - is based
on an operational distinction between vulnerable and
invulnerable insights. He states that "Prior to our
conceptual distinction between correct and mistaken
insights, there is an operational distinction between
invulnerable and vulnerable insights."27 An insight is
vulnerable when further questions arise. "Those further
questions are such that the insight one has at present will
be complemented and qualified and perhaps corrected to some
extent by future insights."28 He concludes that "an
insight is correct if there are no further, pertinent
ibid., 284.
Understanding and Being. 150.
191
questions"29 and that "the conditions for the prospective
judgment are fulfilled when there are no further, pertinent
questions."30 This idea, which he considers to be an
immanent law of cognitional process, can be illustrated by
analysing how an individual comes to judge whether the
following definition of a circle is correct or mistaken.
The definition of a circle was formulated as the loci of a
set of points equidistant from a centre. But, this
definition also describes the coastline of Africa. The
coastline is the loci of a set of points equidistant from
the centre of the earth. The expression of the insight is
vulnerable since further relevant questions arise such as
"Why do the coastline of Africa and a circle both fit this
definition of a circle? Surely the coast of Africa and a
circle are different? Answering these questions involves
the additional insight that the loci of a set of points of
a circle and its centre must lie in the same plane.
Therefore, when the definition of a circle is amended there
are no further relevant questions.
According to Lonergan, "There is a stage where insights
move on to be invulnerable, in the sense that de facto
there are no further relevant questions that might




insight hits things right on; and there is no doubt about
it, no possibility of any further questions that will
change things."31 "Insights head towards a limit. When
that limit is reached, one has the invulnerable insight,
that is, one has reached a point where further relevant
questions de facto do not arise."32 There can be
additional questions, but they are not relevant. When
there are no more relevant questions about a diagnosis or
a verdict and the relevant questions have been
satisfactorily answered, the diagnosis or verdict has
successfully passed tests.
Lonergan states that the condition of the invulnerable
insight is stated objectively, not subjectively.
The point is not that no further relevant questions
occur to me, but that there are no further relevant
questions. It may happen that no further relevant
questions occur to me because I am not giving them a
chance to arise or because I am a scatterbrain,
because I did not think long enough about it. Again,
it may be that further questions arise that seem
relevant to me, but I do not have good enough judgment
to judge whether they are relevant or not...33








exists when there are no further relevant questions. "It
is not a question of possibility, 'Could there be some
further relevant question?' The question of possibility
does not bear upon the judgment that de facto these
insights have reached the point of invulnerability."3'1
Although his notion of objectivity is linked to the fact
that no further questions arise, he is not stating that
invulnerable insights are absolutely correct. He is only
saying that the insights may be as invulnerable as you can
get or need to get in the circumstances. Good judgment
then is relative. In Lonergan's view it depends on:
(1) "[giving] the further questions a chance to arise."35
(2) "the previous acquisition of a large number of other,
connected, and correct insights."36
(3) the fact that insights occur within a self-correcting
process of learning in which the shortcomings of insights
provoke further questions until one becomes familiar with
a situation and masters it.37
(4) making a special effort to cope with temperament, ie.
rashness and indecisiveness.38












insofar as one takes one's time before judging, is alert
and asks questions, talks things over, and tests
hypotheses, explanations, and interpretations.
(c) Judgments of Fact
Reflective insight leads to the act of judgment. Judgment
itself depends on reflective insight. Judgment can be
expressed in two basic ways - "It is so" or "It is not so."
Lonergan states that "judgments proceed rationally from a
grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence."39 "One makes a
judgment because one grasps the sufficiency of the
evidence."40 In other words, "the act of judgment is
caused by the act that grasps the sufficiency of the
evidence where "cause" means "because" as rational
consciousness, a consciousness that is obligated by its own
rationality to judge, by the rational necessity of
judging."41 The act of judgment is not of synthesis, but
an act in which one posits synthesis. A theory, an
hypothesis, an explanation, or an interpretation is already
a synthesis. Judgment does not add further synthesis.
Judging is an expression of a reflective insight.
A judgment of fact answers the Is-question by expressing
Understanding and Being. 138.
Insight. 140.





what is grasped by reflective insight as one of two
alternatives: "Yes" or "No" or in one of a variety of
modalities - "I don't know", "Possibly", "Probably", "We'll
see", "Certainly". The act of judgment is the act that
adds assent to a proposition, that changes a proposition
from the expression of an act of conceiving, defining,
thinking, supposing, or considering to a proposition that
states that the content of the expression is true or that
an object exists. A doctor states, "Yes, this patient's
problem is a stomach ulcer", and a judge states, "This
situation is a case of murder". Thus a judgment of fact is
more than an expression or formulation of a reflective
insight.
For Lonergan, judgment is a personal commitment. Judgment
involves personal responsibility.42 Unlike memory or
insight judgment is under our control, and is a personal
act. "One does not have to say "Yes" or "No"; one can say
"I don't know." One does not have to say "It certainly is
so"; one can say "It probably is so" or "It possibly is
so." All the alternatives relevant to human weakness,
ignorance, and tardiness are provided for, and one is
committed to picking out the right one..."43 He states
that "a judgment is the responsibility of the one that
Understanding and Being. 138.
ibid., 138.
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judges."44 "Because it is so personal, so much an
expression of one's own reasonableness apart from any
constraint, because all alternatives are provided for, it
is entirely one's own responsibility, one does not complain
about one's bad judgments; one is responsible for them."45
Yes, No, I don't know, with certitude or only probability;
the question as presented can be dismissed, distinctions
introduced, and new questions substituted. "The variety of
possible answers makes full allowance for the misfortunes
and shortcomings of the person answering, and by the same
stroke it closes the door on possible excuses for
mistakes."46 A physician is held responsible for a
diagnosis, just as a judge is held responsible for a
verdict. Both the doctor and the judge are the individuals
who discover the criteria that are sufficient for their
judgments and also discover whether the evidence is a
sufficient basis for their own judgments of fact. If the
evidence is considered by the doctor or judge to be
sufficient for the judgment, then, according to that doctor
or judge, the judgment is correct or justified. Hence
doctors and judges are held responsible for their mistaken
judgments. Doctors are sometimes sued for mis-diagnosing
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Like formulations which depend on the concrete data that
are studied and the particular direct insights that occur,
the meaning of a judgment depends on its context. It is
related to a particular Is-question and a particular
reflective insight. According to Lonergan, a judgment is
meaningless apart from the question it answers and its
content which is supplied by a reflective insight. For
this reason Is-questions, reflective insight, and judgment
form an integrated whole. It is an integral element of the
structure of knowing.
Because the judgment depends on the sufficiency of the
evidence it follows that if one does not grasp the
sufficiency of the evidence and nevertheless says "It is"
or "It is not", one is just guessing. For example, judging
that a person has an ulcer without undertaking some sort of
investigation is rash, and judging that a person is guilty
of murder would be unfounded without relying on relevant
forensic evidence. On the other hand, according to
Lonergan, if one grasps the sufficiency of the evidence and
hesitates, one is being silly because one's rationality
demands that one judge. For example, the doctor would be
defaulting on his rationality if he grasped that the
evidence for the diagnosis of a duodenal ulcer is
sufficient, but did not judge. In Lonergan's opinion,
defaulting on your rationality is introducing a
contradiction within your cognitive structure because what
reflective insight discovers or fails to discover does not
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become explicit in the act of judgment. Another
characteristic of rational consciousness "includes the
principle of excluded middle, provided the question is
fairly put - either it is or it is not, either one or the
other. It includes the principle of non-contradiction - it
cannot be both."47 Rationality, for Lonergan, does not lie
in logic.
Understanding and testing in theoretical problem-solving
are not independent phases. According to Lonergan, because
the two previous levels of presentations and understanding
provide the content for Is-questions and reflective
insights, it is possible to distinguish between the proper
content and the borrowed content of a judgment. The proper
content is the positing, the "Yes", the "No", "It is", "It
is not"; the borrowed content of a judgment of fact is the
expression of the insight which is formulated as an
explanation, definition, diagnosis, or interpretation.
Judgment transforms the synthesis reached in the
understanding phase by What-questions, insights, and
formulations into an object that exists or states that a
proposition is correct or incorrect. The explicit content
of the synthesis discovered or invented by the reflective
insight [and its presentation] includes both the contents
borrowed from the direct insight and its own proper content
which consists of the answer "Yes" or "No". But there is
Understanding and Being. 144.
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also the implicit content of judgment. For Lonergan, when
one says, "'It is', one also means 'It is true that it is.'
Truth is the implicit content of every judgment."48
Reflective insight depends on direct insight in another
way. In the ideal situation, Is-questions arise only after
What-guestions have been fully answered by direct insights,
but there can be situations in which Is-guestions lead to
What-questions. Such circumstances may arise when a jury
is asked to pronounce a verdict in a criminal trial. An
Is-question may be asked: "Is the person guilty?" but
after reflecting on the evidence, the jury may need to ask
further What-questions in order to understand the events,
motives, or witnesses' testimony before they make a
judgment. When Is-questions cannot be answered without
further understanding, the attention of the inquirer can
return to questions that seek further direct insights
before reaching a reflective insight and a judgment of
fact.
Lonergan believes that the form of reflective insight is
the basic activity involved in judging rather than
deductive inference. For him, "the link between the
prospective judgment and the fulfilling conditions is a
structure immanent and operative within cognitional
Understanding and Being. 140.
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process."49 It is not a judgment or a definition; "it is
simply a way of doing things..."50 McShane states that
"the fulfilment of conditions is appreciated in a
prejudgmental fashion".51 According to him, there is a
prejudgmental grasp or discovery of the fulfilled
conditions which is on the level of sense-experience and it
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5. Conclusion
Lonergan offers a plausible explanation of problem-solving
in theoretical reasoning. It is comprised of a dynamic
pattern of seven mental activities that involves (1) sense-
experience, (2) What-questions, (3) direct insights, (4)
formulations, (5) Is-questions, (6) reflective insights,
and (7) judgments of fact.
The study of the understanding phase indicates that the
elements that comprise what would otherwise be known by the
legal positivists as the "process of discovery" can be
studied. Moreover, it turns out that the process of
discovery is a deliberate and conscious process that is not
essentially arbitrary, haphazard, and irrational. The
detailed analysis of direct insight as an act that
discovers the relations among data partially addresses
debates about what "discovery" entails insofar as it
explains the nature of the acts of discovery in theoretical
reasoning and precisely addresses the issue concerning what
the term "discovery" refers to.
The analysis of the testing phase addresses an area of the
decision-making or judging process that has been neglected
by legal theorists. Not only is testing performed by
asking and answering pertinent questions, but perhaps the
most significant finding is that testing involves an act of
discovery, namely reflective insight. The explanation of
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reflective insight as a mental activity that discovers the
sufficiency of the evidence for a judgment of fact is a key
contribution to the explanation of the nature of
"discovery" in theoretical problem-solving.
Finally, the understanding and testing phases in problem-
solving are inter-related. The understanding phase
provides the formulations that will be subsequently tested
in the testing phase. The testing phase relies on sense-
experience when discovering whether the conditions for a
judgment are fulfilled. Although the usual progression is
from What-questions to Is-questions, Is-questions can also
lead to What-questions. In short, the understanding and
testing phases are part of a pattern of mental activities
oriented to answering questions and solving problems.
Chapter Five
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"Discovery" in Practical Problem-Solving
1. Introduction
Not only does decision-making in medicine and law involve
theoretical problem-solving, it also involves practical
problem-solving. Physicians and judges both ask practical
questions such as "What is to be done?" "What can I do
about the patient's stomach ulcer?" and "What can I do with
the guilty person?" However, these are only the most
obvious examples. Practical questions occur throughout the
decision-making process. Practical questions demand the
emergence of practical insights which are formulated as
proposed courses of action. The doctor's options could
include prescribing drugs, performing surgery, or advising
a special diet. The judge's options could include
probation, a suspended sentence, or a term in jail. A
judge faced with the problem of judging whether parents,
who suffer from post-traumatic stress syndrome after
watching their children physically injured on television,
can recover for nervous shock has two options - either to
award the parents damages for nervous shock or not to award
them damages.
Nor does the practical problem-solving process end with the
discovery of alternatives. Having formulated their
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options, the doctor and judge go on to ask which
alternative they should perforin. Doctors and judges both
ask "Is this proposed course of action sufficiently
suitable in the particular circumstances?" "Should I
prescribe drugs or perform surgery?" A judge could ask
"Should the sentence be probation or 10 years in jail?"
"Should I judge that the parents can recover damages due to
nervous shock after watching the Hillsborough disaster on
television?" or "Should I judge that they cannot recover
damages for nervous shock in this case?"
Evaluations of options by a doctor or a judge lead to a
practical reflective insight and a judgment of value that
one course of action is sufficiently suitable or more
appropriate than others in the circumstances. Finally, the
physician or judge chooses or decides whether or not to
perform the course of action that has been judged to be
sufficiently suitable in the circumstances.
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2. Practical Reasoning
As in theoretical reasoning, Lonergan does not distinguish
between a process of "discovery" and an independent stage
of "justification" in practical reasoning. The image that
a discrete and essentially irrational "discovery" stage
ends with the formulation of courses of action which are
subjected to an independent and essentially logical process
of justification cannot be found in Lonergan's writings.
Rather, the mental operations that are involved in
discovering (or inventing) and testing options are part of
a recurrent pattern of mental activities that comprise a
problem-solving process.
Unfortunately, Lonergan does not examine practical problem-
solving in the legal context. Even his general explanation
of practical reasoning is not illustrated by examples.
However, one scholar who does illustrate practical
reasoning in a way that is consistent with Lonergan's
writings is Garret Barden. What Barden calls the "ethical
or moral field" is equivalent to "practical reasoning" in
Lonergan's writings. In fact, Barden does not draw a
distinction between ethical, moral, or practical action.
For him, the ethical/moral/practical field encompasses
activities that involve "realizing a possibility over which
one has control and for which one is responsible."1 The
1 G. Barden, After Principles. (London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1990), 7.
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boundaries of the ethical field are defined in terms of the
type of questions asked by an individual, not according to
whether the issue is trivial or important. Hence the
questions "Should I cross the road?" and "Should I kill
Jim?" are both ethical/practical questions. In other
words, ethical or practical actions are actions that are
subject to deliberation and choice.2 By contrast,
theoretical reasoning would include matters not subject to
deliberation and choice.3
Like Lonergan, Barden examines practical reasoning from the
point of view of a person engaged in an inquiry asking and
answering practical questions in order to discover what to
do. The two key ethical or practical questions posed in
this context are: (1) "What am I to do in this
situation?"4 and (2) Is the "proposed course of action
good, better, more important, more urgent than another?"5
The aim of ethical inquiry is to discover what to do in a
particular situation. The search is for what, reasonably,
the situation could be. In short, ethical or practical
reasoning involves deliberation and choice.
But the ethical subject is not limited to simply asking
ibid., 9.
ibid., 12.
ibid., 30, 48, 54, 71.
ibid., 79.
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questions. Like Lonergan, Barden defines the ethical
subject as a pattern of basic mental operations. Not only
does the ethical subject ask questions, but one also
considers a particular situation, works out possible
courses of action, determines which are practicable, truly
valuable, really better, and more worthwhile in light of a
particular situation as it is understood, seeks reasons for
and against each possibility, allows time for questions to
arise so that the disadvantages and difficulties of each
alternative can be discovered and finally chooses a course
of action to perform.6
In this chapter, I analyse Lonergan's account of practical
problem-solving and, where appropriate, I present Barden's
specification of practical reasoning in order to
investigate the extent to which practical insight and
practical reflective insight are acts of "discovery" in
judicial decision-making. My method of examining
"discovery" in practical problem-solving is similar to that
used to study theoretical problem-solving in the previous
chapter. I analyse practical problem-solving in terms of
two phases: (1) the understanding phase and (2) the
testing phase. In the understanding phase. one discovers
possible courses of action. This phase involves: (a)
wondering and puzzling about "What-is-to-be-done?" in a
particular situation, (b) having practical insights, and
ibid., 72, 79 .
(c) formulating proposed courses of action.
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In the testing phase. one is concerned with evaluating
whether or not the proposed courses of action are
sufficiently suitable and whether one option is more
suitable than others. This phase includes: (a) asking "Is
this course of action to be performed?" (b) having
practical reflective insights. and (c) formulating
judgments of value. Finally, deciding or choosing whether
or not to perform the action judged to be sufficiently
suitable ends the testing phase.
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3. The Understanding Phase in Practical Problem-Solving
(1) Elements in The Understanding Phase
(a) Wondering and Puzzling about What to do?
The understanding phase is composed of a pattern of mental
activities that includes and is initiated and motivated by
wondering and puzzling about sensible presentations,
memories, imaginations, direct insights and formulations,
judgments of fact, and previous practical insights that
comprise one's explanation or interpretation of a situation
or problem. A doctor wonders and puzzles about what to do
about the patient who is diagnosed as suffering from a
stomach ulcer. Similarly, a judge puzzles about what to do
in the situation interpreted as a case of murder. A judge
can also puzzle about what to do in the case in which
parents suffer post-traumatic stress syndrome after
watching their children die on television due to the
negligence of the police. In these examples, the raw
materials for practical problem-solving are the diagnosis
and the interpretation of a situation. The attitude of
someone engaged in this phase of the inquiry can be
represented by the question "What-is-to-be-done?" or "What
am I to do in this situation as I understand it?" These
questions call for practical insights.
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(b) Practical Insight: The Act of Discovery in The
Understanding Phase
Practical insight is the act of discovery in the
understanding phase of practical reasoning. Practical
insights discover the link between the relevant aspects
that constitute a particular situation and relevant aspects
of the options which could transform the situation.
Practical insights are subsequently formulated as possible
courses of action in the sense that they are options which
could become actualities.
The occurrence of practical insight depends on the accurate
representation of problems. A sufficiently accurate
interpretation of the problematic situation is required so
that a solution which sufficiently addresses the relevant
aspects of the situation can be discovered. In this
context, practical problem-solving depends on theoretical
problem-solving. Knowing the nature of a patient's problem
helps the doctor to discover what to do in order to treat
the problem. An ambiguous or mistaken diagnosis can lead
to solutions that may not adequately treat the problem.
For example, the diagnosis of a stomach ulcer leads to one
set of options that would be relevant to treating stomach
ulcers, whereas the diagnosis of stomach cancer leads to a
different set of possible alternatives that probably would
not be relevant to treating stomach ulcers. Similarly,
interpreting a situation as a case of murder leads to one
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prescribed option - life imprisonment - whereas
interpreting the situation as a case of manslaughter leads
to a range of sentencing options. Interpreting the effects
of watching the Hillsborough disaster on television as
having an "instant effect on emotions and a lasting effect
on memory" makes the situation similar to previous cases in
which parents have seen or heard of the disastrous event or
its immediate aftermath and have recovered for damages due
to nervous shock. This interpretation of the situation
leads to one solution - the parents can recover. But an
interpretation of the situation as a case of communication
by a third party, not a case of parents being within sight
and hearing of the event, and not a case equivalent to the
immediate aftermath of an accident, leads to the
alternative solution that the parents cannot recover for
nervous shock. In all these examples, the courses of
action that are judged to be suitable depend on how the
situation is understood.
The occurrence of practical insights depends on one's
concerns insofar as one is alert to, and concerned with,
practical matters and asks questions such as "What-is-to-
be-done?" The more familiar a person is with solving
practical problems in particular fields, the more likely it
will be that practical insights will occur in new
situations. Practical insight occurs almost at will in
similar circumstances once one has had the initial
practical insight. What was once a difficult and vexing
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problem is no longer so. The solution is simple and
obvious after the practical insight has occurred. For
example, a doctor who treats ulcers will probably know
immediately what the treatment options are when faced with
an ulcer in a patient. The options do not have to re¬
invented each time a doctor diagnoses an ulcer. Similarly,
a judge who awards damages in the case in which nervous
shock is the outcome of watching a disaster on television
will probably not have to re-discover the range of damages
that would be appropriate compensation in a similar case.
The point is that the entire practical problem-solving
process that was required to find a solution in a novel
situation does not need to be performed again to solve a
similar case. The range of options has already been
discovered.
Moreover, familiarity with situations helps a person
identify what is different, new, or changed and relevant in
subsequent circumstances. In general, experts in
particular fields who are interested in, and experienced
in, solving practical problems will probably notice
deviations from expectations more readily. The doctor who
is an expert in ulcers will probably be able to discover
what to do when faced with unfamiliar types of ulcers.
Similarly, a judge who is an expert on nervous shock cases
will probably be more likely to discover or invent a
suitable solution in a novel case than a judge who is not
familiar with cases involving nervous shock.
(c) Proposed Courses of Action
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In contrast to direct insight, practical insight does not
possess the same degree of generality and relevance to
other situations. A doctor can formulate a general
definition of an ulcer and a judge can formulate a general
definition of murder. But practical insights lead to the
formulation of possible courses of action that might or
might not be appropriate in the particular circumstances.
In practical affairs, new courses of action may be reguired
if the situation changes. The old options may not work or
may not be applicable. Practical insight lacks the
generality of direct insight in theoretical reasoning
because in each concrete situation practical insights
occur. Practical insight depends on particular situations.
Drugs may be an appropriate way to treat one person's
ulcer, but surgery may be reguired to adeguately treat
another person's ulcer. Similarly, a two-year sentence may
be appropriate in one case of manslaughter, but ten years
may be suitable in another manslaughter case. Awarding
damages for nervous shock may be appropriate in one type of
case such as when parents see their injured children
immediately after an accident, but it may not be judged to
be suitable when parents have seen the accident on
television. Practical insight is universal only to the
extent that one situation is judged to be significantly
similar to other situations. And what is significant in a
particular situation is what the person who is familiar
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with both situations judges to be significant in the
circumstances.
Practical insights do not discover the most suitable option
in a situation. In Lonergan's words, practical insight is
not concerned with "Whether the unity is going to be made
to exist or whether the correlation is going to be made to
govern events."7 For example, a cyclist with a flat tyre
could come up with a variety of courses of action to
consider. He could phone home and ask for a lift; he could
stick out his thumb and hitch hike; he could fix the tyre
on the spot; he could walk the bicycle home; or he could
throw the useless machine into the lake and revel in his
ability to solve problems. After a doctor diagnoses an
ulcer, he may ask "What treatment should I prescribe for
this patient?" and become cognizant of various
possibilities such as drugs, surgery, or special diet.
After a judge interprets a situation to be a case of
manslaughter, a judge discovers the possible sentences such
as one year, two years, or ten years. After a judge
interprets the situation of watching a disaster on
television to be equivalent to the perception of the actual
event or its immediate aftermath, the judge may discover
that the possible solutions to the problem are limited to
awarding damages, but that the amount of suitable
compensation must be discovered. The question concerning
7 B. Lonergan, Insight: A Study in Human Understanding,
(London: Harper & Row, 1978), 609.
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which option is sufficiently suitable in the particular
circumstances has not yet been posed.
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4. The Testing Phase in Solving Practical Problems
(1) Introduction
Wondering about possible courses of action leads to asking
questions about whether a proposed course of action should
be performed. The attitude of the inquirer in the testing
phase can be represented by questions that ask "Is-it-to-
be-done?" or "Should I perform this course of action?"
These questions, according to Lonergan, demand practical
reflective insight.8 The practical reflective insight is
an act of discovery. It discovers the relevant issues and
their implications. According to Lonergan, questions can
be raised regarding the proposed course of action such as
the steps required to realize it, its consequences, the
feasibility of making the course of action an actuality;
the motives for performing the course of action -its
agreeableness, its utility, the desirability of the goals,
its short-term and long term implications.9 Practical
reflective insight leads to a judgment of value that a
particular course of action is sufficiently suitable or
more suitable than others. Practical reflection or
evaluation ends in a decision or choice to perform the
action or not to perform it.
See P. McShane, Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations.
(New York: Exposition Press, 1975), 49; Insight, 614.
Insight, 610.
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The testing phase involves discovering answers to questions
such as "Which option should be realized?" and "Is this
course of action sufficiently suitable in this particular
situation?" In this section, I want to examine the actual
process of testing and to analyse the extent to which
"discovery", in the form of practical reflective insight,
is a crucial part of the testing phase in practical
problem-solving.
(2) Elements in The Testing Phase
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(a) Is-questions
The raw materials of reflective insight in theoretical
problem-solving are the contents of previous mental
operations such as sense-experience and direct insight, but
the raw materials for practical reflective insight are
presentations, direct insights, judgments of fact,
practical insights, and proposed courses of action.
Questions for practical reflection can address two issues.
One set of questions asks whether a proposed course of
action can be reasonably realized. "Is this proposed
course of action feasible in the circumstances?" "Is it
possible?" "Is it sufficiently suitable?" Another set of
questions involves a comparison of proposed courses of
action in order to discover which alternative is
sufficiently appropriate in the circumstances. "Is this
proposed course of action more suitable or more appropriate
than others?"
For example, from my analysis of practical insight we know
that the cyclist has a number of options. Although
individuals who are familiar with flat tyres may discover
the most reasonable course of action without hesitation,
the activity of practical reflection can be illustrated by
an analysis from the cyclist's point of view of how he
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chooses or rejects possible courses of action. The bike
rider could phone home for a car ride; hitch hike home;
repair the flat on the spot; pump up the tyre and ride on
it; or throw the bike away and walk home. Each
alternative raises further questions if one is to judge
which one is sufficiently suitable. The reasonableness of
phoning home and asking for a ride depends on whether it is
possible, that is whether a car is available and whether
someone will pick him up. These factors may depend on
whether he is near or far from home, whether he is prepared
to inconvenience someone, or whether he has enough money
for the phone call assuming that a phone is nearby. These
queries and possibly others must be answered if this
particular proposed course of action is to be judged by the
cyclist to be both possible and reasonable. The course of
action may be possible - someone may be able and willing to
pick him up. But he may judge that this particular course
of action is not reasonable because he does not want to
inconvenience anyone. The option to repair his tyre on the
spot may be judged to be impossible if he is on a deserted
road and does not have a bike pump, or if he has the
equipment but lacks the ability to fix flat tyres.
Inflating the tyre to ride on it is possible only if he has
a bike pump and the air does not escape as soon as he
inflates the tube. Or he may judge that the option is
unreasonable because he will bend his rim if he rides on it
without the tyre fully inflated. After judging which
alternatives are possible and impossible, reasonable and
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unreasonable, other factors may be relevant to deciding
which alternative to choose.
He must judge which option is more suitable than another.
If he has the repair equipment he may judge that fixing it
on the spot is more suitable than riding on a flat tyre.
If he is a short distance from home, he may judge that
simply inflating the tyre, riding home, and fixing it later
is more suitable. Judging which proposed course of action
is more appropriate or suitable depends on the particular
situation and the particular person who assesses one's
options in the situation. Each solution in a case has the
potential to be a precedent insofar as other cases are
judged to be similar to it and the solution is judged to be
sufficiently suitable.
A doctor asks whether each option - drugs, special diet, or
surgery - is feasible in the circumstances. For example,
the doctor asks "Is the patient capable of following a
special diet?" "Can I (the doctor) perform the surgery?"
"Is the patient allergic to the drugs?" The doctor could
ask which course of action is more suitable than others.
For example, "What are the side effects of the drugs?"
"Will a change of diet cure the ulcer?" "How much does
surgery cost?" Similarly, a judge could ask whether the
proposed course of action - probation or a prison sentence
- are feasible in the circumstances. A judge could ask
whether it is possible to perform each particular course of
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action. For example, "Is the person likely to leave the
country?" "is there room in a prison for the person?" A
judge could also ask whether each course of action is
reasonable. For example, "Is probation a sufficient
punishment?" "Will a prison sentence deter the person from
doing the criminal act in the future?" in the case of
parents watching a disaster on television, a judge could
ask questions such as "Can the police authority pay the
damages?" "Can the plaintiffs be accurately identified?"
"Is the class of plaintiffs too wide for some reason?" "Is
it reasonable to compensate people who suffer nervous shock
after watching the disaster on television?" "Was it
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the
defendant's negligence would lead people watching the event
on television to suffer injury?"
(b) Practical Reflective Insight: The Act of Discovery in
The Testing Phase
Practical reflective insight discovers the relevant issues
and their implications. The aim of practical reflective
insight is a full discovery of the relevant issues and
their implications. The answers to questions of practical
reflection resemble answers to questions for reflection in
that answers can be "yes", "no", "maybe", "possibly",
"certainly", "probably". You may wonder if you can fix the
flat tyre and answer that "probably you can since you have
the equipment" or that "no, you cannot since you lack the
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ability". Practical reflection not only demands reasons,
but you may also ask yourself "...just what the proposed
course of action is, what are its successive steps, what
alternatives it admits, what it excludes, what consequences
it will have, whether the whole proposal is really
possible, just how probable or certain are its various
features."10 In this fashion, comprehensive sets of
practical reflective insights are constructed that discover
the links among particular aspects of the situation or
problem and particular courses of action.
Practical reflective insights are concerned with assessing
the suitability of proposed courses of action. Practical
reflective insight discovers the links between the relevant
features of a particular situation, the proposed courses of
action, and the reasons for and against the proposed course
of action in order to discover whether the course of action
is possible or impossible, sufficiently suitable or
unsuitable.
The discovery of the appropriate course of action by
practical reflective insight depends on one's familiarity
with the situation at hand, the seriousness of the
consequences of the proposed course of action, the
uncertainties and risks it involves, the extent of one's
willingness to assume responsibility for the consequences
Insight. 610.
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and to run the risks further questions may raise.11 These
factors influence the emergence of questions that would be
considered relevant.
As in other types of insight - direct, practical, and
reflective - once practical reflective insight occurs, its
emergence in identical or similar circumstances is easier
and occurs almost at will. A doctor may routinely dispense
medicine for common ulcers but in unfamiliar and
complicated cases may spend time talking to colleagues
about what the most suitable treatment would be. A judge
may spontaneously discover what to do in familiar cases but
may agonize for days, weeks, or months over what to decide
in cases that are unfamiliar.
(c) Judgments of Value
Practical reflective insight leads to judgments of value
that pronounce whether a particular course of action is
possible or not possible, sufficiently suitable or
unsuitable, or more appropriate than others in the
circumstances. In other words, the judgment of value
pronounces whether or not the action can be or should be
performed.
Barden explains the method of testing proposed actions
Insight, 610.
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along lines similar to Lonergan. A proposed action is
tested by subjecting the reasons for it to questioning. As
in theoretical testing, in practical testing the absence of
further relevant questions is the criterion for the
invulnerability of judgments of value. He emphasizes that
the ultimate criterion for a judgment of value is the
individual who chooses the reason and the criteria for the
action.
As in Lonergan's discussion of practical reasoning, the
criteria of action is whether the ethical subject is
convinced that a particular course of action is the most
appropriate one to perform in the particular
circumstances.12 In other words, the reasons supporting
one's judgment of value that a particular course of action
is sufficiently suitable in the circumstances must be
sufficient for the person making the judgment. The course
of action one judges to be sufficiently suitable is correct
because the person interpreting the situation and making
the judgment of value has asked what are, for that person,
all the relevant questions and is satisfied with the
answers. Thus, the criteria of action depend on the
questions that are asked and answered and the extent that
each ethical subject is open to questions.
Barden stresses that judgments of value are not certain or
After Principles. 48.
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infallible.13 One can over-look relevant features of a
situation. One can give more or less significance to
evaluations than one would give on another occasion. One
can also mis-interpret the situation and thereby reach a
mistaken judgment of value. And one can judge from within
a restricted horizon or context thereby suppressing
questions that would otherwise be relevant in a broader
context.
The particular questions posed and answered depend on one's
horizon or context. Barden argues that the variability
among people in what amounts to sufficient evidence for a
judgment of value is due to the fact that, not only do
individuals differ in their evaluations, but they also live
within different traditions and experience "different
emotional, intellectual, social, cultural, aesthetic,
moral, and spiritual" development.14
Barden argues that the ultimate criterion for a judgment of
value is not a rule or proposition that is accepted because
it is fixed, given, innate or due to some authority. This
perspective would seem to conflict with the goals of more
traditional versions of practical reasoning in which
decisions are legally justified by virtue of their relation




Barden's point of view, the outcome of a case would not
depend on a logical deduction from a universal rule of law
plus requisite facts nor on the legal justification of one
member of a pair of rival rulings. On the contrary, a
particular legal judgment would be judged to be suitable or
more suitable than other judgments insofar as that judge
asked, and satisfactorily answered, what were considered by
the judge to be all the relevant questions. For Barden, a
universal legal ruling would express an appropriate
solution to a practical problem; it would not in itself be
the criterion for a legal judgment.
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5. Decision/Choice
In Chapter One, I noted the terminological confusion among
legal theorists about how to use the word "decision".
Lonergan gives a precise definition of "decision".
Decision is concerned with actuality; decision confers
actuality upon a course of action that otherwise would not
occur. Testing or evaluation in practical problem-solving
ends with a judgment of value, but decision ends practical
problem-solving itself. A decision is an act of will which
may or may not follow the judgment of value.15 It is one
thing to know why you should or should not do something,
but it is quite another matter to do it. Practical
reflection can go on indefinitely. In Lonergan's view, it
possesses no capacity to bring itself to an end. "As long
as one is reflecting, one has not decided yet. Until a
person has decided, the reflection can be prolonged by
further questions. But when a decision is made the
reflection is over and done with."16 Decision, then,
brings to an end the questions and answers in a single view
grounding the choosing of a particular course of action
which ends practical problem-solving. For example,
practical reflection is ended by the cyclist when he
decides to inflate the punctured tyre and ride on it as




again until reaching home. A doctor ends practical
reflection when he decides, in accord with a judgment of
value, to prescribe drugs for the patient's ulcer. A judge
ends the practical problem-solving process when the choice
is made to sentence the person to ten years or when the
decision is made to allow the parents to recover for
nervous shock after watching the Hillsborough disaster on
television.
According to Lonergan, decision selects one member of a
pair of contradictories. Decision either consents or
refuses to perform a specific course of action. Decision
is not concerned with rival options or rival rulings.
After a doctor formulates a judgment of value that drugs
should be prescribed, a doctor either decides to prescribe
drugs or refuses to prescribe them. After a judge
formulates a judgement of value that the person should be
sentenced to ten years, the decision involves sentencing
the person to ten years or refusing to sentence the person
to ten years. After a judge reaches a judgment of value
that the parents who watched their children suffer injuries
on television during the Hillsborough disaster should
recover for nervous shock, the decision involves awarding
them damages or refusing to award them damages.
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6. Conclusion
Lonergan offers a plausible explanation of practical
problem-solving. It is comprised of a dynamic pattern of
six mental activities that involve: (1) wondering,
puzzling, and asking What-is-to-be-done-questions, (2)
having practical insights, (3) formulating proposed courses
of action, (4) asking Is-it-to-be-done-questions, (5)
having practical reflective insights, and pronouncing
judgments of value. Finally, decision ends practical
reflection.
A number of significant findings can be summarized. One,
the understanding phase in practical problem-solving, which
would otherwise be known by legal positivists as the
process of discovery, is a deliberate and conscious
activity that involves asking and answering relevant
questions. Two, the extent to which legal decision-making
involves "discovery" is further developed by my examination
of practical insight and practical reflective insight. Not
only is "discovery" a key part of understanding, but
"discovery" is also a crucial part of testing. Practical
reflective insight is a full discovery of the relevant
issues and implications of courses of action.
Chapter Six
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General Methods of "Discovery" or Problem-Solving
1. Introduction
My analyses of problem-solving in theoretical and practical
reasoning, in the two previous chapters, suggest that the
understanding phases involve a single insight and that the
testing phases also involve a single insight. However, the
actual process is much more complex than I have indicated.
Many insights are involved in each phase. The procedure a
judge follows to interpret a situation can be understood as
the emergence of a complex set of related insights and
judgments of fact. Sufficiently understanding a situation
involves theoretical reasoning. In the process of
understanding a particular situation or problem, the judge
must discover the relevant data. In a murder trial, if
someone has been killed, the judge will listen to witnesses
tell their interpretations of the situation. For the
judge, the witnesses' interpretations are data that must be
understood and tested for their reliability. If witnesses'
stories are judged to be reliable, each story only
constitutes the data or raw materials of the judge's
interpretation. The judge must discover how the different
stories fit together. In other words, the judge must
interpret the various stories. The selection of the
relevant data will depend on the questions and answers of
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the judge which, in turn, depend on what questions the
judge considers relevant to his ultimate goal of judging
guilt or innocence. Through sets of direct insights, the
judge discovers possible relations among events. The judge
must also test that his interpretation is supported by
sufficient evidence. Through sets of reflective insights
and judgments of fact, the judge discovers in a supervening
reflective insight whether the interpretation of the
situation is, in fact, supported by sufficient evidence.
Following an interpretation of the situation, the judge
must discover what should be done. This procedure also
involves complex sets of insights and judgments. There may
be no option; according to law a judgment of "not guilty"
leads to releasing the accused person. But the judge may
have a range of options, albeit limited and prescribed,
when the verdict is guilty and must judge which course of
action would be sufficiently suitable in the circumstances.
If this is the case, practical reflection or evaluation
occurs. Questions are asked in order to evaluate the
various options. The questions lead to sets of practical
reflective insights and a supervening practical reflective
insight. A judgments of value, expressing that one option
are more suitable than another or aspects of one options
are more suitable than another, is formulated. On the
other hand, the judge may not know what to do may compare
the case to other cases in order to discover whether the
solutions in those cases would be suitable in the current
232
case. This procedure also involves sets of insights and judgments.
The same general complex procedure would be involved when
a judge is judging whether the parents of children injured
in the Hillsborough disaster should be entitled to recover
for post-traumatic stress syndrome suffered as a result of
watching the disaster on television. In general terms, the
judge discovers the relevant data; the particular
situation must be sufficiently understood; possible
solutions are discovered by comparing the case to other
cases; the solutions are evaluated; the more suitable
solution is discovered by practical reflective insight and
is subsequently formulated as a judgment of value;
finally, a decision is made. Problem-solving in these
circumstances also involves a complex array or questions
and insights, not single questions and single insights.
In fact, it is difficult to identify all the mental
activities that comprise theoretical and practical problem-
solving in legal decision-making due to the complexity of
situations and the complexity of the process of theoretical
and practical problem-solving. Some insights are
spontaneous and relations among sense-experience can be
discovered instantly and not be noticed. Insights may be
combined with other insights so that new insights may
include and mask previous insights. The fulfilling
conditions of reflective insights may depend on a lifetime
of learning law, identifying issues, knowing when to pursue
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clues, and exceptional powers of attention to what is seen,
read, or heard that may be impossible to make explicit or
to analyse. Spontaneous shifts in the types of questions
asked and the answers reached may be untraceable because
they are not noticed. In Lonergan's opinion, it may be
impossible to identify the mental activities accurately in
all but the simplest situations.1
B. Lonergan, "The Form of Inference", Collection.
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1967).
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2. General Methods of Judicial Decision-Making
Despite the problems involved in identifying all the
specific mental activities that constitute legal decision¬
making, the broad or grand lines of theoretical and
practical problem-solving can be identified. Indeed,
Barden's writings2 suggest there are two basic types of
"discovery" or problem-solving strategies in judicial
decision-making: (1) the process of applying posited law
and (2) the process of discovering equitable judgments.
These two strategies can be distinguished along the lines
of the extent to which they are concerned with either
theoretical or practical problem-solving. Applying posited
law would primarily involve theoretical problem-solving and
reaching equitable judgments would primarily involve
practical problem-solving. Nevertheless, the aim of each
problem-solving strategy is to find just solutions. In
this section, I simply want to portray these strategies as
methods of "discovery" in judicial decision-making.
(a) Applying Posited Law
Barden portrays the expression of posited law as part of a
problem-solving strategy driven by the practical question
G. Barden, "Aristotle's Notion of Epieikeia", ed. M.
Lamb, Creativity and Method. (Milwaulkee: Marquette
University Press, 1980), 359.
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"What is just in this kind of situation?"3 Posited laws
are practical solutions to recurrent situations or
problems. A posited law is a discovery in the sense that,
as an answer to the question immediately above, it is the
expression of what is thought to be just in the kind of
case specified by the posited law.4 A posited law would be
a formulation of the just solution in cases that are judged
to be similar in relevant respects. The posited law would
express the relevant similarities among a set of cases and
also what should be done in such cases. This portrait of
posited law as a practical solution to a problem contrasts
with that of more formalist models which emphasize the role
of rules of law to logically justify a decision. As an
expression of a just solution in a type of case, the rule
of law, for Barden, would be a summary of a set of similar
situations. The primary role of such rules would be to
help a judge discover suitable solutions in cases, not to
ensure that decisions were legally justified.
The application of posited law in particular cases is
presented as a problem-solving strategy by Barden. A
posited law can be used to help discover the just solution
in a particular case. Because a posited law expresses an
understanding of what is thought to be just in the kind of
case specified by that posited law, a posited law only
ibid., 359.
ibid., 358, 359, 363.
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applies to the kind of cases specified by it. The
expression of what is thought to be just in a type or kind
of situation specified by the law is universal, according
to Barden, only in the sense that any particular situation
similar to the type specified by the law can be understood
in the same way as the type of case formulated by the
posited law. Although the operator of the search for the
just solution in a case is the question, "What is the just
solution in this case?, Barden states that the application
of a posited law in a particular case involves answering
the question "Is the particular case an example of the type
specified by the law?" This is a theoretical question.
The first step in discovering whether the case is a member
of the class covered by the law is to compare the
particular case to the posited law. According to Barden,
one must "discover how similar this case is to the case
envisaged in the law and to the other cases where judgments
have been given."5 If the posited law and the particular
case are similar, then the just solution to the kind of
case specified by the posited law will be the just solution
in the particular case. The discovery is that the case
expressed in the law is relevantly similar to the
particular case. "If relevant similarity is established,
then by the principle that similars are similarly
ibid., 358.
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understood,... the law can be applied without further ado"6
i.e. without further inquiry about the just solution. The
just solution to this kind of case has already been
discovered, tested, and formulated as the law. Hence, the
discovery made by the judge is whether or not the
particular case is envisaged by the universal law.
In Barden's opinion, "A law fits a case inasmuch as the
justice intended by the law is realized when the law is
applied to the case."7 If the judge discovers that the law
covers the case, he applies the law because "the law
adequately states what is just in the situation."® The law
is accepted as yielding the just solution to the case.
Testing whether the law expresses the just solution in the
particular case is not required because it has already been
tested.
Testing in this method of problem-solving is primarily
concerned with factual/theoretical similarity, not with
evaluating the justice of the legal solution since, if the
situation described by the law and a particular case are
similar, then the just solution will also be similar.
Nevertheless, practical questions that call for judgments
of value may also be posed. A judgment of value expressing
ibid., 358.
ibid., footnote 15, at 364.
ibid., 365.
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whether the comparison made between the law and the case is
"good enough" or "sufficient" to solve the legal problem
may be given.
Barden stresses the fact that, when the particular case is
not understood as an example of the type of case envisaged
by and formulated by the law, a judge cannot assume what is
just in the case is the same as in the type of case
specified in the law. Thus it is necessary to have a way
of finding out what type of case is envisaged by a
particular law. The just solution is discovered by
comparing cases and asking questions about previous cases
and the particular case itself, not by the automatic or
mechanical application of a universal posited law to a
particular case.
(b) Discovering Equitable Judgments
Barden, following Aristotle, calls just solutions in cases
not covered by posited law "equitable judgments". As
answers to the practical question, "What is the just
solution in this particular case?"9, equitable judgments
are discoveries or inventions of what is thought to be just
in particular situations. An equitable judgment is
discovered in light of the communal sense of justice
"contained in [or expressed by] the law but not totally
ibid., 360.
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specified by it."10 The strategy of a judge is to
investigate the situation in light of what one has learned
by living in the community and studying its tradition
(including its past legislation, past jurisprudence,
general discussions and writing about justice in society)
and precedents which express the community's sense of
justice. For Barden, laws express general types of
acceptable practical solutions to typical practical
problems in a society. They do not specify precisely what
is involved for a particular person at a particular time in
a particular situation. Thus, the tradition does not act
as a sharply delineated criterion which can be applied more
or less automatically to a novel and unforeseen situation.
The tradition is much more like a field of action in which
the detailed action must be discovered or invented11
inasmuch as laws suggest the grand lines of a solution in
a case.
The specification of what to do in particular circumstances
must be performed by the individual asking and answering
practical questions such as "What am I to do in this
situation?" and "Is this or that solution more worthwhile?"
Thus, the procedure used to reach equitable judgments would
predominately involve practical problem-solving. The judge
discovers what is just in a particular case by studying and
10 ibid. , 360 .
11 G. Barden, After Principles. (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1991), 29.
240
correctly understanding both the particular novel situation
and also what is considered just in the tradition. In this
context, the judge would pose and answer theoretical
questions. But the judge builds on that theoretical
knowledge by discovering or inventing a practical solution
to the case and then evaluating it.
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3. Conclusion
Barden's analysis of the problem-solving processes in law
is not an effort to explain in detail the relation between
theoretical and practical reasoning in judicial decision¬
making. His portrait of decision-making is in terms of
general problem-solving strategies, not in terms of the
nature of theoretical and practical problem-solving.
Rather, Barden's study presents two contexts in which the
process of legal decision-making could be further
investigated. (1) The application of a posited law in a
case could be studied from the point of view of how one
discovers and tests the similarities between the situations
comprised by a posited law and a particular case. Further,
Barden's portrait of problem-solving strategies, which
involves comparing situations, provides the framework for
studying the nature of the understanding and testing phases
when making analogies and generalizations. (2) The process
of discovering or inventing equitable judgments in novel
situations could be investigated in terms of the mental
activities involved in discovering and testing equitable
judgments. Such work might help us understand the
relationship between theoretical and practical problem-
solving in judicial decision-making in more detail.
Chapter Seven
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The Form of "Discovery" in R v Moraentaler1
1. Introduction
The analysis of problem-solving in the previous chapters
can be used to help understand the extent to which Madame
Justice Bertha Wilson's discussion of the right to liberty
in R v Moraentaler is a solution to a problem. This
chapter examines how her opinion can be understood as an
explanation of a problem-solving process that is performed
in order to solve a legal problem. In conventional terms,
her opinion can be considered an illustration of a
"discovery" process which includes both discovery and
truth-certification procedures.
Wilson's opinion is interesting because elements that are
involved in theoretical problem-solving, as described by
Lonergan, can be detected in her text. In fact, she
presents her opinion as a report or explanation of her
search for, and discovery of, a solution to a legal
problem. She explicitly formulates What-auestions that
call for definitions and Is-auestions that lead to
judgments of fact. Although these elements can be
identified in Wilson's text, I am not attempting to re-
1 R v Moraentaler. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. (Supreme Court of
Canada)
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construct the actual process Wilson followed to solve the
problem. The questions and answers she formulates in her
text could be a partial re-construction of her own problem-
solving process, but at most her text describes the broad
outline of the actual process she followed. It would be
impossible for her, or me, to identify all her questions
and answers in such a complex problem-solving process.
Rather, I investigate the questions and answers Wilson
formulates in the Moraentaler case in order to identify the
parallels between theoretical problem-solving and the
explanation of problem-solving presented by Wilson.
Not only can elements in theoretical reasoning be detected
in her text, but Wilson uses them for her own purposes.
She exploits the structure of theoretical problem-solving
in an effort to persuade the reader to accept her legal
opinion. In general terms, she leads the reader through
her text by asking and answering questions in the same way
a teacher leads a student to the "desired" answer to a
question. More specifically, Wilson uses What-questions
and definitions or interpretations. Is-questions. and
judgments of fact to provoke, shape, and control the
reader's own questions and answers about the case in order
to lead the reader to understand and to solve the legal
problem in the same way as she presents the case. In the
latter part of this chapter I examine this topic.
The Moraentaler case arose after three physicians - Drs.
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Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott - set up a clinic to perform
abortions on women even though they did not have a
certificate from a committee of an approved or accredited
hospital which is reguired by s. 251(4) of the Canadian
Criminal Code. They were indicted on the charge of
conspiring with each other with the intent to procure
abortions contrary to s. 423(1)(d) and s. 251(1) of the
Criminal Code. Before the three doctors entered pleas they
moved to quash the indictment or to stay the proceedings on
the grounds that s. 251 of the Criminal Code was ultra
vires the Parliament of Canada because it infringed ss.
2(a), 7, and 12 of the Charter of Rights and s. 1(b) of the
Canadian Bill of Rights.2 The appellants and the Crown
agreed that the main issue concerned s. 7 of the Charter.
Conseguently, the arguments of counsel and the judges7
opinions in the case dealt with the constitutional question
whether s. 251 of the Criminal Code infringed the right to
life, liberty and security of the person in s .7 of the
Charter. I will restrict my analysis to Madame Justice
Bertha Wilson's discussion of the right to liberty in this
case.
The problem that Wilson must solve in this case was agreed
upon and formulated by counsel for the Crown and the
defence. The problem she is given to solve is "Does s. 251
The Charter of Rights is part of the Canadian
Constitution and the Canadian Bill of Rights is federal
legislation.
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of the Criminal Code violate s. 7 of the Charter?"3 "Does
251 of the Criminal Code which limits the pregnant
woman's access to abortion violate her right to life,
liberty, and security of the person within the meaning of
s. 7?"4 This problem is formulated as an Is-question that
calls for a judgment of fact such as "Yes, s. 251 violates
s. 7" or "No, s. 251 does not violate s. 7." Wilson's
opinion is ultimately a solution to this problem; it is an
answer to this constitutional question. But she does not
immediately provide an answer to this particular question
and support it with evidence or reasoned arguments.
Rather, she describes an elaborate problem-solving process
that ultimately leads to the solution to this problem.
Wilson's method of solving this abstract constitutional
problem is comprised of three stages. First, she specifies
her version or interpretation of the problem. For her, the
problem is whether a woman can be compelled by law to carry
a foetus to term. Two. she devises and follows a strategy
or method to discover a solution to this problem. She must
discover the meaning of the right to liberty in the context
of the abortion issue. The meaning can be discovered by
considering the purpose of the Charter in general and the
purpose of the right to liberty in particular. She follows
the method in order to answer that question and discovers
3 This question and the other quotations underlined in this
chapter are not underlined in Wilson's text.
4 R v Moraentaler. 162.
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that: (a) the purpose of Charter rights is to achieve
human dignity, (b) the right to liberty "...guarantees to
every individual a degree of personal autonomy over
important decisions intimately affecting their private
lives"5, and (c) in the context of the abortion issue, the
right to liberty "...gives a woman the right to decide for
herself whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."6
Three, she answers the abstract constitutional question by
judging that s. 251 violates the right to liberty in s. 7.
It is useful to summarize the aspects of the other opinions
in the case that are relevant to Wilson's opinion. Chief
Justice Brian Dickson states in his opinion that, in order
to answer the constitutional question, "it is sufficient to
investigate whether or not s. 251 meets the procedural
standards of fundamental justice."7 He emphasizes that the
job of the Court is not to solve the abortion issue, but
simply to measure the content of s. 251 against the
Charter. Although s. 7 of the Charter states that
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of
the person", Dickson answers the abstract constitutional
question solely in terms of the right to security of the
person. He defines a breach of security of the person as




stress imposed by the state.
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Dickson answers two questions, (1) "Does s. 251 infringe
the s. 7 right to security of the person?" and (2) "Is the
infringement of security of the person in accord with the
fundamental principles of justice in the procedural sense?"
His answer to the first question is that the right to
security of the person is breached for two reasons: One,
forcing a woman to carry a foetus to term unless she meets
certain criteria unrelated to her own priorities and
aspirations by a threat of criminal sanction is a profound
interference with a woman's bodily integrity. Two, the
result of the delay in obtaining abortions caused by the
mandatory procedures of s. 251 is a higher probability of
complications and a greater risk to the woman's physical
and psychological health. These two reasons are concerned
with procedural issues.
Dickson's answer to the second question "Does the breach of
security of the person comport with the principles of
fundamental justice in the procedural sense?" is that the
objective of the legislation is valid, but that the means
to balance the competing interests of the woman and the
foetus are not "reasonable ana demonstrably justified"
because the procedures and administrative structure of s.
251 are unfair and arbitrary. Consequently, they defeat
the legitimate objective of protecting the life of the
woman. He argued that, according to the Canadian criminal
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justice system, a defence should not be illusory or so
difficult to attain as to be practically illusory. He
points out that abortions are not available in some
hospitals because the legislation requires that each
hospital must have four doctors who can perform abortions;
some hospitals are not accredited and so are automatically
disqualified from performing abortions; the requirement
that a province must authorize a hospital to perform
abortions restricts the number of hospitals that can
perform abortions; and that s. 251(4) fails to provide an
adequate standard for abortion committees to decide whether
a woman qualifies for an abortion. Thus, in his opinion,
s. 251 infringes the right to security of the person and
the principles of fundamental justice in the procedural
sense guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter.
In a similar opinion, Justice Beetz agrees with Dickson's
analysis of the procedural requirements of security of the
person and with the decision that s. 251 infringes the
right to security of the person. Like Dickson, Beetz says
that the means, ie. the rules and procedures in s. 251, are
not reasonable and demonstrably justified because they are
not rationally connected to the legitimate objective of the
legislation which is to protect the foetus, and to the
ancillary objective, which is to protect the life and
health of the pregnant woman.
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2. Theoretical Problem-Solving as a Form of Expression
(1) Interpreting the Problem
Wilson defines the abstract constitutional problem or
question she is given more specifically by asking
"... whether a pregnant woman can, as a constitutional
matter, be compelled by law to carry a foetus to term. "8
In order to support the view that her version of the
problem is sufficiently suitable, she evaluates the merits
of interpreting the problem solely in terms of procedural
matters which is the approach used by the other judges.
This procedural route had been followed by her fellow
judges who judged that s. 251 infringes a woman's right to
security of the person and that the infringement did not
comport with the principles of fundamental justice in the
procedural sense. They judge that the procedures and
administrative structure stipulated by s. 251 are unfair
and arbitrary and hence defeat the objective of protecting
the life and health of the woman and the foetus. In
contrast to this approach, Wilson argues that, regardless
of whether or not the procedural requirements of s. 251
regulating whether a woman or her physician can terminate
the pregnancy can be imposed, the question whether a woman
can or cannot, according to the Constitution, be compelled
by law to carry a foetus to term should be answered first.
ibid., 161.
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In her opinion, a review of the procedural requirements
would be "purely academic", "pointless", and "an exercise
in futility" if the law that compels a woman to carry a
foetus to term is unconstitutional in the first place. The
problem is not, and should not be, about the procedures
used or the justice of such procedures, but about the
deeper reasons why a woman can or cannot be compelled in
the first place. This is the deeper problem, the real
question, a substantive issue, which is prior to, and more
basic and fundamental than an analysis of procedural
matters.
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(2) Devising a Strategy or Method of Problem-Solving
(a) Narrowing the Search
Wilson's general strategy in answering the question "Does
s. 251 of the Criminal Code which limits the pregnant
woman's access to abortion violate her right to life,
liberty, and security of the person within the meaning of
s. 7 ? " is to search for interpretations or definitions of
the right to life, liberty, and security of the person in
s. 7. She relies on statements made by Chief Justice
Dickson in the same case to help narrow down her search for
these interpretations or definitions. According to
Dickson, it is not necessary to define life, liberty and
security of the person for all possible situations. Not
only is it impossible to envisage all the context in which
the right to liberty might be asserted, but the current
case only concerns s. 251.9 Hence Wilson limits her search
for the definitions of the rights in s. 7 of the Charter to
the more limited context of s. 251. In particular, she
wants to know whether liberty or security of the person
gives a woman the right to decide whether to have an
abortion. This Is-question provides her search for the
meanings of liberty and security of the person with a
further degree of precision.
ibid., 162.
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Wilson further narrows down her search from "life, liberty,
and security of the person" to "liberty" by arguing that
current definitions of security of the person do not and
cannot answer a particular question.10 She begins by
examining Dickson's and Beetz' definition of security of
the person in the Moraentaler case. She agrees with them
that security of the person covers threats to the physical
and psychological security of a pregnant woman. But, in
her opinion, both this definition of security of the person
and this interpretation of s. 7 are limited. This
interpretation of s. 7 does not answer the question
"Whether a legislative scheme that does not pose a threat
to the physical and psychological security of the person of
the pregnant woman would be valid under s. 7?" S. 7, which
includes liberty and security of the person, may encompass
more than physical and psychological security. This
unanswered question is used to demonstrate the relevance of
liberty to the problem and the inadequacy of the current
definition of security of the person. In other words,
Dickson's and Beetz' interpretation of security of the
person is inadequate to answer the question above because
relevant questions about it can still be posed.
The structure of her criticism of Dickson's and Beetz'
interpretation of s. 7 corresponds to the explanation of
testing in theoretical problem-solving in which
10 Wilson does not define or interpret "life" in s. 7 of the
Charter in her legal opinion.
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formulations are sufficient only when they have satisfied
all the relevant questions. Dickson and Beetz stopped
asking questions when they were convinced they had asked
and satisfactorily answered all the relevant questions in
order to give their own interpretation of the
constitutional question. But from Wilson's perspective,
Dickson and Beetz stop asking questions when they have
reached only a partial answer or solution because their
interpretation of s. 7 is insufficient to answer the
question posed by Wilson.
(b) Discovering the Method or Strategy to Discover the
Definition or Interpretation of the Right to Liberty
The right to liberty must be defined before Wilson is able
to answer the question whether s. 7 gives a woman the right
to decide whether to have an abortion. Wilson explicitly
formulates the question as a What-question that calls for
a definition: "...what is meant by the right to liberty in
the context of the abortion issue?"11 After having
answered that question she will be able to answer the
explicit Is-question, "Does it.♦.give the pregnant woman
control over decisions affecting her own body?"12




discover a definition of the right to liberty by reading a
previous case. She follows the method of discovery
outlined by Dickson in the case of R v Big M Drug Mart.13
In that case, he advocates a purposive approach to defining
Charter rights. The purpose can be discovered by referring
to the "character and larger objects of the Charter", to
the "language" expressing the right, the "historical
origin" of concepts enshrined in the Charter. and the
"meaning and purpose of other rights and freedoms"
associated with the rights in question.14 Furthermore, the
interpretation is to be "generous, not a legalistic one,
aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and
securing for individuals the full benefits of the Charter's
protection.1,15 Hence Wilson's method of searching for the
definition of the right to liberty is"...to consider the
purpose of the Charter in general and rthe purpose of 1 the
right to liberty in particular.1,16
(c) Searching for the Purpose of the Charter
The purpose of the Charter is revealed after Wilson
presents a series of passages written by MacCormick, a
legal philosopher, and Dickson, the Chief Justice of the
R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd.r [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.






Supreme Court of Canada, that, taken as a whole, focus on
the links between human dignity, free choice, the state,
and the Charter. After presenting these passages, she
makes further claims about Charter rights and human dignity
and then discovers the purpose of Charter rights. Her
approach is to present issues in general terms and to
specify them as her inquiry unfolds.
She begins her search with the general claim that the
purpose of the Charter is to "erect an invisible fence
around each individual that the state will not be allowed
to trespass."17 In other words, Charter rights are a means
to keep governmental activities and decisions from
interfering with individuals. This perspective is
consistent with the classical notion of liberty.
The second general point, presented by quoting a passage
written by MacCormick, turns on a link between liberty and
human dignity. Liberty, in the sense of being able to
decide for oneself, is a means or a method to achieve self
respect and contentment, ie. human dignity. This is a
quite different version of liberty from the one immediately
above which stresses the protection of individuals from
government interference.
Wilson presents a quote taken from Dickson's opinion in Big
ibid., 164.
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M Drug Mart to develop the theme concerning the
relationship between individual choice and state. For
Dickson, the ability of citizens to make free and informed
decisions is the absolute pre-requisite for democratic
government. Moreover, the Charter rights associated with
freedom of individual conscience are "fundamental" because
they are central both to democracy and to basic beliefs
about human dignity.
In the guotation from MacCormick, liberty and individual
choice are conditions of human dignity. In contrast,
Wilson has used the quotation from Dickson to develop or
specify this tie in terras of the idea that the Charter
rights associated with freedom of individual conscience are
central to beliefs about human dignity. In so doing, she
presents an account of the role of the Charter that is
different from the original idea that the Charter
constructs a fence around each individual. Not only has
she shifted her attention back to the Charter, but she has
also changed the terms of the discussion. Instead of
considering "liberty" and "individual choice" in general
terms of making one's own decisions without state
interference, the relationship between the individual and
the state has been developed into the idea that these
Charter rights are "fundamental" because they are central
to a free and democratic political system and to human
dignity. The "state" is now described more specifically in
terms of a "free and democratic political system" and
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Charter rights are linked to human dignity in some, as yet,
unexplained way.
The next step is a further specification of Dickson's point
above regarding how democracy is tied to human dignity.
Wilson quotes a passage written by Dickson in R v Oakes.18
In that case, respect for human dignity is one of the
values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society.
Wilson makes her own contribution when she claims that
values such as human dignity are the "genesis" of the
rights guaranteed by the Charter and are also the ultimate
standard against which to test whether a limit of a right
is reasonable and demonstrably justified. In her opinion,
"the idea of human dignity is expressed in almost every
right and freedom in the Charter."19 Thus, Wilson
discovers the purpose of Charter rights. The purpose of
Charter rights is to achieve human dignity.
(d) Discovering the purpose of ttje Right to Liberty
As in her search for the purpose of the Charter. the search
for the purpose of the right to liberty begins with general
statements that are formulated more specifically as the
R v Oakes. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
R v Moraentaler. 166.
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search progresses. She begins by considering general
statements about liberty, but ends with the discovery of
the specific purpose of the right to liberty.
Wilson returns to and develops the general theme concerning
the boundary between the individual and the state by
defining the basic theory underlying the Charter to be that
"the state will respect choices made by individuals and to
the greatest extent possible, will avoid subordinating
these choices to any one conception of the good life."20
She refines this point by writing that "an aspect of the
respect for human dianitv on which the Charter is founded
is the right to make fundamental personal decisions without
interference from the state. "21
She broadly defines her first interpretation or definition
of liberty by stating that "the riaht to make fundamental
personal decisions without interference from the state"22
"...is a critical component of the right to liberty."23
Prior to this interpretation or definition, Wilson's
explanation of the relationship between the individual and
the state in the context of the Charter has been that the










she specifies what she did not earlier, namely that
particular types of choices - "personal decisions" - demand
respect. Her position has been that so long as the choices
are made by individuals they will be respected. However,
at this point in her analysis, her position shifts from one
akin to classic liberalism to the idea that the decisions
with which a state will not interfere are a special type or
class, namely "fundamental personal decisions". Wilson
also introduces a second explanation of how liberty and
human dignity are related. In contrast to classical
liberalism's stress on protecting the individual from the
state as fundamental, MacCormick's text implied that
liberty was a condition of, or means to reach, human
dignity, something even more fundamental than protection
from the state. Here Wilson develops that notion by
suggesting that liberty and human dignity are "equivalent"
or "overlap" in some way. She does not clearly define the
relationship between them, however, preferring instead to
let the relationship float.
Her next steps involve interpreting or defining the right
to liberty more precisely. She states that the right to
liberty "...grants the individual a degree of autonomy in
making decisions of fundamental personal importance.1,24
This second definition or interpretation of the right to
liberty compared to her previous definition, namely the
ibid., 166.
260
right to make fundamental personal decisions without
interference from the state, is also different from the
classical notion of liberty. She now incorporates a
"degree of autonomy" into the right to liberty. Instead of
the term "fundamental personal decisions" which suggests a
special definable class of decisions that are basically or
essentially personal according to some criterion or group
, she now speaks of "decisions of fundamental personal
importance" which suggests a wider range of decisions than
would be considered very important by a particular
individual.
Wilson specifies the more general relation between
individual choice and the state by asserting that the
proper ambit of the right to liberty is that liberty does
not require the state to approve personal decisions, but it
does require the state to respect them.
After considering how American cases, including cases about
abortion, have interpreted the right to privacy and the
Fourteenth Amendment to elaborate the scope of the right of
individuals to make fundamental decisions affecting their
private lives, Wilson re-defines or re-interprets the right
to liberty. In the third interpretation or definition, the
right to liberty "...guarantees to every individual a
degree of personal autonomy over important decisions
intimately affecting their private lives.1,25
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Compared to her previous definition of the right to
liberty, she increases the power of the right by changing
the word "grants" to "guarantees". The "individual" still
remains the beneficiary of the right to liberty. But
"decisions of fundamental personal importance" are now
expressed as "important decisions intimately affecting
their private lives". This interpretation is similar to
the interpretation of liberty above26 which stressed
"fundamental personal decisions". But the notion of
"private life" is a development in Wilson's text that seems
to be borrowed from Judge Blackmum of the U.S. Supreme
Court.27 Prior to this definition of the right to liberty,
the notion of "private", in Wilson's opinion, has been
associated with the idea of protecting individual choices
from state interference, ie. the classic liberal notion.
From this perspective, an individual choice is "private" if
it is not regulated by law. In other words, any decision
not regulated by law would be "private" decision. But the
introduction of the term "private lives" here has a
different meaning. In this context it is not associated
with choices that are not regulated by law. Although her
notion of "private lives" is not spelled out, it seems to
ibid., 171.
26 See page 13 .
27 ibid., 170-171; Thornburgh v American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 106 S.Ct. 2169 (1986).
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be associated with "personal" and "intimate" decisions and
she suggests it constitutes a criterion of a specialized
class of decision rather than a wide range of decisions of
a more general character. To be protected by her
definition of the right to liberty, decisions must be
"important" decisions and must "intimately affect" persons'
"private lives".
(e) Searching for the Purpose of the Right to Liberty in
the Context of the Abortion Issue
So far the meaning of the right to liberty in the context
of the abortion issue has not been discovered. Wilson's
method of discovering it involves answering the question
"Does the decision of a woman to terminate her pregnancy
fall within this class of protected decisions fie, the
class of decisions defined bv the right to liberty 1?" This
question is an Is-question that calls for a judgment of
fact concerning whether or not the right to liberty covers
a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. Wilson's
judgment is that she has "no doubt that it does"28 cover a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.
She also presents evidence in support of her judgment. The
evidence which supports her judgment is concerned with the
special nature of the decision whether or not to have an
ibid., 171.
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abortion.29 Wilson writes that the decision will have
"profound psychological, economic and social
consequences..."30, that the circumstances that give rise
to the decision "can be complex and varied"31, and that the
considerations involved in the decision may be, and usually
are, both powerful and militating in opposite directions.32
She says that "the decision reflects the way a woman thinks
about herself and her relationship to others and society at
large"33 and that it is a profound social and ethical
decision, not just a medical decision.34 Finally, the
woman's "response to the decision will be the response of
the whole person."35
A man cannot adequately understand this situation. In
Wilson's opinion, "It is probably impossible for a man to
respond, even imaginatively..."36 to such a dilemma
"because it is outside the realm of his personal
The language used by Wilson to describe the decision
whether or not to have an abortion is similar to that
used by C. Gilligan, In A Different Voice. (London:









experience"37 and "because he can only relate to it by
objectifying it, thereby eliminating the subjective
elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the
dilemma."38 Wilson seems to be giving another sense of
"private", that is, unintelligible to men.
Wilson discusses women's rights and human dignity from the
point of view of women. She uses Noreen Burrows' writings
to explain the special nature of women's rights. According
to Burrows, the struggle for human rights since the
Eighteenth Century has consisted in men struggling to
assert their dignity and common humanity against the state,
but the more recent struggle for women's rights has been "a
struggle to place women in the same position as men."39
The consequence has been that the right to reproduce has
been ignored because it is not part of the existing set of
male rights. In her opinion, the right to reproduce or not
is to be properly perceived "as an integral part of a
modern woman's struggle to assert her dignity and worth as
a human being."40 Thus, it seems that the right to
reproduce or not is both part of the right to liberty and






Next, Wilson answers her early question "What is the
meaning of the right to liberty in the context of the
abortion issue?" For her, the right to liberty "...gives
a woman the right to decide for herself whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy."41 This is Wilson's fourth and




(3) Discovering the Solution to the Abstract
constitutional Problem
Now that she has defined the right to liberty in the
context of the abortion issue, Wilson returns to solve the
abstract constitutional question "Does s.251 of the
Criminal Code violate s.7 of the Charter?" She repeats her
question "...does s.251 of the Criminal Code violate this
right r to liberty I?"42 Wilson's judgment is "Clearly it
does."43
The evidence she presents in support of this judgment is
that (1) the purpose of s. 251 is "...to take the decision
away from women and give it to a committee"44; (2) "...the
committee bases its decision on criteria entirely unrelated
to [a pregnant woman's] own priorities and aspirations"45;
and (3) letting a committee decide whether a woman should
be allowed to terminate her pregnancy is just as great a
violation of a woman's right to personal autonomy in
decisions of an intimate and private nature as letting a
committee decide whether a woman should be allowed to
continue her pregnancy because "both arrangements violate






that she has the right to decide for herself."46
ibid., 172.
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3. Theoretical Problem-Solving as a Method of Persuasion
(1) Introduction
With regard to Wilson's opinion, the problem-solving
process has a number of roles. Not only does she use the
problem-solving process as the form in which to report or
explain her solution to the constitutional problem, but she
also uses the structure of the problem-solving process in
an effort to persuade the reader to agree with her opinion.
To be more specific, she uses the structure of the problem-
solving process as a method of persuading the reader to
agree with, assent to, or accept her way of solving the
abstract constitutional problem. Her approach is not
simply to convince the reader to agree with her ultimate
solution because one accepts a set of reasons that support
her solution. Instead, her general approach is to lead or
guide the reader through a problem-solving process giving
the reader the opportunity to assent to each step in her
search for the solution. Her method of persuasion includes
convincing the reader that her version or interpretation of
the problem that must be solved is sufficiently suitable,
that her method of solving it is the only plausible
approach, and that the solution to the abstract
constitutional question is correct. Stated simply, Wilson
wants the reader to understand and to solve the problem in
the same way as she presents the case. This approach seems
to be typical of judicial opinions and Wilson's opinion
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should not be understood as an exceptional case.
This section is also concerned with examining how Wilson
exploits the nature of problem-solving in order to persuade
the reader to agree with her opinion. I investigate how
she uses the process as a whole and also how she uses
questions and answers as persuasive techniques. The
activity of persuasion cannot be adequately understood if
one is concerned solely with identifying the persuasive
techniques expressed in a text such as Wilson's opinion.
The effects of these persuasive techniques on a person
reading the opinion must also be examined. Regarding
Wilson's opinion, the reader is engaged in problem-solving
in that the reader asks and answers questions in order to
correctly understand her opinion. The reader asks
questions in order to understand ideas expressed in her
text and may also ask questions to understand ideas which
are gestured at rather than spelled out. In both contexts,
the written text provokes the reader to ask one's own
questions and to discover and test the answers for oneself.
For example, the reader might ask "What is the problem
Wilson must solve?" and "Is my understanding of Wilson's
interpretation of the case correct?" In short, the
reader's acceptance of, or assent to, her solution depends
on the reader's questions and answers concerning the case.
More specifically, Wilson's questions and answers play a
crucial role in persuading the reader to agree with each
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step in the problem-solving process. Wilson wants to
convince the reader that the questions she formulates are
relevant and that her answers are correct. For example,
when she defines her version of the abstract constitutional
problem, she raises crucial substantive questions that are
not and cannot be answered by the competing "proceduralist"
position and she does this in order to undermine the
competing position. When she searches for the meaning of
the right to liberty, she presents her line of questioning
as the sole plausible method of discovery and her
definition of the right to liberty as the correct
definition. And her ultimate solution to the problem is
presented as an answer that has been proven to be correct.
The significant feature of Wilson's use of questions and
answers is how she uses them for her own purposes. She
exploits (1) the relationship between her own questions and
answers and those of the reader and (2) the relationship
between question and answer. She uses her own questions
and answers to provoke and shape the questions posed and
the answers given by the reader regarding the case. I
examine how Wilson uses her own questions and answers to
provoke, shape, control, and suppress the questions posed
and the answers given by the reader. She manipulates the
relationship between What-questions and definitions and
between Is-questions and judgments of fact to shape and
suppress the reader's questions and answers.
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Wilson shapes the reader's problem-solving process by
leading or guiding the reader through her own particular
method of solving the problem. She leads the reader to
agree with her solution to the problem in the way a teacher
guides a student to the desired solution to a problem by
asking questions and providing clues that direct the
student to consider particular aspects of the problem.
Similarly, Wilson provokes and creates a series of
opportunities for the reader to ask questions, experience
insights, and make judgments by formulating questions and
answers in her text. She uses her questions and answers to
lead the reader to understand her decision from her point
of view by inviting the reader to answer her questions as
if they are one's own, to follow her strategy of answering
them, and subsequently to reach answers similar to her own.
Wilson influences the reader's problem-solving process by
formulating questions that appeal to the reader's curiosity
and ability to solve problems.47 The reader could, in
principle, ask any question and seek its answer, including
the questions explicitly posed by Wilson. Hence Wilson
shapes the questions the reader asks by explicitly
formulating the relevant questions for the reader. With
this technique she controls the reader's understanding of
the case insofar as answers are correlative to, and depend
For a general discussion of this aspect of persuasion see
G. Barden, After Principles. (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1990), 128-131.
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on, the particular questions asked. Supplying or
presenting the reader with questions to answer is an
effective way to shape the reader's understanding of her
decision. By explicitly formulating significant questions
in an orderly sequence Wilson leads the reader from one
question to its answer and then to the next question and
its answer until the reader comes to understand the case
from her point of view.
Wilson also gives the reader the answers to her questions.
This practice enables the reader to check one's own answers
by comparing them to her answers to ensure that the
reader's answers are correct from Wilson's point of view.
Providing "correct" answers, and in some instances,
evidence in support of her judgments amounts to exerting a
further degree of control over the reader's definitions and
judgments in that alternative answers are not considered.
In this way, answers are shaped and options are suppressed.
By posing particular questions and answering them, Wilson
directs the reader's attention to selected aspects of the
case or the issues that she considers relevant. This
technique shapes the reader's questions and answers to the
extent that, by asking and answering questions along the
line proposed by Wilson, the reader's attention is directed
away from aspects of the case that may provoke questions
about other issues that could be relevant. For example,
questions could be raised about the circumstances in which
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deciding to have an abortion could be appropriate or
inappropriate. By selecting what is important to her
decision, Wilson helps the reader ignore other aspects of
the case. She directs the reader's attention to
considering the capacity or ability of a woman to decide to
have an abortion and ignores guestions about what factors
or guidelines would be relevant to making educated,
reflective individual decisions concerning abortions. This
technique restricts the range of questions the reader asks
about the case. In other words, she uses her questions and
answers to direct the reader's attention to what she
considers relevant and thereby to displace and suppress
other questions that may lead to understanding the case
from another point of view.
Wilson uses What-questions and Is-questions in an effort to
shape and suppress the reader's questions and answers.
Limiting the questions posed to the type of questions
featured in theoretical problem-solving enables the
problem-solving process to be portrayed as a search for
correct definitions or interpretations of an issue and true
judgments of fact. This method is also presented as the
correct way to solve the problem. Practical questions
about possible alternatives and an evaluation of the merits
of alternatives are not posed. The reader may limit one's
own questions to What-questions and Is-questions insofar as
the text fails to provoke questions about other possible
definitions or interpretations and why one definition or
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interpretation is preferred over others. In this way,
practical questions that call for evaluations are
suppressed.
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(2) Shaping the Reader/s Problem-Solving Process
In this section, I examine how Wilson uses questions and
answers to persuade the reader to accept her way of solving
the problem. In particular, I analyse how she uses
questions and answers to lead the reader through (a) the
interpretation of the abstract constitutional problem and
(b) the definition of the right to liberty.
(a) The Use of Questions and Answers to Lead the Reader to
Accept Wilson's Interpretation of the Problem
The way that Wilson defines the problem that must be
answered by focusing on the "real" or "deeper" question
illustrates a number of techniques she uses to persuade the
reader to agree with her version of the problem. Most
important is the way she presents her approach and that of
Dickson and Beetz as alternatives. The competing positions
take different questions as the specification of the
problem. The reader is presented with the choice between
two different interpretations of the relevant problem to be
solved. Wilson confronts the reader with the choice of
either accepting the approach of Dickson and Beetz by
presuming that a woman can be compelled by law to carry a
foetus to term or to accept her own position which is to
explicitly ask and answer the question "Can a woman be
compelled bv law to carry a foetus to term?" Dickson and
Beetz presume the answer to this question in the sense that
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they evaluate the procedural requirements that must be met
in order to have an abortion. One can infer that they
first presume that the law can compel a woman to carry a
foetus to term before they analyse the procedural
requirements of the legislation. The reader's choice is
between presuminq that a woman can be compelled or to
explicitly ask and answer the question "Can a woman be
compelled by law to carry a foetus to term?" If the reader
presumes the answer to the question is yes, then the
problem that must be solved is the question "Do the
procedural requirements of s.251 comport with fundamental
principles in the procedural sense?" But if, on the other
hand, the reader explicitly asks the question whether a
woman can be compelled by law to carry a foetus to term,
this question becomes the problem that must be solved.
These alternatives appear exhaustive, limiting the reader's
choice to these two alternatives. She rhetorically
diminishes Dickson's and Beetz' approach in a series of
three repetitive propositions in which she characterizes
the alternative approach as "purely academic", "pointless",
and "an exercise in futility".
But how is the reader led to choose one alternative rather
another? Wilson first considers the alternative position.
She agrees with Dickson and Beetz that s. 251 violates the
right to security of the person. But then she contrasts
their position more sharply with her own. She presents
their position as limited to considering only security of
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the person and coping only with the contingent and
immediate legislative scheme of s.251. In contrast to her
own position, their analysis does not answer the question
whether an ideal legislative scheme that does not create a
threat to a woman's physical and psychological health would
be valid under s.7. She suggests they do not answer this
question because they do not consider the right to liberty
and fail to ask if the definition of security of the person
is wider. In other words, from her perspective their
approach omits to ask and answer relevant questions.
She continues to denigrate their position by asserting that
their definition of security of the person "begs" the
central issue in the case. They are concerned with purely
procedural matters. Then she presents her own position as
a way to solve the limitations or deficiencies of Dickson
and Beetz. From Wilson's perspective the question they do
not answer is crucial. According to her, if the right to
liberty or security of the person or a combination of the
two confers the right to decide whether or not to have an
abortion, then we must look at both substantive and
procedural issues. Hence the problem that must be solved
is whether the right to liberty or security of the person
or a combination gives a woman the right to decide whether
to have an abortion. Wilson presents the method of solving
the problem by explicitly formulating three questions that
"we must answer".
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To summarize, Wilson introduces the problem as a choice
between two alternative methods of answering the abstract
constitutional question. She shakes the foundation of
Dickson's and Beetz' opinions by posing questions that
their shared perspective does not, and cannot, answer and
presents their focus on procedural justice as evasive.
Moreover, which interpretation of the problem to choose can
only be decided by asking further questions and then
answering them in turn. By identifying the relevant
questions that must be answered, Wilson moves beyond
Dickson's and Beetz' approach. What began as the reader's
choice between two possible alternatives has been developed
by Wilson into a choice between trying to discover an
answer to a crucial question or ignoring the question.
(b) The Use of Questions and Definitions to Persuade the
Reader to Accept Wilson's Definition or Interpretation of
the Right to Liberty
An aspect of Wilson's method of leading the reader to
understand and to agree with her definition of the right to
liberty is to present her approach to discovering the
definition as the only plausible strategy. Wilson
confronts the reader with the problem of how to discover an
answer to the question "What is meant by the right to
liberty in the context of the abortion issue?" by
explicitly posing this question. There is more than one
route that could be taken to answer this question and the
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right to liberty could be defined in a number of ways. But
Wilson leads the reader to the answer by telling the reader
the method to use. The method is to consider the purpose
of the Charter and the purpose of the right to liberty.
She presents the execution of this strategy as if it is the
sole way to answer the question. Alternatives are not
considered. For example, she does not compare or explain
why her interpretation or definition of liberty is more
suitable than others. Remembering that in this case three
doctors have been indicted, perhaps one way to answer the
constitutional question would be to define the right to
liberty from their point of view as a right to perform safe
medical procedures when a woman's physical or psychological
health is threatened and she has consented to the
procedure. She does not evaluate why the reasons that
support the judgment that the law should not be used to
compel a woman to carry a foetus to term are more
persuasive than the reasons why the law should be allowed
to compel a woman to carry a foetus to term. She neither
explains why or how a woman's right to decide whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy leads to greater human
dignity nor what she means by human dignity.
The strategy Wilson follows to discover the purpose of the
Charter is to lead the reader through a series of
interpretations of the relationship between the Charter,
liberty, and human dignity drawn from MacCormick's writings
and legally authorized sources. She specifies a
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potentially broad and general analysis of the topic by
initiating a discussion of the relationship between the
individual and the state from the point of view of
classical liberalism. Then she further develops this
discussion by presenting various versions of the
"inextricable tie" between the Charter, liberty, and human
dignity before presenting the reader with her version of
the purpose of the Charter. The purpose of the Charter is
to achieve human dignity.
Her next step is to lead the reader to accept her
definition of the right to liberty as the correct
definition. She leads the reader to her definition through
a series of definitions of liberty. Each definition is
formulated more specifically than its predecessor. She
begins by claiming that all the Charter rights express the
idea of human dignity and that the Charter is founded on
one aspect of human dignity, namely "the right to make
fundamental decisions without interference from the
state".48 She claims this right is an aspect of the right
to liberty. This general definition of the right to
liberty is consistent with classical liberal theory.
Wilson re-defines this general definition of liberty in
more specific terms by simply presenting increasingly
specific interpretations or definitions of the right to
ibid., 166.
281
liberty. She states that the right to liberty "...grants
to the individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions
of fundamental personal importance."49 In that definition,
she stresses the characteristics of the decision insofar as
the right to liberty is concerned with protecting
"decisions of fundamental personal importance". Wilson
then takes the reader back to the general statement that
the proper scope of the right to liberty requires the state
to respect personal decisions made by citizens, but does
not require them to approve them, and says that this view
is consistent with American jurisprudence. She leads the
reader through American cases in which, according to the
right to equality and the right to privacy in the American
Constitution, the state could not interfere with certain
fundamental personal decisions concerned with education,
child rearing, procreation, marriage, or contraception to
a more specific definition of the right to liberty. Now
the right to liberty is interpreted or defined by stating
that the right to liberty "...guarantees to every
individual a degree of personal autonomy over important
decisions intimately affecting their private lives."5°
After taking the reader through an analysis of the nature
of a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy, she presents her final interpretation or




"•.-gives a woman the right to decide for herself whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy."51 The reader is
invited to agree with her interpretation or definition
because it is presented as the only plausible definition




(3) Exploiting the Relationship Between Questions and
Answers
(a) What-questions and Definitions/Interpretations
Wilson uses the relationship between question and answer in
her text to shape the reader's questions and answers. She
shapes the type of questions asked and the type of answers
reached by the reader about the right to liberty by
limiting the questions she formulates to What-questions and
Is-questions. The reader's answers are shaped insofar as
the answers to questions are correlative to the type of
questions asked. What-questions demand explanations and
definitions such as "What is the purpose of the Charter in
general?" and "What is the content of the right to liberty
in the context of the abortion issue?" Such questions
direct the reader's attention to searching for definitions
or interpretations that can be tested to determine whether
they are true or false. The reader is asked to discover
the correct or true purpose of the Charter and the correct
or true definition of the right to liberty. Wilson's
formulation of the question as a What-question creates an
expectation that the right answer to the question can be
discovered.
Wilson's presentation of the answer as the correct
definition or interpretation of the right to liberty does
not encourage the reader to consider alternative ways to
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understand liberty or to ask whether and why one
alternative should be preferred to another. By presenting
her explanation of liberty in terms of an answer to a What-
question, the reader's attention is directed away from
questions about alternative ways to understand liberty and
away from practical questions concerned with whether and
why her particular definition or interpretation is "good",
"bad", "valuable", or "suitable". In this way, questions
about the possibility of alternatives that could challenge
her explanation of the right to liberty are suppressed by
asking a What-question that calls for a definition or
interpretation and by presenting the answers as the correct
definition. Moreover, practical questions that call for
evaluations of why the purpose of the Charter and why the
right to liberty should be defined in the way she has
defined it are not formulated by Wilson and hence the
reader is not provoked by her text to ask such questions.
(b) Is-questions and Judgments of Fact
Wilson's method of persuading the reader to agree with her
solution to the abstract constitutional problem is to state
her answer as a judgment of fact and then to prove it is
correct by presenting the reasons that support it. Her
judgment that s. 251 violates the right to liberty in s. 7
of the Charter is supported by three reasons. Her
"reasons" consist in an explanation of the purpose and
effects of s.251. The first "reason" is that the purpose
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of the legislation is to take the decision away from a
woman and to give it to a committee. The second "reason"
is that the committee bases its decision on criteria
unrelated to the pregnant woman's own priorities and
aspirations. The third "reason" is that the committee
decides for her something she has a right to decide for
herself.
Wilson uses Is-questions to shape the reader's questions
and answers. The use of Is-questions avoids practical
questions that call for an evaluation of whether the
answers reached are sufficiently suitable in the
circumstances. She uses Is-questions to direct the
reader's questions to factual matters and away from the
invention of options and the evaluation of which option
should be implemented or which interpretation should be
accepted. She treats questions such as "Can a woman be
compelled bv law to carry a foetus to term?" "Does the
right to liberty give a woman control over decisions
affecting her own body?" "Does the decision of a woman to
terminate her pregnancy fall within the class of decisions
protected by the right to liberty?" and "Does s. 251
violate s. 7 of the Charter?" are Is-guestions that demand
judgments of fact.
Wilson presents her answers to these questions as judgments
of fact that have been proven to be factually correct. She
formulates the judgment and then gives the evidence that
supports it. For example, she presents her judgment that
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the decision to have an abortion is protected by her
interpretation or definition of the right to liberty. The
evidence in support of that judgment consists in an
analysis of the special characteristics of the decision to
have an abortion and a woman's assertion of human dignity.
The first characteristic consists of sweeping and general
characteristics and implications of such a decision stated
in language borrowed from C. Gilligan.52 The second
characteristic is Wilson's claim that it is probably
impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to
such a dilemma. The third characteristic concerns the way
in which Wilson describes the special relationship between
the right to reproduce or not and dignity. The right to
reproduce or not is stated to be an integral part of a
woman's struggle to assert her human dignity and worth.
She does not explicitly analyse either the reason why the
decision to have an abortion is protected by the right to
liberty or the reasons why the decision should not be
protected.
The reader is persuaded to agree with her judgment because
the statements made in support of it are so sweeping and
general that it is difficult to refute them. However, the
question that Wilson does not raise is whether and why she
considers that her description of the special nature of the
decision and her arguments about autonomy and dignity are
See C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice.
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sufficient to support her judgment. She suppresses
questions that call for evaluations by posing the question
as an Is-question that demands a judgment of fact.
Wilson's text does not provoke the reader to ask questions
that evaluate the merits of this judgment. Indeed, the
effect of this type of presentation on the reader is to
suppress practical questions that call for judgments of
value. The judgment is presented as "true", in the
theoretical sense, and the evidence for it as beyond
reproach. Further questions are unnecessary.
Wilson's questions and answers form a complete and closed
point of view or context. Only questions directly relevant
to her solution to the constitutional problem are raised
and answered by her. The question "What is the right to
liberty?" is relevant because it helps answer the abstract
constitutional question. Questions that are not relevant
to her particular and immediate concerns are outside her
context and are not raised. Questions about religious
perspectives on abortion, whether the foetus is a person,
whether the foetus has a right to life, and the
responsibilities of doctors regarding abortions do not, in
her opinion, help to answer the question and are not posed.
Portraying her questions as the only questions that need to
be answered in order to solve the problem helps to restrict
the range of questions that are considered relevant by the
reader and also suppresses the reader's questions that may






My investigation of "discovery" in judicial decision-making
began by analysing the legal realists' accounts of
decision-making. The realists study the judicial decision¬
making process itself. They believe that understanding
this process, and the factors that influence it, would
promote wise decisions and candid reporting. Their method
of inquiry is to analyse the self-reports of judges which
described how they actually reached decisions. Although
they amount to little more than names, the realists
identify five key elements in the decision-making process:
(1) puzzling and brooding, (2) having a hunch or intuition,
(3) checking and testing the hunch, (4) reaching a
decision, judgment, or solution, and (5) expressing or
expounding the solution.
Unfortunately, modern legal theorists have neglected to
build on the realists' methodology and results. A number
of factors seem to support this state of affairs. Perhaps
the most significant factor is Wasserstrom's attempt to
create a clear distinction between the process of discovery
and the process of justification. In an effort to resolve
the debate between the realists and formalists over the
nature of decision-making, he argued there is a "rigid
dichotomy" between the process of discovery and the process
290
of justification. He claimed that the realists studied
only the process of discovery, the process whereby
tentative legal decisions are discovered. The process of
justification, by contrast, was a separate and independent
process with the function of publicly justifying these
tentative legal decisions. He considered this process to
be the proper subject-matter of legal theorists.
A number of related factors support the view of modern
legal theorists that justification, not discovery, is the
more crucial process in the legal context. Modern
theorists claim that investigating the process of discovery
is beyond the scope of their methodology and outside their
range of concerns. They accept, and argue, that the
process of justification is, and should be, the method of
constraining judicial decisions in a liberal democracy.
I ended this introductory discussion by contrasting the
positions of the legal realists and legal positivists on
the nature of "discovery" itself. Although they both name
hunches/insights as creative elements in decision-making,
their views on the nature of "discovery" differ. The
realists portray decision-making as a deliberate and
conscious problem-solving activity, whereas the positivists
represent "discovery" as an essentially arbitrary,
irrational, and unconscious activity that is primarily
influenced by the bias and prejudices of judges. I noted
Bankowski's concern with the question whether "discovery"
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includes testing. I concluded that such confusion about
the nature of "discovery" in judicial decision-making can
only be settled by investigating "discovery" in detail.
In an effort to investigate the nature of "discovery" in
greater detail, I identified a number of connections
between MacCormick's explanation of first-order and second-
order legal justification and "discovery". I argued that
aspects of the process of justification play a role in the
process of discovery. The legal syllogism can guide the
search for appropriate rules of law and relevant facts.
The requirements of coherence and consistency can act as
guidelines in the search for appropriate legal rulings.
Further, the requirement of coherence can be used to
discover clues or can function as a source of inspiration
in the search for a solution to a novel case. Hence, not
only do elements in the process of justification have
justifying roles, but they also play roles in the process
of discovery.
Next, I turned to Lonergan's study of insight in other
fields of inquiry. I described his general method of
studying human knowing and identified the pattern of
thirteen mental acts involved in human knowing. These
thirteen mental elements were distinguished in terms of two
orientations - theoretical problem-solving and practical
problem-solving. Theoretical problem-solving involves
asking What-auestions that call for definitions and
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interpretations and asking Is-questions that demand
judgments of fact. By contrast, practical problem-solving
involves asking What-is-to-be-done-auestions that call for
courses of action and Is-it-to-be-done-questions that
demand judgments of value.
I highlighted Lonergan's account of insight as the source
of new discoveries and inventions. In so doing, I
identified two types of insight: (1) insights concerned
with understanding such as direct insights which discover
ideas and practical insights which discover or invent
courses of action and (2) insights involved in testing
ideas and courses of action, such as reflective insights
which discover the sufficiency of the evidence for a
judgment of fact and practical reflective insights which
discover the issues relevant to, and the implications of,
a course of action that are sufficient for a judgment of
value.
I then used this general analysis of insight in problem-
solving to help understand "discovery" in judicial
decision-making. Judicial decision-making was represented
as comprising both theoretical and practical problem-
solving. Theoretical problem-solving is concerned with
interpreting situations and testing whether the
interpretations are correct. On the other hand, practical
problem-solving is concerned with discovering and
evaluating solutions to practical problems.
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In turn, theoretical and practical problem-solving each
consist of an understanding phase and a testing phase. I
examined the extent to which insight is an act of discovery
in the understanding and testing phases of theoretical and
practical problem-solving. These investigations led to a
number of very interesting findings. Not only can the non-
logical activities, such as insights, involved in
"discovery" or "invention" in judicial decision-making be
studied, but they are not essentially arbitrary,
irrational, nor unconscious. On the contrary, asking
guestions and having insights is a conscious and deliberate
process. However, the more surprising finding is that
"discovery", in the form of reflective insights and
practical reflective insights, is a crucial part of the
testing phase in judicial decision-making. "Discovery",
therefore, occurs in two contexts - understanding and
testing. Moreover, the analysis of questions and answers,
and the pattern of mental activities in which they occur,
can be understood as an account of a form of "discovery" in
judicial decision-making.
General strategies or methods of "discovery" in judicial
decision-making can also be identified. Despite the
difficulty of identifying every single question, insight,
and judgment that occurs, it is possible to trace the grand
lines of judicial decision-making. I represented Barden's
analysis of applying posited law and reaching equitable
judgments as such specialized methods of "discovery".
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The Moraentaler case was used to illustrate another form
that "discovery" takes in judicial decision-making.
"Discovery" takes two forms in this case. It is a method
or form of expression and a method of persuasion. Wilson
expresses her legal opinion as a theoretical problem-
solving process, ie. as a search for, and discovery of, a
solution to her legal problem. She formulates her
interpretation of the legal problem; she devises and
follows a strategy to solve the problem; and she presents
her solution to the legal problem. She also uses this form
of "discovery" to lead and guide the reader to agree with
each step in her solution to the problem. More
specifically, she controls a reader's problem-solving
process by exploiting the relationship between questions
and answers in order to provoke, shape, and suppress a
reader's questions and answers. She provides the reader
with questions to answer and leads the reader to the
"correct" answers. She exerts a further degree of
influence over the reader by suppressing questions that
call for judgments of value. Only theoretical questions -
What-questions and Is-questions - are formulated. The
reader's attention is directed to discovering the
definition or interpretation that is "factually correct",
not to discovering options or to evaluating what the
solution should be.
Finally, this study of "discovery" in judicial decision¬
making raises doubts about the extent to which "discovery"
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and justification are separate and independent processes.
Not only are elements conventionally identified as aspects
of legal justification part of the process of discovery,
but "discovery", in the form of insights, is a crucial part
of testing, and "discovery", as a form of expression or
method of persuasion, can also be part of justification.
Such findings blur the distinction between discovery and
justification. Further, the extent to which justification
is the dominant process relative to discovery needs to be
re-examined in light of my re-interpretation of
"discovery". This study indicates that "discovery" could
even be the predominant activity in legal reasoning. Such
questions, however, are beyond the scope of this project.
I have been content to restrict my efforts to the more
fundamental problem of understanding the nature of
"discovery" in judicial decision-making.
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Answer:
With respect to s. 605, the answer is No. As to s.
610(3), 1 adopt the reasons of the Court of
Appeal and say that no costs should be awarded. a
7. Question:
If sections 605 and 610(3) of the Criminal Code of
Canada infringe or deny the rights and freedoms b
guaranteed by ss. 7, 11 (<f), 11(7). 11(A) and 24(1) of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, are
ss. 605 and 610(3) justified by s. 1 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and therefore not
inconsistent with the Constitution Act, 19821 c
Answer:
No answer is required.
d
The following are the reasons delivered by
Wilson J.—At the heart of this appeal is the
question whether a pregnant woman can, as a
constitutional matter, be compelled by law to carry e
the foetus to term. The legislature has proceeded
on the basis that she can be so compelled and,
indeed, has made it a criminal offence punishable
by imprisonment under s. 251 of the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, for her or her physi- f
cian to terminate the pregnancy unless the proce¬
dural requirements of the section are complied
with.
My colleagues, the Chief Justice and Justice g
Beetz, have attacked those requirements in reasons
which 1 have had the privilege of reading. They
have found that the requirements do not comport
with the principles of fundamental justice in the
procedural sense and have concluded that, since h
they cannot be severed from the provisions creat¬
ing the substantive offence, the whole of s. 251
must fall.
With all due respect, I think that the Court '
must tackle the primary issue first. A consider¬
ation as to whether or not the procedural require¬
ments for obtaining or performing an abortion
comport with fundamental justice is purely aca- j
demic if such requirements cannot as a constitu¬
tional matter be imposed at all. If a pregnant
Reponse:
La reponse est negative quant a l'art. 605. Pour
ce qui est du par. 610(3), je suis d'avis d'adopter
les motifs de la Cour d'appel et de ne pas
accorder de depens.
7. Question:
Si 1'article 605 et le par. 610(3) du Code criminel du
Canada portent atteinte aux droits et aux liberies
garantis par l'art. 7, les al. 11 d), 11/), 11 A) et le par.
24(1) de la Charte canadienne des droits et liberies,
sont-ils justifies par l'article premier de la Charte
canadienne des droits et liberies et done compatibles
avec la Loi constitutionnelle de 19821
Reponse:
II n'est pas necessaire de repondre a cette
question.
Version frangaise des motifs rendus par
Le juge Wilson—La question au cceur de ce
pourvoi est de savoir si une femme enceinte peut,
sur le plan constitutionnel, etre forcee par la loi a
mener le foetus a terme. Le legislateur a tenu pour
acquis qu'on pouvait l'y forcer et a d'ailleurs
prevu, a l'art. 251 du Code criminel, S.R.C. 1970,
chap. C-34, que l'interruption de grossesse par une
femme ou son medecin, a moins que les exigences
procedurales de cet article ne soient respectees,
constitue une infraction criminelle punissable
d'emprisonnement.
Mes collegues, le Juge en chef et le juge Beetz,
ont attaque ces exigences dans des motifs que j'ai
eu l'avantage de lire. lis ont juge qu'elles ne
respectent pas les principes de justice fondamen-
tale sur le plan de la procedure et ont conclu que,
puisqu'elles ne peuvent etre separees des disposi¬
tions de fond qui creent l'infraction, l'ensemble de
1'art. 251 doit etre invalide.
Avec egards, je pense que la Cour doit s'atta-
quer d'abord a la question fondamentale. Se
demander si les exigences procedurales pour obte-
nir un avortement ou pour le pratiquer respectent
ou non la justice fondamentale devient une ques¬
tion purement theorique si, sur le plan constitu¬
tionnel, ces exigences ne peuvent absolument pas
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woman cannot, as a constitutional matter, be com¬
pelled by law to carry the foetus to term against
her will, a review of the procedural requirements
by which she may be compelled to do so seems
pointless. Moreover, it would, in my opinion, be an
exercise in futility for the legislature to expend its
time and energy in attempting to remedy the
defects in the procedural requirements unless it
has some assurance that this process will, at the
end of the day, result in the creation of a valid
criminal offence. 1 turn, therefore, to what 1
believe is the central issue that must be addressed.
1. The Right of Access to Abortion
Section 7 of the Charter provides:
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security
of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.
I agree with the Chief Justice that we are not
called upon in this case to delineate the full con¬
tent of the right to life, liberty and security of the
person. This would be an impossible task because
we cannot envisage all the contexts in which such a
right might be asserted. What we are asked to do.
1 believe, is define the content of the right in the
context of the legislation under attack. Does sec¬
tion 251 of the Criminal Code which limits the
pregnant woman's access to abortion violate her
right to life, liberty and security of the person
within the meaning of s. 7?
Leaving aside for the moment the implications
of the section for the foetus and addressing only
the s. 7 right of the pregnant woman, it seems to
me that we can say with a fair degree of confi¬
dence that a legislative scheme for the obtaining of
an abortion which exposes the pregnant woman to
a threat to her security of the person would violate
her right under s. 7. Indeed, we have already
stated in Singh v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, that security of
the person even on the purely physical level must
encompass freedom from the threat of physical
punishment or suffering as well as freedom from
the actual punishment or suffering itself. In other
words, the fact of exposure is enough to violate
security of the person. I agree with the Chief
Justice and Beetz J. who, for differing reasons.
etre imposees. Si une femme enceinte ne peut. sur
le plan constitutionnel, etre forcee par la loi a
mener le foetus a terme contre sa volonte, 1'examen
des exigences procedurales par lesquelles elle peut
a v etre forcee perd sa raison d'etre. En outre, il
serait, a mon avis, futile pour le iegislateur de
gaspiller temps et energie a tenter de remedier aux
defauts des exigences procedurales s'il n'a quelque
assurance que ce faisant. une infraction criminelie
b valide sera en fin de compte creee. J'en viens done
a ce que je crois etre le point central qu'il faut
examiner.
1. Le droit a l'avortement
C
L'article 7 de la Charte porte:
7. Chacun a droit a la vie, a la liberte et a la securite
de sa personne; il ne peut etre porte atteinte a ce droit
qu'en conformite avec les principes de justice fondamen-
d tale.
Je conviens avec le Juge en chef qu'il ne nous est
pas demande dans cette affaire de delimiter dans
tous ses aspects le droit a la vie, a la liberte et a la
securite de la personne. Ce serait la une tache
impossible car nous ne pouvons concevoir tous les
contextes dans lesquels ce droit pourrait etre
revendique. Ce qu'on nous demande de faire, je
crois, e'est de definir ce droit dans le contexte de la
/ loi contestee. L'article 251 du Code criminel qui
limite le recours d'une femme enceinte a 1'avorte-
ment viole-t-il son droit a la vie, a la liberte et a la
securite de sa personne au sens de l'art. 7?
g Si nous mettons de cote pour le moment les
incidences que peut avoir l'article pour le foetus et
que nous nous interessons uniquement au droit que
l'art. 7 confere a la femme enceinte, il me semble
que nous pouvons dire avec suffisamment de certi-
h tude qu'une structure legislative regissant l'avorte-
ment qui menace la securite de la personne de la
femme enceinte viole le droit que lui garantit l'art.
7. D'ailleurs, nous avons deja dit dans l'arret Singh
c. Ministre de I'Emploi et de I'Immigration,
' [1985] 1 R.C.S. 177, que la securite de la per¬
sonne. meme au niveau purement physique, doit
comprendre la liberte d'etre exempt de toute
menace de chatiment corporel ou de souffrance,
. tout autant que la liberte d'etre exempt du chati¬
ment ou de la souffrance eux-memes. En d'autres
termes, l'eventualite elle-meme suffit pour qu'il y
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find that pregnant women are exposed to a threat
to their physical and psychological security under
the legislative scheme set up in s. 251 and, since
these are aspects of their security of the person,
their s. 7 right is accordingly violated. But this, of a
course, does not answer the question whether even
the ideal legislative scheme, assuming that it is one
which poses no threat to the physical and psycho¬
logical security of the person of the pregnant
woman, would be valid under s. 7. I say this for b
two reasons: (1) because s. 7 encompasses more
than the right to security of the person; it speaks
also of the right to liberty, and (2) because secu¬
rity of the person may encompass more than phvsi- c
cal and psychological security; this we have yet to
decide.
It seems to me, therefore, that to commence the
analysis with the premise that the s. 7 right
encompasses only a right to physical and psycho¬
logical security and to fail to deal with the right to e
liberty in the context of "life, liberty and security
of the person" begs the central issue in the case. If
either the right to liberty or the right to security of
the person or a combination of both confers on the
pregnant woman the right to decide for herself /
(with the guidance of her physician) whether or
not to have an abortion, then we have to examine
the legislative scheme not only from the point of
view of fundamental justice in the procedural sense
but in the substantive sense as well. I think, there- g
fore, that we must answer the question: what is
meant by the right to liberty in the context of the
abortion issue? Does it, as Mr. Manning suggests,
give the pregnant woman control over decisions h
affecting her own body? If not, does her right to
security of the person give her such control? I turn
first to the right to liberty.
(a) The Right to Liberty '
In order to ascertain the content of the right to
liberty we must, as Dickson C.J. stated in R. v. Big
M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, com¬
mence with an analysis of the purpose of the right. J
Quoting from the Chief Justice at p. 344:
ait atteinte a la securite de la personne. Je partage
l'avis du Juge en chef et du juge Beetz qui, pour
des raisons differentes, ont conclu que les femmes
enceintes voient leur securite physique et psycholo-
gique menacee par la structure legislative elaboree
a l'art. 251 et, comme il s'agit la d'aspects de la
securite de la personne, leur droit en vertu de Fart.
7 est par consequent viole. Mais bien entendu, cela
ne repond pas a la question de savoir si meme une
structure legislative ideale, en presumant qu'elle
ne constitue pas une menace a la securite physique
et psychologique de la personne de la femme
enceinte, serait valide en vertu de Fart. 7. II y a
deux raisons a cela: (1) parce que Fart. 7 englobe
plus que le droit a la securite de la personne, il
mentionne aussi le droit a la liberte. et (2) parce
qu'il se peut que la securite de la personne englobe
plus que la securite physique et psychologique;
c'est ce que nous avons a decider.
II me semble done que prendre comme point de
depart de Fanaiyse la premisse que le droit de Fart.
7 ne comprend qu'un droit a la securite physique
et psychologique, sans traiter du droit a la liberte,
dans ce contexte de tla vie, la liberte et la securite
de sa personne», c'est presumer resolue des le
depart la question centrale en litige. Si le droit a la
liberte, le droit a la securite de la personne ou une
combinaison des deux conferent a la femme
enceinte le droit de decider elle-meme (sur les
conseils de son medecin) d'avoir ou non un avorte-
ment, il nous faut alors examiner la structure
legislative non seulement du point de vue de la
justice fondamentale quant a la procedure mais
aussi quant au fond. Je pense done que nous
devons repondre a la question: qu'entend-on par le
droit a la liberte dans le contexte de la question de
Favortement? Donne-t-il, comme Mc Manning le
pretend, a la femme enceinte le pouvoir de prendre
des decisions relativement a son corps? Sinon, son
droit a la securite de sa personne lui donne-t-il ce
pouvoir? Je traiterai d'abord du droit a la liberte.
a) Le droit a la liberte
Pour determiner ce que comprend le droit a la
liberte, nous devons, comme le juge en chef Dick¬
son le dit dans l'arret R. c. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,
[1985] 1 R.C.S. 295, proceder d'abord a Fanaiyse
de l'objet de ce droit. Pour citer le Juge en chef, a
la p. 344:
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... the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to
be sought by reference to the character and the larger
objects of the Charier itself, to the language chosen to
articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical
origins of the concepts enshrined, and where applicable,
to the meaning and purpose of the other specific rights
and freedoms with which it is associated within the text
of the Charier. The interpretation should be, as the
judgment in Southam emphasizes, a generous rather
than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of
the guarantee and securing for individuals the full ben¬
efit of the Charter's, protection.
. . . l'objet du droit ou de la iiberte en question doit etre
determine en fonction de la nature et des objectifs plus
larges de la Charte elle-meme. des termes choisis pour
enoncer ce droit ou cette liberte. des origines historiques
a des concepts enchasses et, s'il y a lieu, en fonction du
sens et de I'objet des autres libertes et droits particuliers
qui s'y rattachent selon le texte de la Charte. Comme on
le souligne dans l'arret Southam. Interpretation doit
etre liberate plutot que formaliste et viser a realiser
b l'objet de la garantie et a assurer que les citoyens
beneficient pleinement de la protection accordee par la
Charte.
We are invited, therefore, to consider the purpose On nous invite done a examiner 1'objet de la
of the Charier in general and of the right to liberty Charte en general et du droit a la liberte en
in particular. c particulier.
The Charier is predicated on a particular con- La Charte est fondee sur une conception parti-
ception of the place of the individual in society. An culiere de la place de l'individu dans la societe. Un
individual is not a totally independent entity dis- individu ne constitue pas une entite totalement
connected from the society in which he or she lives. d coupee de la societe dans laquelle il vit. Cependant
Neither, however, is the individual a mere cog in l'individu n'est pas non plus un simple rouage
an impersonal machine in which his or her values, impersonnel d'une machine subordonnant ses
goals and aspirations are subordinated to those of valeurs, ses buts et ses aspirations a celles de la
the collectivity. The individual is a bit of both. The collectivite. L'individu est un peu les deux. La
Charter reflects this reality by leaving a wide Charte exprime cette realite en laissant un vaste
range of activities and decisions open to legitimate champ d'activites et de decisions au controle legi-
government control while at the same time placing time du gouvernement, tout en fixant des bornes a
limits on the proper scope of that control. Thus, l'etendue appropriee de ce controle. Ainsi, les
the rights guaranteed in the Charter erect around / droits garantis par la Charte erigent autour de
each individual, metaphorically speaking, an invis- chaque individu, pour parler metaphoriquement,
ible fence over which the state will not be allowed une barriere invisible que l'Etat ne sera pas auto-
to trespass. The role of the courts is to map out, rise a franchir. Le role des tribunaux consiste a
piece by piece, the parameters of the fence. delimiter, petit a petit, les dimensions de cette
s barriere.
The Charter and the right to individual liberty La Charte et le droit a la liberte individuelle
guaranteed under it are inextricably tied to the qu'elle garantit sont inextricablement lies a la
concept of human dignity. Professor Neil MacCor- notion de dignite humaine. Neil MacCormick, pro-
mick, Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law A fesseur de droit public et de droit naturel et inter-
of Nature and Nations, University of Edinburgh, national a 1'Universite d'Edimbourg, dans son
in his work entitled Legal Right and Social ouvrage intitule Legal Right and Social Demo-
Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political cracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy
Philosophy (1982), speaks of liberty as "a condi- (1982), parle de la liberte comme [traduction]
tion of human self-respect and of that contentment ' "une condition du respect de soi et de la satisfac-
which resides in the ability to pursue one's own tion que procure la capacite de realiser sa propre
conception of a full and rewarding life" (p. 39). conception d'une vie bien remplie, qui vaille la
He says at p. 41: peine d'etre vecue" (a la p. 39). II dit a la p. 41:
To be able to decide what to do and how to do it. to j [traduction] Pouvoir decider ce qu'on veut faire et
carry out one's own decisions and accept their conse- comment le faire, pour concretiser ses propres decisions,
quences, seems to me essential to one's self-respect as a en en acceptant les consequences, me semble essentiel au
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human being, and essential to the possibility of that
contentment. Such self-respect and contentment are in
my judgment fundamental goods for human beings, the
worth of life itself being on condition of having or
striving for them. If a person were deliberately denied
the opportunity of self-respect and that contentment, he
would suffer deprivation of his essential humanity.
Dickson C.J. in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.
makes the same point at p. 346:
It should also be noted, however, that an emphasis on
individual conscience and individual judgment also lies
at the heart of our democratic political tradition. The
ability of each citizen to make free and informed deci¬
sions is the absolute prerequisite for the legitimacy,
acceptability, and efficacy of our system of self-govern¬
ment. It is because of the centrality of the rights
associated with freedom of individual conscience both to
basic beliefs about human worth and dignity and to a
free and democratic political system that American
jurisprudence has emphasized the primacy or "firstness"
of the First Amendment. It is this same centrality that
in my view underlies their designation in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms as "fundamental".
They are the sine qua non of the political tradition
underlying the Charter.
It was further amplified in Dickson C.J.'s discus¬
sion of Charter interpretation in R. v. Oakes,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at p. 136:
A second contextual element of interpretation of s. 1
is provided by the words "free and democratic society".
Inclusion of these words as the final standard of justifi¬
cation for limits on rights and freedoms refers the Court
to the very purpose for which the Charter was originally
entrenched in the Constitution: Canadian society is to be
free and democratic. The Court must be guided by the
values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society which I believe embody, to name but a few.
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person,
commitment to social justice and equality, accommoda¬
tion of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and
group identity, and faith in social and political institu¬
tions which enhance the participation of individuals and
groups in society. The underlying values and principles
of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the
respect de soi en tant qu'etre humain et essentiel pour
parvenir a cette satisfaction. Ce respect de soi et cette
satisfaction sont. a mon avis, des biens fondamentaux
pour 1'etre humain, la vie elle-meme ne valant la peine
a d'etre vecue qu'a la condition de les eprouver ou de les
rechercher. L'individu auquel on refuserait deliberement
la possibility de parvenir au respect de lui-meme et a
cette satisfaction se verrait prive de 1'essence de son
humanite.
b Le juge en chef Dickson, dans l'arret R. c. Big
M Drug Mart Ltd., soutient le meme point de vue.
a la p. 346:
Toutefois, il faut aussi remarquer que l'insistance sur
la conscience et le jugement individuels est egalement au
coeur de notre tradition politique democratique. La pos¬
sibilite qu'a chaque citoyen de prendre des decisions
libres et eclairees constitue la condition sine qua non de
la legitimite, de 1'acceptabilite et de 1'efficacite de notre
svsteme d'auto-determination. C'est precisement parce
que les droits qui se rattachent a la liberte de conscience
individuelle se situent au cceur non seulement des con¬
victions fondamentales quant a la valeur et a la dignite
de l'etre humain. mais aussi de tout systeme politique
libre et democratique, que la jurisprudence americaine a
e insiste sur la primaute ou la preeminence du Premier
amendement. A mon avis, c'est pour cette meme raison
que la Charte canadienne des droits et liberies parle de
libertes «fondamentales». Celles-ci constituent le fonde-
ment meme de la tradition politique dans laquelle s'in-
/ sere la Charte.
Le juge en chef Dickson a approfondi ce point de
vue dans son analyse de l'interpretation de la
Charte dans l'arret R. c. Oakes, [1986] 1 R.C.S.
g 103, a la p. 136:
Un second element contextuel d'interpretation de Par¬
ticle premier est fourni par l'expression «societe libre et
democratique». L'inclusion de ces mots a titre de norme
finale de justification de la restriction des droits et
A libertes rappelle aux tribunaux l'objet meme de 1'enchas-
sement de la Charte dans la Constitution: la societe
canadienne doit etre libre et democratique. Les tribu¬
naux doivent etre guides par des valeurs et des principes
essentiels a une societe libre et democratique, lesquels
i comprennent, selon moi, le respect de la dignite inhe-
rente de l'etre humain, la promotion de la justice et de
l'egalite sociales, l'acceptation d'une grande diversite de
croyances, le respect de chaque culture et de chaque
groupe et la foi dans les institutions sociales et politiques
j qui favorisent la participation des particuliers et des
groupes dans la societe. Les valeurs et les principes
sous-jacents d'une societe libre et democratique sont a
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ultimate standard against which a limit on a right or
freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reason¬
able and demonstrably justified.
The idea of human dignity finds expression in
almost every right and freedom guaranteed in the
Charier. Individuals are afforded the right to
choose their own religion and their own philosophy
of life, the right to choose with whom they will
associate and how they will express themselves, the
right to choose where they will live and what
occupation they will pursue. These are all exam¬
ples of the basic theory underlying the Charier.
namely that the state will respect choices made by
individuals and, to the greatest extent possible, will
avoid subordinating these choices to any one con¬
ception of the good life.
Thus, an aspect of the respect for human dignity
on which the Charier is founded is the right to
make fundamental personal decisions without
interference from the state. This right is a critical
component of the right to liberty. Liberty, as was
noted in Singh, is a phrase capable of a broad
range of meaning. In my view, this right, properly
construed, grants the individual a degree of
autonomy in making decisions of fundamental per¬
sonal importance.
l'origine des droits et libertes garantis par la Charte et
constituent la norme fondamentale en fonction de
laquelie on doit etablir qu'une restriction d'un droit ou
d'une liberie constitue, malgre son effet, une limite
a raisonnable dont la justification peut se demontrer.
La notion de dignite humaine trouve son expres¬
sion dans presque tous les droits et libertes garan¬
tis par la Charte. Les individus se voient offrir le
b droit de cnoisir leur propre religion et leur propre
philosophic de vie. de choisir qui ils frequenteront
et comment ils s'exprimeront, ou ils vivront et a
quelle occupation ils se livreront. Ce sont tous la
des exemples de la theorie fondamentale qui sous-
c tend la Charte, savoir que l'Etat respectera les
choix de chacun et, dans toute la mesure du possi¬
ble, evitera de subordonner ces choix a toute con¬
ception particuliere d'une vie de bien.
This view is consistent with the position I took in
the case of R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284. One
issue raised in that case was whether the right to
liberty in s. 7 of the Charter included a parent's
right to bring up his children in accordance with
his conscientious beliefs. In concluding that it did I
stated at pp. 318-19:
1 believe that the framers of the Constitution in
guaranteeing "liberty" as a fundamental value in a free
and democratic society had in mind the freedom of the
individual to develop and realize his potential to the full,
to plan his own life to suit his own character, to make
his own choices for good or ill. to be non-conformist,
idiosyncratic and even eccentric — to be, in to-day's
parlance, "his own person" and accountable as such.
John Stuart Mill described it as "pursuing our own good
in our own way". This, he believed, we should be free to
Ainsi, un aspect du respect de la dignite
humaine sur lequel la Charte est fondee est le droit
de prendre des decisions personnelles fondamenta-
les sans intervention de l'Etat. Ce droit constitue
une composante cruciale du droit a la liberte. La
liberte, comme nous l'avons dit dans l'arret Singh,
est un terme susceptible d'une acception fort large.
A mon avis, ce droit, bien interprete, confere a
/ l'individu une marge d'autonomie dans la prise de
decisions d'importance fondamentale pour sa
personne.
Ce point de vue est conforme a la position que
g j'ai prise dans l'arret R. c. Jones, [1986] 2 R.C.S.
284. Dans cette affaire, il s'agissait de determiner
notamment si le droit a la liberte enonce a l'art. 7
de la Charte incluait le droit pour un pere d'elever
A ses enfants conformement a ses croyances intimes.
En concluant que c'etait le cas, j'ai dit, aux
pp. 318 et 319:
Je crois que les redacteurs de la Constitution en
garantissant la «liberte» en tant que valeur fondamentale
i d'une societe libre et democratique, avaient a l'esprit la
liberte pour 1'individu de se developper et de realiser son
potentiel au maximum, d'etablir son propre plan de vie,
en accord avec sa personnalite; de faire ses propres
choix, pour le meilleur ou pour le pire, d'etre non
j conformiste, original et meme excentrique, d'etre, en
langage courant, ilui-meme» et d'etre responsable en
tant que tel. John Stuart Mill decrit cela ainsi: [tra-
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do "so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of
theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it". He added:
Each is the proper guardian of his own health, wheth¬
er bodily or mental and spiritual. Mankind are great¬
er gainers by suffering each other to live as seems
good to themselves than by compelling each to live as
seems good to the rest.
Liberty in a free and democratic society does not
require the state to approve the personal decisions
made by its citizens: it does, however, require the
state to respect them.
This conception of the proper ambit of the right
to liberty under our Charter is consistent with the
American jurisprudence on the subject. While care
must undoubtedly be taken to avoid a mechanical
application of concepts developed in different cul¬
tural and constitutional contexts, I would respect¬
fully agree with the observation of my colleague.
Estey J., in Law Society of Upper Canada v.
Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, at pp. 366-67:
With the Constitution Act, 1982 comes a new dimen¬
sion, a new yardstick of reconciliation between the
individual and the community and their respective
rights, a dimension which, like the balance of the Con¬
stitution, remains to be interpreted and applied by the
Court.
The courts in the United States have had almost two
hundred years experience at this task and it is of more
than passing interest to those concerned with these new
developments in Canada to study the experience of the
United States courts.
As early as the 1920's the American Supreme
Court employed the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend¬
ments to the American Constitution to give par¬
ents a degree of choice in the education of their
children. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), the Court struck down a law prohibiting
the teaching of any subject in a language other
than English. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), an Oregon statute requiring all
"normal children" to attend public school and thus
prohibiting private school attendance was held to
be unconstitutional. The Court in Pierce at pp.
534-35 characterized the interest being infringed
duction] «rechercher notre propre bien, a notre fagon».
Nous devrions. pensait-il. etre libre de le faire «dans la
mesure ou nous ne tentons pas de priver les autres du
leur, ni d'entraver leurs efforts pour y parvenir». 11
a ajoutait:
[traduction] Chacun est le veritable gardien de sa
propre sante. tant physique que mentale et spirituelle.
L'humanite a plus a gagner a laisser chacun vivre
comme cela lui semble bon. qu'a forcer chacun a vivre
b comme cela semble bon aux autres.
La liberte dans une societe libre et democratique
n'oblige pas l'Etat a approuver les decisions per-
sonnelles de ses citoyens: elle l'oblige cependant a
c les respecter.
Cette conception de la portee qu'il convient de
donner au droit a la liberte sous le regime de notre
Charte est conforme a la jurisprudence americaine
d sur le sujet. Quoiqu'il faille sans doute prendre
garde d'appliquer mecaniquement des concepts
elabores dans des contextes culturels et constitu-
tionnels differents, je souscris a ['observation que
fait le juge Estey dans l'arret Law Society of
e Upper Canada c. Skapinker, [1984] 1 R.C.S. 357,
aux pp. 366 et 367:
La Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 apporte une nouvelle
dimension, un nouveau critere d'equilibre entre les indi-
vidus et la societe et leurs droits respectifs, une dimen-
f sion qui. comme l'equilibre de la Constitution, devra etre
interpretee et appliquee par la Cour.
Les tribunaux americains ont presque deux cents ans
d'experience dans l'accomplissement de cette tache, et
g l'analyse de leur experience offre plus qu'un interet
passager pour ceux qui s'interessent a cette nouvelle
evolution au Canada.
Des les annees 20, la Cour supreme des Etats-
h Unis a eu recours au Cinquieme et au Quator-
zieme amendements de la Constitution americaine
pour accorder aux parents une certaine latitude
dans I'education de leurs enfants. Dans l'arret
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), la Cour
'
a annule une ioi interdisant l'enseignement, quelle
que soit la matiere, dans une langue autre que
l'anglais. Dans i'arret Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), une loi de l'Oregon obligeant
j tous les «enfants normaux* a frequenter l'ecole
publique, et leur interdisant par le fait meme la
frequentation d'une ecole privee, a ete jugee
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as "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under
their control".
The sanctity of the family was underlined by the
decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535
(1942). where the Supreme Court invalidated a
state law authorizing the sterilization of individu¬
als convicted of two or more crimes involving
moral turpitude. While the law was struck down
on the basis that it violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
had this to say of the interest at stake: "We are
dealing here with legislation which involves one of
the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and pro¬
creation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race" (at p. 541).
Later the Supreme Court was asked to deter¬
mine the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute
forbidding the use of contraceptives by married
couples. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), the majority held this statute to be invalid.
The judges writing for the majority used various
constitutional routes to arrive at this conclusion
but the common denominator seems to have been a
profound concern over the invasion of the marital
home required for the enforcement of the law.
Griswold was interpreted by the Supreme Court in
the later case of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), where the majority stated at p. 453:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in
question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the
marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individu¬
als each with a separate intellectual and emotional make
up. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision wheth¬
er to bear or beget a child.
In Eisenstadt the Court struck down a Massachu¬
setts law that prohibited the distribution of any
inconstitutionnelle. Dans l'arret Pierce, aux pp.
534 et 535, la Cour a qualifie l'interet auquel on
portait atteinte comme etant [traduction] «la
liberte des parents et tuteurs de diriger l'education
a des enfants dont ils ont la garde et l'enseignement
qui leur est donne».
Le caractere sacre de la famiile a ete souligne
par 1'arret Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535
b (1942). ou la Cour supreme a invalide la loi d'un
Etat qui autorisait la sterilisation des individus
reconnus coupables de deux ou plusieurs crimes
impliquant la turpitude morale. Quoique la loi ait
ete annulee parce qu'elie violait la clause de l'egale
c protection de la loi etablie par le Quatorzieme
amendement, voici ce que la Cour a dit de l'interet
en cause: [traduction] "Nous avons affaire ici a
une loi qui touche aux droits civils fondamentaux
d de l'homme. Le mariage et la procreation sont
fondamentaux pour l'existence et la survie memes
de la race" (a la p. 541).
Ulterieurement, la Cour supreme a ete appelee a
statuer sur la constitutionnalite d'une loi du Con-
e necticut interdisant aux gens maries d'utiliser des
contraceptifs. Dans l'arret Griswold v. Connecti¬
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), la majorite a juge cette
loi invalide. Les juges qui ont ecrit au nom de la
y majorite ont emprunte diverses voies constitution-
nelles pour arriver a cette conclusion, mais le
denominateur commun semble avoir ete une pro-
fonde apprehension que l'application de la loi exige
une incursion dans le foyer conjugal. La Cour
g supreme a interprets l'arret Griswold dans une
affaire ulterieure, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972), ou elle a dit, a la majorite, a la p. 453:
[traduction] II est vrai que dans 1'arret Griswold le
droit a la vie privee en cause a ete considere comme
* inherent a la relation conjugale. Neanmoins le couple
marie n'est pas une entite independante dotee d'un esprit
et d'un cceur distincts, mais une association de deux
individus, chacun pourvu de caracteristiques intellectuel-
les et emotionnelles distinctes. Si le droit a la vie privee
' signifie quelque chose, c'est bien le droit de I'individu,
marie ou celibataire, d'etre libre de toute intrusion
gouvernementale injustifiee dans des domaines touchant
si fondamentalement a la personne, comme la decision
de porter ou de mettre au monde un enfant.
1
Dans l'arret Eisenstadt, la Cour a annule une loi
du Massachusetts qui interdisait la distribution de
304
[1988] 1 R.C.S. r. c. morgentaler Le juge Wilson 169
drug for the purposes of contraception to unmar¬
ried persons on the ground that it violated the
equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause was also used by the
Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967). to strike down legislation that purported to
forbid inter-racial marriage. The Court tied its
decision to the previous line of cases that protected
basic choices relating to family life. It stated at p.
12: "The freedom to marry has long been recog¬
nized as one of the 'vital personal rights essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,'
fundamental to our very existence and survival
.... [The] freedom to marry . . . resides with the
individual...." Thus, by a process of accretion
the scope of the right of individuals to make
fundamental decisions affecting their private lives
was elaborated in the United States on a case by
case basis. The parameters of the fence were being
progressively defined.
For our purposes the most interesting develop¬
ment in this area of American law are the deci¬
sions of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), and its sister case Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973). In Roe v. Wade the Court
held that a pregnant woman has the right to decide
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. This
conclusion, the majority stated, was mandated by
the body of existing law ensuring that the state
would not be allowed to interfere with certain
fundamental personal decisions such as education,
child-rearing, procreation, marriage and con¬
traception. The Court concluded that the right to
privacy found in the Fourteenth Amendment guar¬
antee of liberty ".. . is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy" (p. 153).
toute drogue a des fins de contraception aux gens
non maries pour le motif qu'elle violait la clause de
l'egale protection de la loi.
a La Cour supreme a aussi eu recours a la clause
de I'egale protection de la loi dans I'arret Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). pour invalider une loi
qui avait pour objet d'interdire les mariages
raciaux mixtes. La Cour a lie sa decision a la
b jurisprudence anterieure qui protegeait les choix
fondamentaux en matiere de vie familiale. Elle dit,
a la p. 12: [traduction] «La liberte de se marier
est reconnue depuis longtemps comme I'un des
droits vitaux personnels essentiels a la recherche
c methodique du bonheur par les hommes libres. Le
mariage est l'un des «droits civils fondamentaux de
l'homme». le fondement de notre existence et de
notre survie memes . . . [La] liberte de se marier
d ■ ■ ■ reside chez l'individu*. Ainsi, en quelque sorte
par accretion, l'etendue du droit des individus de
prendre des decisions fondamentales concernant
leur vie privee a ete elaboree cas par cas aux
Etats-Unis. Les dimensions de la barriere ont ainsi
e ete progressivement definies.
Pour nos fins, les decisions concomitantes de la
Cour supreme Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
et Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), constituent
j le developpement le plus interessant dans ce
domaine du droit americain. Dans l'arret Roe v.
Wade, la Cour a juge qu'une femme enceinte a le
droit de decider d'interrompre ou non sa grossesse.
Cette conclusion, a dit la majorite, etait imposee
g par le corps de droit existant qui interdit a l'Etat
d'intervenir dans certaines decisions personnelles
fondamentales telles l'enseignement donne aux
enfants et leur education, la procreation, le
mariage et la contraception. La Cour a conclu que
h
le droit a la vie privee que l'on trouve dans la
garantie de la liberte du Quatorzieme amendement
[traduction] «. .. est suffisamment large pour
inclure la decision d'une femme d'interrompre ou
l non sa grossesse» (a la p. 153).
This right was not, however, to be taken as
absolute. At some point the legitimate state inter¬
ests in the protection of health, proper medical
standards, and pre-natal life would justify its
qualification. Lawrence H. Tribe, Professor of
Law at Harvard University, in his work entitled
Ce droit ne doit pas, toutefois, etre considere
comme absolu. Parvenu a un certain point, les
interets legitimes de l'Etat vis-a-vis de la protec¬
tion de la sante, des normes medicales appropriees
et de la vie foetale justifient de le restreindre. Dans
son ouvrage intitule American Constitutional Law,
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American Constitutional Law (1978), convenient¬
ly summarizes the limits the Court found to be
inherent in the woman's right. 1 quote from
pp. 924-25:
Specifically, the Court held that, because the woman's
right to decide whether or not to end a pregnancy is
fundamental, only a compelling interest can justify state
regulation impinging in any way upon that right. During
the first trimester of pregnancy, when abortion is less
hazardous in terms of the woman's life than carrying the
child to term would be. the state may require only that
the abortion be performed by a licensed physician: no
further regulations peculiar to abortion as such are
compellingly justified in that period.
After the first trimester, the compelling state interest
in the mother's health permits it to adopt reasonable
regulations in order to promote safe abortions — but
requiring abortions to be performed in hospitals, or only-
after approval of another doctor or committee in addi¬
tion to the woman's physician, is impermissible, as is
requiring that the abortion procedure employ a tech¬
nique that, however preferable from a medical perspec¬
tive. is not widely available.
Once the fetus is viable, in the sense that it is capable
of survival outside the uterus with artificial aid, the state
interest in preserving the fetus becomes compelling, and
the state may thus proscribe its premature removal (i.e..
its abortion) except to preserve the mother's life or
health.
The decision in Roe v. Wade was re-affirmed by
the Supreme Court in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983), and again, though by a bare majority,
in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri¬
cians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
In Thornburgh, Blackmun J., speaking for the
majority, identifies the core value which the
American courts have found to inhere in the con¬
cept of liberty. He states at pp. 2184-85:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution
embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of
individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach
of government .... [citations omitted] That promise
extends to women as well as to men. Few decisions are
more personal and intimate, more properly private, or
more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a
1978, Lawrence H. Tribe, professeur de droit a
1'Universite Harvard, donne un resume commode
des limites que la Cour a juge inherentes au droit
de la femme. Je cite les pp. 924 et 925:
a [traduction] Plus precisement, la Cour a juge que.
puisque le droit de la femme de decider d'interrompre ou
non une grossesse est fondamental, seul un interet supe-
rieur peut justifier une reglementation de l'Etat qui
entraverait ce droit de quelque facon. Au cours du
b premier trimestre de la grossesse. alors que l'avortement
est moins dangereux pour la vie de la femme que mener
la grossesse a terme le serait. tout ce que TEtat peut
exiger. c'est que l'avortement soil pratique par un mede-
cin qualifie: aucune autre reglementation de l'avorte-
c ment comme tel n'est imperieusement justifiee au cours
de cette periode.
Apres le premier trimestre, 1'interet superieur de
l'Etat dans la sante de la mere 1'autorise a adopter une
reglementation raisonnable afin de favoriser des avorte-
d ments sans danger; mais exiger que les avortements ne
soient pratiques que dans des hopitaux, ou uniquement
apres qu'un autre medecin ou comite aura donne son
aval, outre le medecin de la femme, ne saurait etre
autorise, car ce serait exiger que la procedure d'avorte-
e ment suive une technique qui, si preferable soit-eile dans
une optique medicale, n'est pas largement repandue.
Lorsque le foetus devient viable, en ce sens qu'il peut
survivre a 1'exterieur de 1'uterus pourvu qu'on l'aide
artificiellement, l'interet de l'Etat dans la preservation
f du foetus devient superieur et 1'Etat peut alors interdire
qu'on 1'enleve prematurement (c.-a-d. le faire avorter)
sauf pour preserver la vie ou la sante de la mere.
L'arret Roe v. Wade a ete reaffirme par la Cour
g supreme dans l'arret City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983), et aussi, quoique par une tres mince
majorite, dans l'arret Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S.
h Ct. 2169 (1986). Dans l'arret Thornburgh, le juge
Blackmun, s'exprimant au nom de la majorite,
cerne la valeur centrale que les tribunaux ameri-
cains ont juge inherente a la notion de liberie. II
. dit, aux pp. 2184 et 2185:
[traduction] Notre jurisprudence reconnait depuis
longtemps que la Constitution comporte la promesse
qu'une certaine sphere privee de la liberte individuelie
demeurera largement hors de portee du gouvernement
j ... [references omises]. Cette promesse vaut pour les
femmes autant que pour les hommes. Peu de decisions
sont aussi personnelles et intimes, aussi litteralement
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woman's decision — with the guidance of her physician
and within the limits specified in Roe — whether to end
her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice
freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our view,
would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere
of liberty that our law guarantees equally to all.
In my opinion, the respect for individual deci¬
sion-making in matters of fundamental personal
importance reflected in the American jurispru¬
dence also informs the Canadian Charter. Indeed,
as the Chief Justice pointed out in R. v. Big M
Drug Mart Ltd., beliefs about human worth and
dignity "are the sine qua non of the political
tradition underlying the Charter". I would con¬
clude, therefore, that the right to liberty contained
in s. 7 guarantees to every individual a degree of
personal autonomy over important decisions inti¬
mately affecting their private lives.
The question then becomes whether the decision
of a woman to terminate her pregnancy falls
within this class of protected decisions. I have no
doubt that it does. This decision is one that will
have profound psychological, economic and social
consequences for the pregnant woman. The cir¬
cumstances giving rise to it can be complex and
varied and there may be, and usually are, powerful
considerations militating in opposite directions. It
is a decision that deeply reflects the way the
woman thinks about herself and her relationship to
others and to society at large. It is not just a
medical decision; it is a profound social and ethical
one as well. Her response to it will be the response
of the whole person.
It is probably impossible for a man to respond,
even imaginatively, to such a dilemma not just
because it is outside the realm of his personal
experience (although this is, of course, the case)
but because he can relate to it only by objectifying
it. thereby eliminating the subjective elements of
the female psyche which are at the heart of the
dilemma. As Noreen Burrows, lecturer in Euro¬
pean Law at the University of Glasgow, has point-
privees ou aussi fondamentales pour la dignite et l'auto-
nomie individuelles que la decision prise par une femme
— sur les conseils de son medecin et dans les limites
indiquees dans l'arret Roe — d'interrompre ou non une
a grossesse. Le droit de la femme de faire ce choix libre-
ment est fondamental. Toute autre conclusion, a notre
avis, protegerait inadequatement un aspect central de
cette sphere de liberte que notre droit garantit egaie-
ment a tous.
A mon avis, le respect du pouvoir decisionne! de
1'individu dans des domaines d'importance person-
nelie aussi fondamentaux que traduit la jurispru¬
dence americaine nous renseigne aussi sur la
c Charte canadienne. D'ailleurs, comme le Juge en
chef le rappelle dans l'arret R. c. Big M Drug
Mart Ltd., la foi en la valeur et en la dignite
humaines «constitue [ .. . ] le fondement meme de
la tradition politique dans laquelle s'insere la
d Charte». Je conclus done que le droit a la liberte
enonce a Tart. 7 garantit a chaque individu une
marge d'autonomie personnelle sur ses decisions
importantes touchant intimement a sa vie privee.
e La question devient alors de savoir si la decision
que prend une femme d'interrompre sa grossesse
releve de cette categorie de decisions protegees. Je
n'ai pas de doute que ce soit le cas. Cette decision
j. aura des consequences psychologiques, economi-
ques et sociales profondes pour la femme enceinte.
Les circonstances qui y menent peuvent etre com-
pliquees et multiples et il peut y avoir, comme e'est
generalement le cas, des considerations puissantes
g en faveur de decisions opposees. C'est une decision
qui reflete profondement l'opinion qu'une femme a
d'elle-meme, ses rapports avec les autres et avec la
societe en general. Ce n'est pas seulement une
decision d'ordre medical; elle est aussi profonde-
h ment d'ordre social et ethique. La reponse qu'elle y
donne sera la reponse de tout son etre.
II est probablement impossible pour un homme
d'imaginer une reponse a un tel dilemme, non
' seulement parce qu'il se situe en dehors du
domaine de son experience personnelle (ce qui,
bien entendu, est le cas), mais aussi parce qu'il ne
peut y reagir qu'en l'objectivant et en eliminant
j par le fait meme les elements subjectifs de la
psyche feminine qui sont au coeur du dilemme.
Comme Noreen Burrows, maitre de conference en
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ed out in her essay on "International Law and
Human Rights: the Case of Women's Rights", in
Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality (1986).
the history of the struggle for human rights from
the eighteenth century on has been the history of
men struggling to assert their dignity and common
humanity against an overbearing state apparatus.
The more recent struggle for women's rights has
been a struggle to eliminate discrimination, to
achieve a place for women in a man's world, to
develop a set of legislative reforms in order to
place women in the same position as men (pp.
81-82). It has not been a struggle to define the
rights of women in relation to their special place in
the societal structure and in relation to the biologi¬
cal distinction between the two sexes. Thus,
women's needs and aspirations are only now being
translated into protected rights. The right to
reproduce or not to reproduce which is in issue in
this case is one such right and is properly perceived
as an integral part of modern woman's struggle to
assert her dignity and worth as a human being.
Given then that the right to liberty guaranteed
by s. 7 of the Charter gives a woman the right to
decide for herself whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy, does s. 251 of the Criminal Code vio¬
late this right? Clearly it does. The purpose of the
section is to take the decision away from the
woman and give it to a committee. Furthermore,
as the Chief Justice correctly points out, at p. 56.
the committee bases its decision on "criteria
entirely unrelated to [the pregnant woman's] own
1 priorities and aspirations". The fact that the deci¬
sion whether a woman will be allowed to terminate
her pregnancy is in the hands of a committee is
just as great a violation of the woman's right to
personal autonomy in decisions of an intimate and
private nature as it would be if a committee were
established to decide whether a woman should be
allowed to continue her pregnancy. Both these
arrangements violate the woman's right to liberty
by deciding for her something that she has the
right to decide for herself.
droit europeen a l'Universite de Glasgow, le fait
observer dans son essai "International Law and
Human Rights: the Case of Women's Rights",
dans Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality
" (1986), l'histoire du combat pour les droits de la
personne, du dix-huitieme siecle a aujourd'hui, est
l'histoire des hommes qui ont lutte pour affirmer
leur dignite et leur commune humanite contre un
appareil d'Etat autoritaire. Plus recemment, la
b lutte pour la reconnaissance des droits des femmes
a ete un combat contre la discrimination, pour que
les femmes trouvent une place dans un monde
d'hommes, pour elaborer un ensemble de reformes
c legislatives afin de placer les femmes sur le meme
pied que les hommes (aux pp. 81 et 82). II ne s'agit
pas d'une lutte pour definir les droits des femmes
par rapport a leur position particuliere dans la
structure sociale et par rapport a la difference
d biologique entre les deux sexes. Ainsi les besoins et
les aspirations des femmes se traduisent seulement
aujourd'hui en des droits garantis. Le droit de se
reproduire ou de ne pas se reproduire, qui est en
cause en l'espece, est l'un de ces droits et c'est a
e raison qu'on le considere comme faisant partie
integrante de la lutte contemporaine de la femme
pour affirmer sa dignite et sa valeur en tant
qu'etre humain.
f Etant donne alors que le droit a la liberte garan-
ti par 1'art. 7 de la Charte confere a une femme le
droit de decider elle-meme d'interrompre ou non
sa grossesse, 1'art. 251 du Code criminel viole-t-il
ce droit? Manifestement il le viole. L'article a pour
8 objet d'enlever cette decision a la femme pour
confier a un comite le soin de la prendre. En outre,
comme le Juge en chef l'observe a juste titre, a la
p. 56, le comite fonde sa decision sur "des criteres
h totalement sans rapport avec ses [celles de la
femme enceinte] propres priorites et aspirations".
Le fait que la decision d'autoriser ou non une
femme a interrompre sa grossesse soit dans les
mains d'un comite est une violation tout aussi
i grave du droit de la femme a l'autonomie person¬
nels en matiere de decision de nature intime et
privee que serait celle d'etablir un comite pour
decider s'il faut autoriser une femme a mener sa
grossesse a terme. Dans les deux cas, il y a viola-
1 tion du droit de la femme a la liberte, car on
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